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Abstract	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  In	  political	  philosophy,	  perfectionism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  it	  is	  the	  job	  of	  the	  state	  to	  best	  enable	  its	  citizens	  to	  live	  good	  or	  flourishing	  lives.	  It	  claims	  that	  certain	  lives	  can	   be	   judged	   to	   be	   sound,	   and	   thus	   instructs	   governments	   to	   promote	   those	  lives	  using	  state	  institutions	  etc.	  Anti-­‐perfectionism	  denies	  this.	  It	  says	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  job	  of	  the	  state	  to	  promote	  good	  lives.	  Instead	  it	  should	  restrict	  itself	  to	  securing	  basic	  rights	  and	  duties,	  a	  threshold	  level	  of	  resources	  and	  so	  on.	  Citizens	  should	   be	   left	   to	   adopt	   pursuits	   however	   they	   see	   fit.	   For	   some	   anti-­‐perfectionists,	   this	   is	  precisely	  because	  we	  cannot	   judge	  any	  putative	   life	   to	  be	  sound.	   However,	   many	   are	   not	   sceptics,	   and	   justify	   state	   neutrality	   for	   other	  reasons.	  	  All	   accounts	   of	   anti-­‐perfectionism	   must	   overcome	   what	   has	   been	   called	   the	  asymmetry	   objection:	   what	   justifies	   the	   imbalance	   inherent	   in	   anti-­‐perfectionism?	   Why	   believe	   that	   the	   state	   is	   permitted	   to	   act	   on	   judgements	  about	   justice,	   but	   not	   on	   judgements	   about	   flourishing?	  My	   thesis	   argues	   that	  attempts	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  asymmetry	  objection	  have	  failed	  thus	  far.	  Further,	   I	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  political	  morality	  that	  can	  overcome	  the	  problem.	  	  	  The	  first	  four	  chapters	  of	  the	  thesis	  clarify	  the	  debate	  between	  perfectionists	  and	  anti-­‐perfectionists,	   narrowing	   the	   former	   down	   into	   its	   most	   plausible	   form.	  Chapters	  five	  and	  six	  focus	  on	  two	  failed	  attempts	  to	  vindicate	  anti-­‐perfectionism	  –	   Brian	   Barry’s	   argument	   from	   scepticism	   and	   Jonathan	   Quong’s	   Rawlsian	  approach.	  In	  the	  final	  chapter	  I	  put	  forward	  a	  much	  more	  promising	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  anti-­‐perfectionism	  –	  justice	  as	  a	  set	  of constraints.	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Introduction 
In political philosophy, perfectionism is the view that it is the job of the state to 
best enable its citizens to live good or flourishing lives. It claims that certain lives 
can be judged to be sound, and thus instructs governments to promote those 
lives using state institutions etc. Anti-perfectionism denies this. It says that it is 
not the job of the state to promote good lives. For some anti-perfectionists, this is 
precisely because we cannot judge any putative life to be sound. However, many 
are not sceptics, and justify state neutrality for other reasons. 
Although perfectionism can be traced back to Aristotle, the contemporary debate 
between perfectionists and anti‐perfectionists first came to the fore over four 
decades ago, when John Rawls published the seminal A Theory of Justice. Rawls 
argued that a commitment to liberalism required that governments should be 
neutral between judgements about good human lives. For the subsequent ten or 
so years, it was largely assumed that liberalism was necessarily anti- 
perfectionist. However, in 1986, Joseph Raz published The Morality of Freedom, 
his thesis on liberal perfectionism. Raz argued that autonomy was a necessary 
part of a flourishing life, and that an autonomy‐supporting political structure will 
give us distinctly liberal outcomes. Around this time, Rawls began to rethink his 
original argument for anti‐perfectionism, culminating in 1993’s Political 
Liberalism. Contrary to his earlier work, Rawls claimed that any liberal political 
system should itself be free of any comprehensive commitments. Thus, he argued 
that not only should our account of justice be neutral between judgements about 
flourishing, it should also be free‐standing in the sense that it presupposes no 
view about valuable lives. 
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Since then, notable exceptions aside,1 there has not been a great deal of debate 
about perfectionism and neutrality, resulting in a subsequent lack of  clarity 
about what the two positions are committed to. However, a few years ago, the 
debate was re-energised after Jonathan Quong published Liberalism Without 
Perfection, a passionate defence of the Rawlsian political liberal project. 
In this thesis, I will offer my own argument for anti‐perfectionism. However, 
unlike Quong, I will not offer a Rawlsian defence of neutrality. Instead, I will 
argue that we should understand justice as a set of constraints. Constructing our 
account of justice this way will inevitably rule out any appeal to perfectionist 
judgements. 
In chapter one I will present precisely what I understand perfectionism to be 
committed to. In particular, I will argue that it does not entail paternalism or 
inegalitarianism, a criticism that has traditionally been aimed at perfectionism. I 
will also draw some distinctions found within perfectionism, such as between 
those who understand perfectionism to apply cross‐culturally and those who 
think that it is particular to certain cultures or time periods. 
In chapter two, I nail down the anti‐perfectionist position. Again, I seek to clarify 
what it is and is not committed to. I also introduce what is called the asymmetry 
objection: what justifies the imbalance inherent in anti‐perfectionism? Why 
believe that the state is permitted to act on judgements about justice, but not on 
judgements  about  flourishing?  I  will  claim  that  the  anti‐perfectionist  must 
provide an answer to this question. 
However, before I look at the adequacy of anti‐perfectionist responses to the 
problem of asymmetry, I will narrow down my focus. In chapter three, I argue 
against the two most prominent cross‐cultural or universal accounts of 
perfectionism. I reject Thomas Hurka’s human nature based perfectionism 
because  it  leads  to  hugely  counter‐intuitive  consequences.  I  reject  Martha 
Nussbaum’s ‘function’ argument because it fails to explain precisely why humans 
1 Thomas Hurka (1993). Brian Barry (1995). George Sher (1997). Steven Wall (1998). 
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value certain goods. I conclude by suggesting that a plausible perfectionism will 
be particular to cultures and time periods. 
In chapter four I introduce and clarify Joseph Raz’s contextual argument for 
perfectionism. The purpose of this chapter is largely exegetical. It seeks to get a 
grip  of  precisely  how  the  Razian  argument  is  contextual;  is  it  relativist,  for 
example? 
In chapter five I focus on Jonathan Quong’s anti‐perfectionism. In the first half of 
the chapter, I will argue that Quong’s response to Raz does not work. I argue that 
the first objection, that his account of justice is contingent on empirical premises, 
does not actually pose a problem for Raz. I argue that the second, that Raz’s 
account involves high levels of manipulation, relies on a major misreading of The 
Morality of Freedom. In the second half of the chapter, I will argue that Quong 
fails to overcome the asymmetry objection. Quong has to rely on an idealised 
view of citizens in order to overcome the objection, and such idealisation cannot 
be vindicated. 
In chapter six, I discuss Brian Barry’s account of anti‐perfectionism. Contra Raz, 
Barry thinks that we have reason to be sceptical about whether we can know if 
any conception of the good can be true. He argues that such scepticism should 
lead us to embrace anti‐perfectionism. If we cannot vindicate any putative 
judgement about flourishing, we should not appeal to it when justifying state 
action. However, as I will argue, Barry’s account fails to provide a response to the 
asymmetry objection. If we have reason to be sceptical about the truth of 
conceptions of the good, don’t we also have reason to doubt the plausibility of 
judgements about justice? If so, then it seems that an appeal to principles of 
justice would also be illegitimate, and the asymmetry cannot be justified. 
In the final chapter, I will offer my own account of anti‐perfectionism. In the first 
half of the chapter I will argue against Raz’s claim that there is consensus on the 
value of  the  autonomous  life. I  will  do  so  by  appealing  to  James  Tully’s 
Wittgensteinian argument for constitutional change. The fact of disagreement is 
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shown by the diversity of different language games taking place. The different 
cultural perspectives found within modern liberal society mean that 
disagreement about the good is inevitable. However, this alone does not 
overcome the asymmetry objection. Tully’s argument applies to judgements 
about justice just as much as it does to judgements about the good. Different 
cultural groups do not agree about what is just any more than they agree about 
what is good. Rather, my anti-perfectionism is secured not by looking at what 
people do happen to agree on. Instead, we should construct our principles of 
justice by looking at what they could agree on. I will argue that people could 
agree to an account of justice that embodies a set of constraints. I will further 
argue that any political structure that incorporated judgements about the good 
could not be agreed upon. This is because judgements about the good depend on 
metaphysical commitments that could not be subject to a consensus. 
Thus, my thesis takes a fairly clear route. First it tells you what perfectionism 
and anti‐perfectionism entail. Then it narrows down perfectionism to its most 
plausible form – Raz’s contextual perfectionism. It then looks at two responses to 
Razian contextualism that do not work, before offering a much more promising 
account  of  anti‐perfectionism  that  appears  to  overcome  the  asymmetry 
objection. 
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1 
Perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
There are three ways in which a philosopher might talk about perfectionism; as a 
prudential theory, as a general moral theory, or, more specifically, as a model of 
political morality (i.e. identifying which principles should guide political action). 
Prudential perfectionism claims that there is an ideal form of human life and 
argues that the level of well-being for any person is in direct proportion to how 
near that person’s life gets to this ideal.2 It identifies a supremely valuable way of 
life for human beings, for example one where one’s options are autonomously 
chosen, and claims that an individual’s quality of life is higher the closer she gets 
to fully living such a life. 
Moral perfectionism gives an account of correct conduct. Instead of being a 
theory based solely on well-being, as prudential perfectionism is, it gives agents 
instructions on how to act. To quote Hurka extensively, perfectionism argues 
that “certain properties…constitute human nature or are definitive of humanity - 
they make humans human. The good life, it then says, develops these properties 
to a high degree or realizes what is central to human nature.” 3 That is, 
perfectionism instructs agents to do that which best promotes good human lives. 
Thus, instead of claiming that autonomous choice simply improves the quality of 
an agent’s life, it tells the agent that she should live her life dedicated to such an 
ideal, even if it doesn’t necessarily improve her well‐being. This ethical theory 
2  Griffin (1986: 56). 
3  Hurka (1993: 3) 
 
 
9 
has a great tradition, being found in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche, Green and many others. 
Perfectionism as a theory of political morality is more specific. In its most basic 
form it tells us that (at least sometimes) the state should act so as to promote the 
human good. 4 More precisely, it is committed to the view that political 
authorities should take an active role in creating and maintaining social 
conditions that best enable their subjects to lead valuable and worthwhile lives.5 
We all know, says the perfectionist, that a life lived in accordance with charity 
and generosity is superior to one idly spent watching daytime television, so the 
state should, if it is able, act in ways which promote the former, as well as, 
perhaps, ways which discourage the latter. 
The three forms of perfectionism outlined above are not wholly distinct. All three 
specify a vision of the human good or human flourishing.6 It is how they utilise 
such goods that differs. Whereas prudential perfectionism simply says that the 
greater the level of human good we realise the higher our well‐being will be, moral 
perfectionism says that we should aim at such a good, even if this doesn’t 
necessarily improve our well-‐‐being. The two could be intertwined however. 
Pursuing the human good might be something we should do and which 
necessarily improves our well-‐‐being as a side-‐‐effect. Or, it could be argued that 
the most plausible form of moral perfectionism will include well-‐‐being amongst 
its list of human goods.7 Political perfectionism can be seen as an extension of 
either form. That is, it might direct the state to promote a vision of human 
flourishing where this is something its citizens should pursue, or where this is 
something that will make their lives go better (or both, if the two positions are 
aligned). 
4 Following Wall (1998:10-‐‐11) I understand “the state” as including the political constitution of a 
society, its political institutions and the policies of government. 
5 This definition is given by Steven Wall (1998: 8) 
6 I shall be using the terms “human flourishing” and “the human good” interchangeably. 
7 George Sher makes a similar point (1997: 229). 
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Importantly, human flourishing and well-being are different. Flourishing 
represents a view of human perfection. Well-‐‐being represents a view of what 
makes one’s life go better.8 These are not necessarily the same thing. The 
difference is twofold. Firstly, a theory of flourishing necessarily grounds 
judgements about moral (and perhaps political) requirements. A theory of well-
-being could do this - in which case it would be functionally equivalent to a theory 
of flourishing – but it need not. Secondly, a moral or political theory could take 
certain considerations of well‐being to be important without taking the flourishing 
aspect into account. For example, it might concern itself with a sufficient level of 
well‐being that falls vastly short of the threshold of flourishing. This is Hurka’s 
point. He argues, “Perfectionism cannot concern well‐being. Its ideal cannot define 
the “good for” a human because the ideal is one he ought to pursue regardless of 
his desires…It gives an account of the good human life, or of what is good in a 
human, but not of what is “good for” a human in the sense tied to well-‐‐being.”9 
I want to focus on perfectionism as a theory of political morality. My project 
looks to examine whether political perfectionism is a legitimate view of political 
morality, and if so, to what extent. Accordingly, I will take no position on the 
plausibility of perfectionism as a prudential or moral theory directly, though 
obviously some of my criticisms may have knock on effects on either (or both). 
From now on, unless stated otherwise, when using the term perfectionism I will 
have in mind political perfectionism. 
Quite what perfectionism is, and what it is committed to, is often unclear in 
discussions of the subject. In this chapter I will clarify the different kinds of value 
that the perfectionist seeks to promote, distinguish between two varieties of 
perfectionism, and discuss what the positions might be committed to (along with 
8 See, for example, Hurka (1993: 16-‐‐17).  “What makes ones life go better” could be desire-‐‐based, 
pleasure-‐‐based, or could appeal to an objective list of goods. See Crisp (2013). 
9 ibid. Note, however, that Hurka is presupposing a desire-‐‐based view of well-‐‐being here. An 
objective list theory of well-‐‐being which contained only perfectionist values might not lead to 
such a conflict. That is, if the list contained only such values, and the threshold was set at the 
same level for flourishing and well-‐‐being, then an appeal to either would be equivalent. 
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what they might not be committed to). I will conclude by briefly explaining why 
many see perfectionism as an attractive view of political morality, as well as 
flagging up a deeper problem that both versions of the principle face. 
2. How Should We Understand “the Human Good?” 
Perfectionism argues that the state should act to promote the human good or 
human flourishing. But what exactly does the human good entail? I believe that it 
has three constitutive elements: personal ideals, conceptions of the good and 
substantive conceptions of the good.10 
Personal Ideals are judgements about those pursuits, activities, associations, 
talents, virtues, traits etc. that make up a good human life. Such considerations 
are the ideals that we have or pursue, and they indicate what it is that we value. 
Some might be substantively specific, such as the mastery of tactical awareness 
in football. Others might be more general, referring more to the way in which 
people live their lives, for example free from external pressure.11 Some ideals 
will cover a wide range of conduct. A long‐term committed relationship will 
dictate many, if not most, of an individual’s derivative choices, activities, projects 
and so on. However, others will cover a narrower range. If I have a moderate 
interest in playing the piano I may set aside a period of time each week in which 
to practice, perhaps neglecting other possible activities and so on. But this 
pursuit will not seep into my social and emotional life anywhere close to the 
same extent that a long-term relationship would. Accordingly, our various 
personal ideals will form a structured hierarchy, with our more important ones 
dictating our more frivolous ones. 
A conception of the good can be understood as the full set of personal ideals 
found within an individual life. Judgements concerning conceptions of the good 
involve evaluating the quality of a person’s life overall. Such conceptions of the 
10 Quong makes a similar threefold distinction, though uses different terminology. (2011: pp. 12-‐‐ 
13). 
11 See also Wall (1998: 12). This distinction between substantive and general ideals will become 
relevant later in my discussion of the charge of paternalism. 
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good can be more or less substantive. Some conceptions of the good might 
involve a fairly loose collection of personal ideals. For example, I might enjoy 
autonomous choice, and accordingly engage in personal relationships, take up a 
few hobbies, work for a living in order to fund these, and so on, without giving 
their relative importance much thought, or having in mind any sort of unifying 
end. Other conceptions of the good might be extremely unified, detailed and 
wide‐ranging. For example, my conception might be dictated by the importance 
(to me) of what my family expects of me. Accordingly, my relationships, my 
career, my pursuits and so on, will almost solely be directed at living up to what I 
believe the dynasty expects of me. We can call a way of life that is unified in this 
way a substantive conception of the good. Such a conception is very specific, and 
contains values, associations and pursuits that dictate all, or nearly all, conduct. 
Substantiveness is an inexact scale. Conceptions can be more or less detailed and 
so on, but at which point a conception becomes substantive is unclear. 
Thus, the perfectionist argues that the state should promote personal ideals, 
ways of life, or substantive conceptions of the good. But why is this? Wall argues 
that the perfectionist is committed to the following four claims12: 
1. Some personal ideals/conceptions of the good/substantive conceptions of 
the good are sound and can be known to be sound, where this is 
understood as being such that it is reasonable for people to be interested 
in them, regardless of whether they in fact happen to be interested in 
them. 
2. The state is presumptively justified in favouring these human goods. That 
is, if a human good can be shown to be sound, then there is a presumptive 
case for state promotion. Note that the case is only presumptive. There is 
no  ipso  facto  move  from  the  soundness  of  a  human  good  to  state 
promotion. 
12 His account is only concerned with the promotion of personal ideals, but I have adapted his 
claims in order to include all three constitutive elements of the human good specified above. 
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3. A sound account of political morality must be informed by sound human 
goods, as either it is not possible to exclude ideas of human good from 
conceptions of political morality, or if it were possible, that account of 
political morality would be impoverished. 
4. There is no general moral principle that forbids the state from favouring 
sound human goods, as well as enforcing conceptions of political morality 
informed by them, when these goods are controversial and subject to 
reasonable disagreement. That is, there is no moral rule that says that the 
state should not promote the good if there exists disagreement between 
reasonable citizens as to its value. Thus there is a standing case for the 
state  to  promote  human  goods  whether  or  not  there  is  a  consensus 
amongst reasonable citizens regarding their value.13 
The key claim for the perfectionist is that if we can judge a human good to be 
sound, and that good could be effectively promoted through political action, then 
there is a standing case for using the state to promote it. Thus, we can call 
perfectionism a teleological doctrine. It identifies a conception of the good as 
central and foundational to moral reasoning. 
3. Perfectionist Action vs Perfectionist Justification 
At this point it might be worth pausing to consider two ways in which one might 
talk about perfectionism. Most political action will have the effect of altering the 
ability of at least some of its citizens to pursue their conceptions of the good. For 
example, a woman who values autonomy will find her conception of the good 
restricted if a new government passes laws which deny women an equal 
standing in society. Such political action has the effect of altering an individual’s 
ability to pursue their conception of the good, irrespective of how such action is 
justified. Thus we can define: 
13 Wall (1998: 8-‐‐15). Whilst I am sympathetic to the denial of all four of the claims, my thesis will 
argue that Wall’s fourth claim is false. 
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Perfectionist action: any political action which has the effect of promoting 
or discouraging any form of human flourishing. 
Perfectionist action can be contrasted with: 
Perfectionist  justification:  reasons  appealing  to  the  human  good  upon 
which political action is premised. 
Whereas perfectionist action focuses solely on the effect of political action, 
perfectionist justification looks at the reasons which justify it. Thus, in order for 
a piece of political action to count as perfectionist in this sense we need to look at 
the justification for that action, rather than the effect it happens to have on 
particular conceptions of the good. Thus, on this view, if the reason for any state 
action  appeals  to  human  flourishing,  then  such  action  is  perfectionist.  If it 
appeals to some other concept, it is not perfectionist. 
My thesis will focus on perfectionism in this second sense. That is, it will explore 
the permissibility of using the human good as a justification for political action. 
As I say above, most political action will have the effect of promoting or 
discouraging at least one person’s conception of the good. Thus, debating the 
legitimacy of perfectionist action would be daft; a political morality cannot but 
affect an agent’s chances of pursuing her conception of human flourishing. Thus, 
in order to count as perfectionist, a state must base their reasoning on  the 
human good. That is, a political morality is perfectionist insofar as its principles 
are justified by an appeal to human flourishing. Whether or not a particular piece 
of political action actually happens to promote or discourage a certain 
conception of the good is neither here nor there. If such a policy was justified by 
an appeal to anything other than the human good then it should not be counted 
as perfectionist. 
This can be demonstrated by an analogy. Suppose a wealthy football club offer 
Lionel Messi a multi-‐‐million pound contract, which, if accepted, would make him 
the highest paid individual in sporting history. Now, if accepted, such a contract 
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could not but improve the welfare of Messi, as well as his family and friends. 
However, in the example, the welfare of the player and his loved ones plays no 
justificatory role in the reason for the club offering the contract. Instead, the 
reason for offering Messi the lucrative contract is that the Chairman of said 
football club is desperate for his team to win the UEFA Champions League for the 
first time. The effect on the welfare of Messi and his family is a side-effect of an 
action taken for another reason, namely the desire to win the Champions League. 
In the same way, the promotion and/or discouragement of conceptions of the 
good can be a side-effect of actions taken for other reasons. Policy X might affect 
John’s ability to pursue his conception of the good, but unless that policy is 
justified by an appeal to human flourishing, then such action would not be 
perfectionist in the relevant sense. Obviously, perfectionist reasoning will 
usually imply perfectionist action. That is, if a government wants to promote a 
certain conception of the good, the best way of doing so might well be to act in a 
way which promotes such a conception. But it need not. Promoting the good 
might require political inaction. So, for example, promoting autonomy might 
require that governments refrain from acting to promote certain options, as to 
do so would violate the self-direction of its citizens. 
4. Pure Perfectionism vs Mixed Perfectionism 
I now want to distinguish between two forms of perfectionism. The first form, 
which we can call pure perfectionism, argues that human flourishing is the only 
intrinsic value appropriate for constructing a political morality. That is, pure 
perfectionism identifies what the human good entails, and justifies state 
institutions and so on solely by reference to it. Thus, says the pure perfectionist, 
maintaining the social conditions that best promote human flourishing is the 
state’s sole function. The civil liberties, political rights, democratic institutions 
and  so  on  that  are  realised  within  such  a  state  are  justified  insofar  as  they 
promote the human good. 
Pure   perfectionism   can   be   contrasted   with   mixed   perfectionism.   Mixed 
perfectionism still claims that the state should, at least sometimes, promote the 
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good, but also believes that human flourishing is but one value amongst several 
with regards to political morality. That is, according to the mixed perfectionist 
the human good should be measured against other moral concepts, such as 
liberty, rights, equality, justice, democracy and so on (where no further appeal is 
made to human flourishing), when deciding upon political action. In such a way, 
perfectionist values are tempered by other values relevant to deciding upon 
political institutions, the policies of government and so on. Nevertheless, the 
mixed perfectionist maintains that the good life is an important justificatory 
value within a political morality, albeit one amongst several others.14 
In the next two sections I shall outline some of the unsavoury implications which 
at first glance perfectionism might have, and discuss to what extent the two 
positions – pure perfectionism and mixed perfectionism – are committed  to 
them. These implications fall under two categories: perfectionism as paternalism 
and perfectionism as inegalitarianism. 
5. Perfectionism as Paternalism 
One assumption that might be made against perfectionism is that it identifies a 
single supremely preferable substantive conception of the good, way of life or 
personal ideal, and instructs the state to promote only this value. For example, 
the state might claim that the good life is one where individuals focus all action 
at a slavish dedication to the Quran. From this, it might seek to promote all and 
only those goods that realise this conception of the good. Critics charge that such 
action would be sectarian and inhibiting, producing a homogenous and stunted 
population. This is, to most fair‐minded people, something we should avoid. 
Thus, we can ask whether either form of perfectionism is necessarily committed 
to such monism. 
14  I owe the terms pure perfectionism and mixed perfectionism to Joseph Chan (2000: 15). See 
also Rawls (1999: 290). Obviously, the mixed perfectionist would have to tell a story about when 
perfectionist values trump, or are trumped by, other values.  I tentatively suggest that such 
conflicts should be taken on a case-‐‐by-‐‐case basis, as I doubt a strict lexical ranking would be 
workable. 
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Now there is one obvious level at which we might ask this question which 
precisely brings out the difference between pure and mixed perfectionism. Pure 
perfectionism is monist in the sense that perfectionist values alone justify all 
state action, whereas mixed perfectionism is pluralist in the sense that 
perfectionist considerations can be tempered with other values. However, the 
criticism traditionally focuses on a more substantive level. Is perfectionism 
necessarily committed to monism about the good? That is, is there one single 
value which perfectionism identifies and subsequently seeks to promote? The 
short answer is no. There is no conceptual connection between either pure or 
mixed perfectionism and monism about the good. In either case the good to be 
promoted could be a single end, such as the one suggested above, but it needn’t 
be. Perfectionism might identify a whole range of disparate, unconnected goods 
and instruct the state to promote all of them. Modern society is marked by a high 
level of pluralism, so the most plausible perfectionism might seek to promote a 
number of different goods. Note, however, that even if a perfectionist position 
was monist, if the value to be promoted was sufficiently general then it could be 
realised in a number of different ways. That is, the end itself may be singular but 
capacious, admitting of multiple realisations. It could manifest in a plurality of 
divergent subordinate activities, pursuits, relationships, and so on. Suppose the 
good in question referred to the manner in which people lived their lives, for 
example free from external pressure. Then a huge range of options would remain 
open to promotion, and hence such political action would not be sectarian in the 
sense that it would not force citizens to select from a minimal set, and hence 
would not produce a homogenous populace. Thus neither form of 
perfectionism is necessarily committed to monism, and even if either was it 
needn’t have the uncomfortable implications that at first might appear. 
15 
Nevertheless, the charge of paternalism might remain. Regardless of whether it 
is committed to pluralism about the good, it has been claimed that perfectionism 
15 See also Griffin (1986: 57 - 63). Note that if the good in question wasn’t sufficiently 
general – i.e. it was a substantially specific good, for example being a good piano player – then a 
monist perfectionism would be both odd and unworkable as a principle of political morality, 
particularly for the pure perfectionist. How could all state action be justified by reference to how 
adequately it promoted high proficiency in playing the piano? 
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necessarily involves high levels of coercion. If the good life is important, 
perfectionists will care about whether people are actually obtaining it. Good 
options cannot simply be made available; folk must actually pursue them. One of 
the key reasons for which people subscribe to perfectionism is that citizens get 
things wrong. If left to their own free choices, they will not all pursue the correct 
conception(s) of the good. Thus, human flourishing might be best promoted 
through state action that forced citizens to pursue some activity which most 
adequately serves it. For example, if the best way to get people interested in the 
arts is to force them to attend opera houses through legal threats, then the state 
should do this. This should be seen as regrettable as it offends against liberty. 
Thus, the charge goes, perfectionism will trample over citizens’ freedom when 
this is the best way to achieve the highest levels of human flourishing. This is the 
concern that Berlin has in Freedom and its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human 
Liberty. In his chapter on Rousseau, Berlin claims that perfectionism, in 
promoting a single conception of how to live, gives us a monstrous view of 
freedom: to be free is to live the good life, and so forcing folk to flourish does not 
restrict their freedom. We can coerce people into making right choices because if 
they knew what they really wanted, they would pursue it of their own accord. 
That, says Berlin, is outrageous. The worry is that perfectionists are so singly 
focussed on the good that they don’t give sufficient importance to freedom. This 
would be true regardless of how many goods perfectionists promote.16 
Does perfectionism necessarily involve high levels of coercion? The mixed 
perfectionist, if he cares about liberty, has a fairly straightforward answer. The 
human good should be tempered with other values. Thus, if the best way in 
which to promote it involves interfering greatly with liberty, then it should not  
be allowed. In cases such as this claims of liberty would trump the human good. 
Thus, even if an appreciation of opera could be best promoted through 
compulsory attendance, such an interference with citizens’ choices should not be 
permitted. 
16 Berlin (2003: 27-49) 
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Could the pure perfectionist undermine the objection? Well, a presumptive case 
against coercion might itself be built into the ideal to be promoted. For example, 
if the conception of human flourishing in question were autonomous choice, then 
this would automatically limit the way in which the state could promote it. So, for 
example, the state would be prohibited from coercively forcing its citizens to 
achieve the human good as coercion runs counter to the ideal which it is 
attempting to promote. That is, this sort of coercion is counter-‐‐productive; 
autonomy cannot be coercively imposed upon an agent. However, this might 
apply to all liberal theories of human flourishing. If Hurka is right the good can’t 
be imposed from without.17 If folk are coerced into attending the opera, they 
won’t enjoy it. In fact, they may resent being forced to do so, which might 
actually lessen their level of human flourishing. Therefore, the state should not 
impose goods on its citizens. Thus, the pure perfectionist could also respond. He 
could say that coercing individuals into perfection either doesn’t work, or, more 
strongly, actually lessens their level of human flourishing. 
Note, however, that the pure perfectionists response is contingent in a way in 
which the mixed position is not. There is nothing in the formal structure of either 
perfectionist argument that rules out coercive promotion of the good. But, if the 
mixed perfectionist cares sufficiently about liberty he can prohibit coercive 
interference by tempering the human good with this value. This option is not 
available to the pure perfectionist. If the above empirical claim was false, and the 
human good could be coercively promoted (for example, perhaps agents might 
come to value the opera for its own sake) then the pure perfectionist could not 
prohibit this. But, again, there is nothing in the formal structure that requires 
coercion either. If we return to Wall’s second condition above, a pure 
perfectionist could argue that perfectionism enjoins states to promote the good. 
It does not instruct the state to promote the good by any means necessary. 
However, unlike the mixed perfectionist, he can restrict the ways in which the 
state may pursue human flourishing only by appealing to the good(s) in 
question. 
17  Hurka (1993: 153) 
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If the perfectionist can reject coercion, they can still justify non-coercive 
promotion. Such a perfectionist claims that the state should promote the good, 
but only through non‐coercive means. Non-coercive means would include 
lowering the cost of expensive, but valuable, activities through subsidisation, 
offering advice, offering incentives, and so on. Such action would encourage 
rather than force citizens to pursue the activities in question. This form of state 
action is often referred to as nudging. Rather than directly forcing us to pursue 
an option, it attempts to influence us into making such a choice. To stress, we can 
say that perfectionism is not necessarily committed to allowing the use of 
coercive force as a means of promoting the good.18 One can be a perfectionist 
and still reject action which forced individuals to pursue the good. 
Perfectionism is committed to both promoting the good and discouraging the 
bad. That is, if we can identify which pursuits, relationships and so on are 
valuable, and thus allow the state to promote them, we can also identify which 
are worthless, and thus allow the state to discourage them. In fact, 
discouragement might be automatically implied by promotion. If I give you n-
-pounds to choose X over Y, how could I not be viewed as discouraging you 
from choosing Y, as well as encouraging you to select X? That is, the very act of 
promoting certain goods will entail the discouragement of others. So, if a state 
subsidises opera houses, but doesn’t subsidise the games console industry, then 
it is both promoting an appreciation of the arts, and discouraging the idle 
enjoyment of computer games. Here we might distinguish two different kinds of 
discouragement. One sort involves the state taking positive steps to limit the 
enjoyment of a certain activity, the prevalence of a certain character state, and so 
on. Thus, a government might prohibit the possession of a certain drug as it 
judges a life including its enjoyment as morally repugnant. On the other hand, 
one might attempt to limit the pursuit of a purported worthless option through 
18 Note that there are very fine lines here. Nozick (1969) discusses several cases where a coercive 
threat and a non-‐‐coercive warning might be hard to distinguish. Furthermore, if Elster (1983) is 
right, some goods could not even be promoted non-‐‐coercively, as the very act of deliberate 
promotion (coercive or non-‐‐coercive) renders the good unattainable. That is, such goods can only 
be achieved as a by-‐‐product of some other contrivance. Thus, perfectionism might be limited in 
which goods it can promote, even non-‐‐coercively. If all human goods were characterized as such 
essential by-‐‐products, this would be a damning empirical reason against employing perfectionist 
policies. See Elster pp. 43-‐‐108. 
 
 
21 
the promotion of a rival valuable one. Just as with promotion, discouragement of 
certain options can be non‐coercive as well as coercive. It might simply involve 
high costs through VAT or the like, government warnings, incentives to refrain, 
and so on. 
In this section I have argued that perfectionism, in either form, is not necessarily 
committed to the paternalistic charge that philosophers such as Berlin have 
aimed at it. Perfectionism can happily accept a pluralist theory of the good, and 
coercive interference can be prohibited, either by reference to moral claims 
outside of the justificatory realm of human flourishing (as with mixed 
perfectionism), or by reference to the actual ideal being promoted (as with pure 
perfectionism). 
6. Perfectionism as Inegalitarianism 
Another criticism that has traditionally been levelled at perfectionism is that it is 
inherently elitist. This criticism is most associated with the perfectionist theories 
of philosophers such as Nietzsche and Rashdall. In an oft‐repeated quotation, 
Rashdall disturbingly claimed that: 
Improvement in the social condition of the higher races of mankind 
postulates the exclusion of competition with the lower races. That means 
that, sooner or later, the lower well-‐‐being — it may be ultimately the very 
existence — of countless Chinamen or negroes must be sacrificed that a 
higher life may be possible for a much smaller number of white men.19 
Even if a perfectionist were to dismiss Rashdall’s shocking mode of promotion, it 
remains a seeming implication of perfectionism that if the human good is that 
important, and the state can promote it, then it makes sense for it to promote it 
as best as it can. Some folk are more appreciative of the arts, others are more 
courageous. Some are more intelligent, and others more self‐directed. If the state 
was to act to promote the goods of these people over the philistines, the wimps, 
19 Rashdall (1907: 238‐39) 
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the dunces and the heteronomous, then it will create more good overall than if it 
acted to promote the good equally between them. Thus, the state should 
distribute resources, opportunities and so on unevenly, giving more to those 
who are best placed to realise high levels of human good and less to those who 
are not. This is a criticism given by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice where he 
argues that the sum of human flourishing might be best increased by vastly 
unequal rights and opportunities.20 Griffin calls such a reading of perfectionism 
the “superman” conception21, where the state cares most about the perfection of 
its more outstanding individuals, and distributes resources, rights, opportunities 
etc. accordingly. Such a position, the critic claims, is inherently unfair as the few 
are favoured over the many. 
Are either of the forms of perfectionism committed to such elitism? The mixed 
perfectionist can again – assuming he is an egalitarian -‐‐ respond quite easily. 
Perfectionism, it says, is not necessarily maximising. The human good should be 
tempered with other values. Although it might be true that more human good 
could be realised through uneven distribution of resources, this would offend 
against egalitarian values, and a lesser amount of perfection should be favoured. 
The promotion of human flourishing is still important, says the mixed 
perfectionist, but it should be constrained by a concern for other important 
values. 
This route is obviously not open to the pure perfectionist. However, she can 
respond to the charge of elitism in three different ways. Firstly, she could argue 
that contrary to what folk like Rawls claim, perfectionism is not concerned with 
excellence. That is, the perfectionist might claim that the term perfectionism is 
misleading. As we have already stipulated, perfectionism advocates only that 
the state promote the good. It says nothing about maximising excellence in its 
most outstanding individuals. In fact, perfectionism isn’t maximising at all. 
Perfectionism cares about the human flourishing of all, therefore state action 
should be set up so as to best promote it in all citizens, not just the most 
20  Rawls (1999: 290) 
21 Griffin (1986: 60-‐‐61) 
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outstanding. Perfectionism claims that the state should promote human 
flourishing, not the greatest aggregate level of flourishing. The good of all should 
be the aim of political action, even if this falls short of the greatest overall  
amount of flourishing.22 One might follow Hursthouse in stipulating a threshold 
level of human good above which one can be said to be flourishing. What matters 
for Hursthouse is getting everybody’s level of good over that threshold. It is not 
about maximising it in the most excellent citizens. Hence, resources, 
opportunities, rights and so on should be distributed in such a way that all 
individuals are able to reach this threshold.23 
A second way in which a pure perfectionist might respond to the charge of 
elitism accepts that perfectionism is concerned with excellence. However, if the 
perfectionism in question is pluralist about the human good, or the good to be 
promoted is sufficiently general, then excellence can be achieved in many 
domains. That is, there would be no one ability, pursuit or activity one must have 
excellence in. For example, if the good to be promoted was creativity, then many 
of us could achieve excellence through the copious number of activities this can 
be realised in. Most of us have a gift, the response claims, a plausible 
perfectionism will seek to promote many of these, therefore resources, 
opportunities, rights, and so on should be distributed fairly evenly.24 
A third way in which a pure perfectionist might respond to this charge is by 
stipulating diminishing marginal perfectionist utility. This echoes the response 
often given by utilitarians to the claim that their own account might require 
vastly unequal distribution. The perfectionist might respond to the charge of 
elitism by claiming that resources are much more effective in moving people 
from modest to medium levels of perfection than they are in moving people from 
high to the highest levels. Further, it might be claimed that past a point  
additional resources will not increase an individual’s level of human flourishing 
at all. Thus, far from requiring that more be given to the most outstanding 
22 Note, though, that some perfectionists would explicitly reject this line of reply. Aristotle and 
Nietzsche, for example, both deny that the good life is attainable by all. See Annas (1996). 
23  Hursthouse (1991: 241) 
24 Hurka runs a such an argument (1993: 167) 
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individuals, perfectionism might instruct the state to take resources from those 
who are flourishing to a high level, and to redistribute to those who are unable to 
flourish.25 
Note that even if any one of the three responses above are accepted, this does 
not commit the perfectionist to any strict egalitarian principle. My conception of 
the good might require more in the way of resources, for example, than yours. 
That is, your pursuit of the good might be fairly inexpensive, requiring only a 
modest level of resources, whereas mine might require much more. But this isn’t 
a problem for the perfectionist. What matters are objectionable inequalities. The 
inequalities above would not be such. It is equality of consideration that is 
important, not equality per se. If each of our conceptions of the good is given 
equal weight, then the state is treating us in an egalitarian matter, even if the 
distribution of resources informed by the good is unequal. Furthermore, if the 
pure perfectionist were to stipulate a threshold level of flourishing for 
distribution, as suggested above, once all citizens have reached such a level, any 
inequalities in resources, opportunities etc. above that could not be objected 
against. 
Hence, I have shown that neither mixed nor pure perfectionism is necessarily 
committed to elitism. Perfectionism merely stipulates that states should promote 
the good. How they go about doing that is a separate matter. There is no 
conceptual connection between any particular distributional scheme and 
perfectionism. 
7. The Pragmatic Argument Against Perfectionism 
I would now like to briefly set out and subsequently reject what I believe to be 
another bad argument sometimes offered as a way of demonstrating the 
25 Hurka discusses this in detail in chapter 12 of Perfectionism (1993). He goes on to make the 
even stronger claim that past a point additional resources will actually decrease a person’s 
excellence. If true, this would add further doubt to the claim that perfectionism is necessarily 
elitist (though it might be inegalitarian in another, perhaps less objectionable, way). Rawls 
(1999: 290) doubts whether the perfectionist can appeal to diminishing marginal value. 
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impermissibility of perfectionism. This is a pragmatic argument based on the 
inefficiency of political institutions. Such an argument claims that even if there is 
nothing philosophically illegitimate about instructing the state to act on 
perfectionist reasons, we should not, as things stand, allow it to do so because  
our governments are corrupt and inefficient. Even if the state was able to 
discover which conceptions of the good are worthwhile and which are base, 
which itself is a very dubious claim, we have reason to suspect whether it could 
promote and discourage such conceptions adequately or fairly. That is, the 
danger is twofold. Firstly, governments might choose the wrong human goods to 
promote or discourage. Secondly, even if it selected the correct goods to promote 
or discourage, we cannot trust it to do so efficiently or fairly.26 
Irrespective of the plausibility of this pragmatic claim, I think this is a bad 
argument for two important reasons.27 Firstly, consider two separate questions: 
Philosophical question: Is it legitimate for the state to promote 
worthwhile conceptions of the good and discourage base conceptions of 
the good? 
Empirical question: Are current states, as a matter of fact, able to select 
and efficiently promote or discourage conceptions of the good? 
In my thesis I am considering the philosophical problem of whether it is 
legitimate for the state to promote the good. I will have nothing to say about the 
empirical problem. As such, I will grant the empirical premise, that states are 
able to efficiently promote the good, in order to explore the theoretical question 
of whether it is legitimate for them to do so. Empirical concerns such as this do 
not affect the philosophical cogency of perfectionism. They only concern its 
26 See, for example, Kymlicka (1989b: 900-‐‐902). 
27 Incidentally, I suspect that the claim that states cannot be trusted any more than citizens to 
select and promote the good is highly dubious. Furthermore, as Chan points out (2000: 15) 
perfectionism needn’t be state-centred. A multi-centred perfectionism, which held that voluntary 
associations should be the primary promoters of the good, and that states should only step in 
where civil society fails, would still count as a perfectionist political morality, and wouldn’t have 
the problematic implications that the pragmatic argument claims that state‐centred forms might 
have. In such a system, civil society would provide checks on the state, and vice versa. 
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applicability in current society. Of course, I am not claiming that the empirical 
question is unimportant. Far from it. If perfectionism turns out to be empirically 
unworkable, then that provides a damning reason to refuse to adopt it as a 
political morality. However, qua philosopher, I shall be investigating the 
theoretical cogency of perfectionism. It is then up to the political scientist to 
discover whether or not we have a practical reason to adopt it.28 
A second response to the pragmatic argument is that if we have reason to 
distrust the state in selecting and acting upon ideals of human flourishing, then 
don’t we also have reason to worry about its other functions? That is, if we claim 
that the state shouldn’t be trusted to promote the good, then mustn’t we also, on 
pain of contradiction, also claim that the state shouldn’t be trusted to uphold 
justice, maintain law and order, and so on? Thus, in order for the pragmatic 
argument to only apply to perfectionism, one must find a non-arbitrary reason to 
believe that the state cannot be trusted to promote the good, but can be trusted 
to perform many other functions. I cannot think of one. Thus the pragmatic 
argument would have to apply to all of the functions of the state, and, if true, we 
would have to embrace some form of political anarchism.29 
8. Universal Perfectionism vs Contextual Perfectionism 
At this point, it is worthwhile introducing a further distinction. We can 
distinguish two senses in which one might value human goods. An ahistorical or 
universal perfectionist identifies goods to be promoted by the state, and claims 
such goods contribute to the flourishing of all agents however they are 
temporally or spatially located. For example, it is claimed, strong, loving 
relationships are important whether you are a French medieval peasant or a 21st 
Century Chinese businessman. These goods should be promoted whatever the 
nature of the society in question. As such, these goods are not contingent on the 
social  and  economic  conditions  of  the  community  or  era,  and  so  on.  Thus, 
perfectionism may be committed to an ahistorical reading of the good. However, 
28 This response echoes comments made by Dudley Knowles in Political Obligation, albeit 
concerning a separate philosophical problem. (2010: 51-‐‐53) 
29 For a thorough perfectionist response to the pragmatic argument see Sher (1997: 106-‐‐139). 
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it is not necessarily so. Contextual perfectionism identifies goods to be promoted 
by the state, and claims that these goods are essentially connected to a particular 
community or belief system. Such goods are contingent on the social and 
economic conditions of the community in question, and are good only for those 
living within those belief systems. Such a perfectionist will identify some good, 
and instruct the state to promote it, without making any claims about the status 
of that value in any other temporally or spatially located community.30 
Neither mixed nor pure perfectionism is necessarily committed to either an 
ahistorical or relative strain. One might hold that some good is valuable 
ahistorically, whilst claiming that it should be tempered by other values, and one 
might hold that some good is only good for people living within a certain 
community, whilst claiming that that value should justify all political action, and 
vice versa. Note that whilst a perfectionist could be a relativist about the good, he 
could not plausibly be a sceptic. If he could not discover what is good for human 
beings then it would make no sense to enjoin the state to promote them.31 
9. Contemporary Perfectionists. 
Thus far in this chapter, I hope to have dispelled some of the misconceptions 
about perfectionism. It does not have the objectionable air that it at first might 
seem to have. Of course, perfectionism might be committed to elitism and/or the 
use of coercion. But, it need not be committed to either of them. What is common 
to all perfectionist positions is precisely Wall’s four conditions. That is, if we can 
identify which goods are sound, and if the state can act so to promote them, then 
we should allow political action which seeks to promote these goods. 
In this section I will attempt to label six of the most prominent perfectionists in 
the  literature  as  mixed  or  pure  perfectionists.  I  will  discuss  the  theories  of 
30 I am using the term “belief system” following Bernard Williams (1981) and (1985). Note that 
the most plausible form of perfectionism (assuming it is pluralist) might include goods of both 
kinds. That is, it might seek to promote some goods that are ahistorical, and others that are only 
of value to the community in question. 
31 In the second case there would be no such goods to be promoted. 
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Thomas Hurka, Joseph Raz, Joseph Chan, George Sher, Steven Wall and Vinit 
Haksar. This task is easier for some than it is for others. Four of these 
philosophers are fairly explicit about which category their view should fall 
under. The other two will require a bit more in the way of guess-‐‐work, meaning 
that I will only cautiously offer a way of understanding their theories, rather than 
place them in one camp rather than the other. 
Thomas Hurka is perhaps the paradigm example of a pure perfectionist. Hurka is 
primarily concerned with perfectionism as a general moral theory, rather than 
specifically as a political theory, leading him to justify political principles insofar 
as they promote the perfection of moral agents. Thus, he argues, “The best 
political act, institution, or government is that which most promotes the perfection 
of all humans.”32 Hurka believes that the fundamental liberal values, such as liberty, 
autonomy and equality are best justified by an appeal to the good. Joseph Raz is 
also a pure perfectionist. He believes “it is the goal of all political action to enable 
individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good, and to discourage evil or 
empty ones.”33 Like Hurka, Raz believes that liberalism is best justified by an appeal 
to human flourishing. For example, he believes that a perfectionist  reading  of  
Mill’s  harm  principle  is  more  plausible than  an  anti-perfectionist one.34 
Joseph Chan explicitly subscribes to mixed perfectionism. He champions what he 
calls moderate perfectionism. According to Chan, moderate perfectionism -‐‐  
which “allow[s] the pursuit of the good life to be tempered by other values”35 -‐‐ is 
“much more sensible and acceptable” than a stronger pure perfectionism.36 
George Sher is similarly clear in his mixed perfectionist leanings. He accepts that 
perfectionist values are not “the only proper grounds for political decisions [and] 
nor…should  [they]  dominate  all  others.” 37 Nevertheless,  non-perfectionist 
reasons  do  not  exhaust  the  legitimate  reasons  for  state  action:  “when  a 
32  Hurka (1993: 147) 
33  Raz (1986: 133). Emphasis added. 
34 ibid. pp. 412-‐‐420. 
35 Chan (2000: 15) 
36 ibid. p. 17. 
37  Sher (1997: 246). Emphasis in original. 
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government can elevate its citizens’ tastes, characters, aspirations, and modes of 
interaction, these too fall within its legitimate aims.”38 
Steven Wall and Vinit Haksar are a little tougher to pigeonhole. I tentatively 
suggest that both should be understood as mixed perfectionists. Steven Wall calls 
perfectionism a “results‐priority view.” 39 That is, perfectionism argues that 
political institutions should be judged in part as instruments for serving the 
goals of substantive political morality. He contrasts results‐prioritarian views 
with what he calls “process‐centred views.”40 Such views judge state action by 
asking which procedures are fair, or which institutions treat people with equal 
respect, and so on.41 In discussing the relation between the two, Wall argues: 
The results-priority view does not imply that process-oriented 
considerations could not have intrinsic value. If one rejects the process‐ 
centred view, then one must accept that political procedures are to be 
judged in part by the substantive results they are likely to yield; but it 
does not follow that one must discount process-oriented considerations 
altogether. If this is right, one can accept both the results-priority view 
and  the  view  that  [for  example]  democracy  has  intrinsic,  as  well  as 
instrumental, value.42 
Thus,  by  allowing  that  “process‐oriented  considerations”  can  have  intrinsic 
value, and can be weighed against the substantive results they are likely to yield, 
I suggest that Wall should be understood as subscribing to mixed perfectionism. 
Vinit Haksar, who was writing over two decades before Chan drew the 
distinction between mixed and pure perfectionism, is the least explicit on this 
issue. I think that he is best read as arguing that perfectionism should be a 
supplement to liberal egalitarianism. That is, I believe that Haksar is arguing that 
38 ibid. 
39 Wall (1998: 22) 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid. p. 23. Emphasis added. 
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liberalism is a theory that has to appeal to perfectionist reasoning in some 
spheres, for example when ranking liberties. However, I also believe that he 
holds that other spheres do not require such an appeal to the human good. Thus, 
I think that he is best understood as being a mixed perfectionist. But, as I 
suggested earlier, this is only a tentative claim, based on my best understanding 
of Haksar’s work. It could well be that he would take issue with such a label. 
Thus,  we  can  neatly  set  out  the  respective  positions  of  the  philosophers 
discussed in Fig. 1.1. 
Fig. 1.1. 
10. Why Perfectionism? 
This draws me to the end of the chapter. I want to conclude by briefly outlining 
why perfectionism is often seen as an attractive form of political morality. A 
presumption in favour of all forms of perfectionism goes thus: the state exists in 
order to serve its citizens. If it can help them by promoting human goods, then it 
should. There is no general reason for excluding human goods from the 
justification of political action. Perfectionism takes account of all reasons. That is, 
sometimes considerations of the human good are highly relevant in making good 
political decisions, and thus there is good reason to include them in the sources 
of justification for political action. If we can use state power to enforce justice, 
then why not use it to promote the good. As Arneson points out, the state should 
nudge us, not just offer us a path.43 
43  Arneson (2010: 103) 
Pure Perfectionists Mixed Perfectionists 
Thomas Hurka Joseph Chan 
Joseph Raz George Sher 
 Steven Wall (?) 
 Vinit Haksar (?) 
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A presumption in favour of milder forms of perfectionism in particular is that it 
can promote conceptions of the good in ways that do not seriously invade 
citizens’ liberty or lead to a vastly unequal distribution of resources. That is, if 
the state can promote the good non‐coercively, and thus does not impinge on 
citizens’ freedom, then there is even more of a case to allow it to do so. 
Furthermore, such perfectionism could be non‐elitist, promote a plurality of 
goods, and so on. Thus, argues the perfectionist, there is a strong reason in 
favour of allowing the state to promote the good. 
In this chapter, I have suggested ways in which a perfectionist position might 
respond to charges of paternalism and inegalitarianism. However, if the 
perfectionist believes that by responding to these charges he has refuted anti‐ 
perfectionist concerns, then he is mistaken. There is a deeper concern about 
perfectionism that both the mixed and the pure versions must respond to. 
Namely, that there is something illegitimate about the state promoting human 
flourishing. The anti-perfectionist might accept that perfectionism doesn’t 
necessarily involve high levels of coercive paternalism or vast inegalitarianism, 
but still reject it on the basis that the human good is not the domain of political 
action. This deeper problem does not concern what effects the promotion of the 
good might have. It says that the very act of promotion is illegitimate. 
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2 
Anti-Perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter I discussed perfectionism as a political morality. Namely, the 
claim that states should play an active role in setting up and maintaining social 
conditions which promote the flourishing of its citizens. In this chapter I shall 
examine perfectionism’s obverse – anti‐perfectionism. Anti‐perfectionism claims, 
contra perfectionism – that states should not take such an active role. It argues 
that whether or not a conception of the good is worthwhile or worthless should 
never be a relevant consideration when constructing the principles which guide 
society. 
In this chapter, I will dispel some common myths about anti‐perfectionism, and 
in the process give a clearer indication of what it is committed to. I will begin by 
introducing three forms of anti‐perfectionism, and arguing why we should only 
go with one of these understandings. I shall then introduce a further distinction 
made by Mulhall and Swift between what they call political and comprehensive 
anti perfectionism, before arguing why comprehensive anti‐perfectionism 
should not be understood as a form of anti‐perfectionism at all. Next, I will 
introduce a common misunderstanding about anti-perfectionism -  that it 
subscribes to the bracketing strategy as described by Michael Sandel. I will argue 
that anti-perfectionism should not be understood in this way. Then, I shall refute 
the  claim  that  the  anti‐perfectionism  entails  the  minimal  state.  I  will 
introduce   the   concepts   of   the   right   and   the   good,   and   describe   how 
perfectionism  and  perfectionism  map  onto  such  a  distinction.  I  will 
then 
anti‐ 
next 
introduce  an  objection  from  Joseph  Raz,  which  all  forms  of  anti-perfectionism 
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must face. I will then discuss John Rawls’s response to this objection, before 
introducing Jeremy Waldron’s criticism of this account and indicating a couple of 
ways in which the anti‐perfectionist could respond, which will be the focus of 
following  chapters.  I  shall  then  briefly  conclude  by  discussing  what can be 
said in favour of anti-perfectionism. 
2.  Anti-Perfectionism vs Neutrality 
The anti‐perfectionist says that it is not the job of the government to dictate to its 
citizens what the good life consists in. Contra perfectionists, she believes that it is 
inappropriate to use the infrastructure of the state to promote the flourishing of 
individual persons. She believes that the basic requirements of justice should not 
be derived from any conception of the good, and that individuals should be free 
to shape their lives as they see fit within the constraints of the basic  
requirements of justice. That is, citizens should be free to pursue whatever 
conception of the good they choose, consistent with principles of justice. Thus,  
the anti-perfectionist argues, it is not up to the state to impose any conception of 
the good on its citizens. Instead, individuals should decide for themselves what 
to do with their freedom and resources. 
Billy’s conception of the good might be one which dedicates a large portion of his 
time to the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure. That is, he might spend a great deal of 
time admiring works of art, listening  to  classical  music,  reading  poetry,  and  so 
on. Joan, on the  other hand, might  be a thrill‐seeker, and value a life spent in 
pursuit of the adrenaline rush  experienced when  faced  with  dangerous 
situations. She might dedicate a majority of her spare time to rock-climbing, 
paragliding, mountain biking and so on. Anti‐perfectionism says that we should 
not promote Billy’s way of life over Joan’s, or vice versa. Instead, it says that the 
state should guarantee for both an equal set of rights and liberties, a fair level of 
resources etc., which they can then utilise in  pursuit  of  the  conceptions  of  the 
good  described  above.  Importantly,  however,  anti‐perfectionism  does  not  say 
that each conception of the good is equally worthwhile. Instead, it makes no such 
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judgement at all. The anti‐perfectionist believes that it is up to individuals (and 
perhaps  non‐political  institutions)  to  make  such  judgements.  Making  value 
judgements about competing ways of life should not be the business of the state. 
There  are  three  supposed  forms  of  anti-perfectionism  that  have  often  been 
conflated: 
1. States should not act in ways that as a matter of fact result in some 
conception(s) of the good being promoted and others discouraged. 
A government should “make sure that its actions do not help acceptable 
ideals more than unacceptable ones, [and should] see to it that its actions 
will not hinder the cause of false ideals more than they do that of true 
ones.”44 
“The fact that some conception of the good is true or valid or sound or 
reasonable, etc., should never serve as a reason for any political action. 
Nor should the fact that a conception of the good is false, invalid, unsound, 
unreasonable, etc. be allowed to be a reason for a political action.”45 
2. 
3. 
The first is often defined as “neutrality of effect”. This position claims that the 
state should not act, or set up its institutions etc., in any way which affects the 
pursuit of any conception of the good. Thus across, conceptions of the good C1, 
C2, C3… Cn, no state action should affect any such view of human flourishing, 
either positively or negatively. Thus, returning to Billy and Joan above, if any 
piece of governmental action happens, as a matter of fact, to make it more 
difficult  for  Billy  to  admire  works  of  art,  or  easier  for  Joan  to  engage  in 
paragliding, then this piece of action should be avoided. 
This is not how anti-perfectionism should be understood. Such neutrality would 
be unintelligible to aspire to. As a matter of fact, the state cannot but avoid 
affecting the fortunes of competing conceptions of the good. Any piece of political 
action,  any  state  institution  etc.  is  going  to  have  the  effect  of  promoting  or 
44 Raz (1986: 111) 
45 ibid. p.136. 
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discouraging at least one conception of the good. However minimal they might 
be, when a political morality constructs principles of justice, it will necessarily 
affect how easily certain conceptions of the good can be pursued. For example, 
any stipulation that all citizens should have an equal set of liberties will rule out 
a conception of the good which denied women equal protection through law. As 
Rawls argues “it is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just 
constitutional regime not to have important effects and influences as to which 
comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents over time”. 46 Such 
neutrality would be unworkable, and thus is not what the anti-perfectionist 
should be understood as committed to. 
The second and third readings of anti-perfectionism come from Joseph Raz.47 
The second claim, which Raz attributes to Robert Nozick48 and John Rawls49, 
entails that governments should neither help nor hinder the success of one 
conception of the good over another (or several over others). It tells the state 
that it should act in an even handed manner with regards to the different lives its 
citizens choose to lead, regardless of their supposed objective value. Thus, if 
there are two competing conceptions of the good, state action should promote or 
discourage both to an equal degree, if it acts at all. It is importantly different from 
the first conception. It does not say that states should not act at all if doing so 
affects the chances of any conception of the good being pursued. Instead it says 
that if state action happens to promote or discourage any conception of the good, 
it should act to counteract such an effect by affecting all other conceptions of the 
good  to  the  same  degree.  It  allows  governments  to  promote  or  discourage 
conceptions of the good so long as it does so to an equal degree. 
Thus, imagine we have a situation where a political body is considering whether 
to  raise  money  through  taxation  and  use  this  revenue  to  subsidise  some 
46  Rawls (2005: 193). 
47 See references in footnotes 1 and 2. 
48 Raz (1986: 111-‐‐117). That said, the specific interpretation of neutrality that Raz attributes to 
Nozick (p. 114) is actually closer to the second form of anti-‐‐perfectionism, which I discuss below. 
49 ibid. pp. 117-‐‐133. Rawls certainly should not be understood as being anti-‐‐perfectionist in this 
sense. In fact he explicitly rejects the position attributed to him by Raz in his later work (2005: 
193). 
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conception(s) of the good subscribed to by members of the community. An 
advocate of this kind of anti‐perfectionism would not allow the body to act in 
such a way unless it subsidised all competing conceptions of the good equally. 
Suppose, for the sake of ease, that the body raises £3000, and there are just two 
competing conceptions of the good – Billy’s life of aesthetic experience,  and 
Joan’s dedication to thrill-seeking. The second form of anti-perfectionism tells 
the body that it should give £1500 each to, for example, Scottish Opera and the 
John Muir Trust. 
Again, this is not how we should understand anti‐perfectionism. And again this is 
because such a principle would be completely unworkable from a practical point 
of view. As we have seen, any piece of political action will have the effect of 
changing the fortunes of at least one conception of the good. Thus the state 
would have to counteract every single occasion by affecting the fortunes of every 
other conception of the good to a similar degree. How could such a policy be 
practical? States cannot predict in advance how its institutions and regulations 
will affect all parties subject to them, so a continual process of compensation will 
have to be sustained as conceptions of the good form and develop. Furthermore, 
such a view would lead to contradictions. How could the state affect equally the 
fortunes of a conception of the good which denied the vote to women and 
another  that  didn’t?  Thus,  anti-perfectionism  should  not  be  understood  as 
neutrality of effect, or even-handedness. 
How about the third option? Joseph Raz dubs this form of anti‐perfectionism the 
exclusion of ideals50 and attributes the position to Bryan Barry,51 Robert Nozick 
again,52 and Ronald Dworkin.53 The exclusion of ideals is stronger than the 
previous two conceptions of anti‐perfectionism. It does not say that governments 
should not promote one conception of the good over another. Instead, it says that 
governments should not promote any conception of the good at all for the reason 
50 Raz (1986: 108). See also pp. 134-‐‐162. 
51 ibid. pp. 137 – 145. 
52Ibid. pp. 145 – 148. Raz thinks that Nozick moves between evenhandedness and the exclusion 
of ideals. However, as I point out in n.5 above, the form of evenhandedness that Raz attributes to 
Nozick looks more like a form of this second type of anti-‐‐perfectionism. 
53 ibid. pp. 157-‐‐162. 
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that it is good. That is, a state must never use the fact that a particular conception 
of the good is understood to be valuable or disvaluable as a justification for any 
piece of political action, any state institution, and so on. In fact, it should not even 
make  such  judgements. The  correctness  or  incorrectness  of  any  particular 
conception of the good should not be the state’s business. Such judgements 
should be restricted to private morality, and any action based on them should be 
through non-political means. Thus, according to the exclusion of ideals, if there 
are two competing conceptions of the good, such as Billy’s and Joan’s above, the 
state should not do anything to promote either (for the reason that they are 
valuable). It is an area of individual activity into which the government should 
not step.54 Unlike the previous conception, which tells governments what to do 
(act even‐handedly), the exclusion of ideals forbids them to act for certain 
reasons.55 
The previous two conceptions of anti‐perfectionism, it can be said, concern 
actions. They place restrictions on what the state can and cannot do. They tell us 
that political action should not affect conceptions of the good at all, or, if it does, 
it should not help certain ideals more than others. If governments are to act, they 
must do so even‐handedly between conceptions of the good. The exclusion of 
ideals, on the other hand, concerns reasons for action. Instead of placing 
restrictions on what states can and cannot do, it places a restriction on what 
reasons can be used to justify state action. Instead of focusing on governmental 
action itself, the exclusion of ideals forbids the state from acting for the reason 
that some conception of the good is true/false, valid/invalid, 
worthwhile/worthless and so on. 
This is the correct way in which we should understand anti‐perfectionism. As I 
said in the previous chapter, perfectionism is about the reasons which justify 
state action. It is not about the actions themselves. This is also the case with anti‐ 
perfectionism. Anti‐perfectionism does not say that states should not promote or 
discourage conceptions of the good. It says that it should not do so if this is 
54 ibid. p.107. 
55 ibid. p. 135. 
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justified by an appeal to human flourishing. As I said above, and in the previous 
chapter, all state action will affect the fortunes of at least one conception of the 
good. The reasons being given in support of such action are what matters. The 
perfectionist justifies their preferred institutional scheme by appeal to the ways 
in which that scheme promotes human flourishing. The anti-perfectionist rejects 
any such justification. 
I have largely avoided using the term neutrality in the discussion of anti‐ 
perfectionism above. This is because I believe that the term is misleading. The 
term neutrality might lead folk to understand anti‐perfectionism in the first two 
(incorrect) ways. That is, thinking in terms of neutrality might entail the claim 
that states should not act at all to promote or discourage conceptions of the 
good, for whatever reasons, or, that if it can, it should do so even-handedly. As I 
have already said, this is not how we should understand anti‐perfectionism. Anti‐ 
perfectionism allows states to act in ways that as a matter of fact affect citizens’ 
ability to pursue some conception of the good, just so long as this is not justified 
by an appeal to human flourishing. Thus, although many leading anti‐ 
perfectionists use the term neutrality (such as Rawls), I want to avoid using it. 
Instead, I shall insist on using the term anti‐perfectionism. Obviously, the correct 
form of anti-perfectionism is neutral in that it argues that the principles 
stipulated  by  a  political  morality  should  not  presuppose  any  conception  of 
human flourishing. But, it is non‐neutral in two important ways. 
Firstly, it is non-neutral between the reasons deemed relevant for constructing 
political principles. It excludes certain sorts of reasons from serving as a 
justification for state action, political institutions, and so on. That is, it prohibits 
any appeal to human flourishing in a political morality. If a state institution is 
premised on a view about how humans should live their lives, then such an 
institution is illegitimate and should be discarded. Thus, anti-perfectionism is not 
neutral about the reasons which should guide a political morality. 
Secondly, anti-perfectionism is importantly non-neutral if we are to understand 
neutrality  in  the  even-handed  sense  described  above.  That  is,  any  form  of 
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political morality will necessarily affect at least one conception of the good in 
some way. It might place restrictions on many, encourage or discourage some 
and outright prohibit yet others. For example, any theory which placed great 
importance on an equal set of liberties for all citizens will say that conceptions of 
the good can only be pursued in ways which are compatible with such a set, thus 
(largely) non‐coercively, for example. Further, it will promote some – for 
example those which give a fundamental place to autonomous choice – and 
discourage others – for example those that rely on theological teachings which 
don’t give high regard for equal liberty. Furthermore, it will prohibit yet others, 
for example those that involve the sadistic torture of non‐consenting humans. 
Thus, I will chiefly use the term anti-perfectionism, and this should be 
understood as the view that state action, political institutions, and so on, should 
not be justified by an appeal to human flourishing. It should not be understood as 
neutrality of effect, or even-handedness. 
3. Political Anti-Perfectionism vs Comprehensive Anti-Perfectionism 
At  this  point  I  would  like  to  distinguish  between  two  supposed  forms  of  anti‐ 
perfectionism, political anti‐perfectionism and comprehensive anti‐ 
perfectionism. In this section I will describe the distinction between the two. In 
the following section, I will deny that comprehensive anti‐perfectionism should 
be understood as a form of anti-perfectionism at all, and should instead be 
understood as a minimal form of perfectionism. 
The terms political and comprehensive anti‐perfectionism were first introduced 
by  Stephen  Mulhall  and  Adam  Swift  in  Liberals and Communitarians: Second 
Edition. The distinction can be brought out by considering two questions: 
1.   Can  a  particular  vision  of  the  role  of  the  state  itself  be  defended  or 
justified by appeal to a conception of the good?56 
56  Mulhall and Swift (1996: 251) 
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2.   What kinds of consideration are deemed relevant when making decisions 
about the exercise of power by the state?57 
The first question, according to Mulhall and Swift, concerns the theoretical 
method of a political morality. The second concerns its political substance. The 
answer to the first question will determine whether a political morality is 
political or comprehensive. If one answers no, then she will be committing 
herself to a political form of justice. That is, she will argue that a political 
morality should not presuppose any particular conception of the good. If one 
answers yes, then she will be committing herself to a comprehensive form of 
justice. That is, she will argue that a political morality should itself be justified by 
an appeal to a conception of human flourishing. 
The answer to the second question will determine whether a political morality is 
perfectionist or anti-perfectionist. That is, if one answers that only reasons not 
appealing to human flourishing are relevant, then she will be committing herself 
to anti-perfectionism. However, if one answers that all reasons are relevant 
when making decisions about the exercise of power then she will be committing 
herself to perfectionism. 
According to Mulhall and Swift, one’s answer to either question does not commit 
her to an answer in the other. Thus we have four distinct positions: 
(i) Political anti-perfectionist – State not justified by an appeal to a 
conception of the good. Exercise of power not justified by an appeal to 
a conception of the good. 
Political perfectionist - State not justified by an appeal to a conception 
of the good. Exercise of power justified by an appeal to a conception of 
the good. 
(ii) 
57 Mulhall and Swift actually use the term “coercive” power. I have dropped the use of coercive, as 
I have established that perfectionism is not necessarily coercive (see chapter one). 
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(iii) Comprehensive anti‐perfectionist -‐‐ State justified by an appeal to a 
conception of the good. Exercise of power not justified by an appeal to 
a conception of the good. 
Comprehensive perfectionist -‐‐ State justified by an appeal to a 
conception  of  the  good.  Exercise  of  power  justified  by  an  appeal  to  a 
conception of the good. 
(iv) 
Thus there are two ways one can be a perfectionist, and two ways one can be an 
anti‐perfectionist. The comprehensiveness of a political morality depends upon 
whether such a political morality is itself justified by an appeal to the good. 
As such, Mulhall and Swift claim one could be an anti-perfectionist in either of 
the two ways above. That is, political principles might presuppose no conception 
of the good (as well as prohibiting the state from acting on such goods) in which 
case such an anti‐perfectionism would be political. However, an anti‐ 
perfectionism might be neutral regarding the different views folk have about 
human flourishing, but justify this by drawing upon a specific conception of 
human flourishing. In this case, such an anti-‐‐perfectionism would be 
comprehensive. Fig. 2.1 is adapted from Mulhall and Swift’s own diagram. Their 
examples of political anti‐perfectionists are John Rawls58 and Richard Rorty.59 
However, one could also add Charles Larmore60 and Jonathan Quong.61 Their 
sole example of a comprehensive anti‐perfectionist is Ronald Dworkin.62 Again, 
one could add other examples. J.S. Mill would be a traditional example63, Ben 
Colburn a contemporary example.64 
58 See Rawls (1999) and (2005) 
59 See Rorty (1989) and (1991) 
60  See Larmore (1987) 
61  See Quong (2010)  
62  See Dworkin (1995) 
63 See Mill (1991) 
64  See Colburn (2010) 
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Fig 2.1 
4. Rejecting Comprehensive Anti-Perfectionism 
Thus, according to Mulhall and Swift, anti‐perfectionism might itself be justified 
by an appeal to a conception of the good (as comprehensive perfectionism does), 
or it might presuppose no such conception. However, if an anti‐perfectionism 
itself appeals to a view about human flourishing can it actually be a form of anti‐ 
perfectionism? Surely the two questions above are not distinct. To identify 
considerations relevant to the exercise of power by the state just is to identify 
the state’s role. If one instructs the state to refrain from promoting certain 
concrete pursuits, but does so by appealing to a more general conception of the 
good  (as  Mill,  Dworkin  and  Colburn  do),  is  this  anti-perfectionist  in  any 
intelligible matter? 
I do not think so. Mulhall and Swift point out that some might find such an appeal 
to anti-perfectionism a “sham.”65 However, they attempt to overcome such a 
charge by distinguishing between two different senses in which one might talk 
about a conception of the good. They distinguish abstract conceptions of the 
good and concrete conceptions of the good. Abstract conceptions of the good, 
such as the autonomous life, justify prohibiting the state from acting upon the 
concrete conceptions of the good between which folk select when exercising 
such a capacity. Thus, argue Mulhall and Swift, one can be an anti-perfectionist in 
the sense that he prohibits political principles from favouring certain concrete 
conceptions of the good, but justifies doing so by appealing to a more abstract 
conception of the good. 
I don’t think this approach can succeed. Recall two aspects of the debate about 
which I have already spoken. I emphasised in chapter one that conceptions of the 
65  Mulhall and Swift (1996: 253) 
Political anti-perfectionists Comprehensive anti-perfectionists 
Rawls, Rorty 
Larmore, Quong 
Dworkin 
Mill, Colburn 
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good could be either abstract or more substantive. I also emphasised that this 
didn’t make a difference as to whether a political morality was perfectionist or 
not. That is, I argued that whether or not one’s conception of the good is abstract 
or concrete, it still occupies the same level; it is a view about what constitutes 
human flourishing. Furthermore, I have repeatedly stressed that 
perfectionism/anti‐perfectionism is a debate about the reasons justifying state 
institutions and so on. That is, in order to discover whether a political principle is 
perfectionist or anti-perfectionist one must look to the reasons justifying it. Thus, 
returning to comprehensive anti‐perfectionism, the justification for acting in a 
neutral manner between concrete conceptions of the good is that it serves some 
abstract good, for example autonomy. But this abstract good is still a view about 
human flourishing, and is serving as  the  reason  justifying  such  a  political 
morality. Thus, comprehensive anti‐perfectionism is actually a form of minimal 
perfectionism. It doesn’t matter how abstract the view of human flourishing 
appealed to is, if it is serving as the justificatory reason for a political morality, 
then it is explicitly perfectionist. Thus, what Mulhall and Swift call political anti‐ 
perfectionism is the only intelligible form of anti-perfectionism available. Anti‐  
perfectionism   says   that   political   institutions   and   state   action   should   not   be 
justified by an appeal to human flourishing, however minimal. 
One might counter, as Mulhall and Swift do, 66 that any adequate political 
morality must be grounded in some view of human flourishing. That is, any view 
of the state must presuppose some minimal view about what the good life is for 
humans. I deny this, and will demonstrate why in the following chapters. I 
believe  that  it  is  possible  to  construct  a  robust,  intelligible,  interventionist 
political morality without appealing to any conception(s) of the good. 
5. Rejecting the Bracketing Strategy 
66 ibid. p. 255. However, they use the term “well-being” in this statement. They appear to be using 
the terms interchangeably throughout the discussion. However, as I have argued in chapter 1, 
well‐being and human flourishing are not necessarily the same thing, so one might ground their 
vision of politics in well‐being without being perfectionist. 
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I now want to briefly highlight and reject a common misunderstanding about 
anti‐perfectionism. This misunderstanding arises from a criticism given by 
Sandel in his review of Rawls’s Political Liberalism,67 and then repeated in his 
own Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.68 Sandel 
claims that the anti‐perfectionist is committed to the bracketing of all contending 
moral and religious issues for political purposes. That is, when it comes to 
deciding upon a political morality, the anti-perfectionist is committed to ignoring 
all controversial moral outlooks. This, says Sandel, is a serious error. The debate 
between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas regarding slavery was a 
controversial one. There was not consensus amongst Americans on whether 
slavery was morally wrong. Therefore, according to Sandel, the anti‐perfectionist 
would not be able to side with Lincoln, and claim that slavery is morally wrong. 
Present day liberals would not want to be in the company of Douglas, thus they 
should shun anti-perfectionism. 
This reading of anti‐perfectionism is grossly mistaken. Anti‐perfectionism is not 
about bracketing all moral issues, controversial or otherwise, as Sandel claims. 
Instead, it is about restricting the sorts of reasons that can justify state action. It 
does not say that “the law is wrong to embody any moral judgements at all”.69 As 
Rawls points out in ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, an anti‐perfectionist 
political morality is still itself a moral conception, and can side with Lincoln.70 
Why? Because slavery clearly contravenes the first principle of justice. As I will 
go on to explain, the priority of the right argues that permissible conceptions of 
the good must satisfy the principles of justice. The existence of slavery does not 
satisfy these principles, thus it can be prohibited. A non-Rawlsian anti‐ 
perfectionist can also side with Lincoln. Although she wouldn’t explicitly appeal 
to Rawls’s two principles of justice, she could prohibit slavery by reference to 
similar principles of right. 
67 Sandel (1994. pp. 1777 ff.) 
68 Sandel (1996. pp. 19-‐‐24) 
69  Sandel (1994: 1792) 
70  Rawls (1997: 484 n.91) 
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In fact, one can pin Sandel’s misinterpretation of anti‐perfectionism to a single 
passage of Political Liberalism. In introducing bracketing, Sandel quotes Rawls as 
stating “political values normally outweigh whatever non‐political values conflict 
with them.”71 Sandel takes this as Rawls arguing that claims of morality or 
religion should be ignored when it comes to political decision‐making. This is not 
what Rawls is claiming. As I said above, a political morality is still a morality! 
What he is arguing here is simply the right should be prior to the good; that in 
society conceptions of the good must satisfy the principles of justice. 
Thus, thinking in terms of bracketing is misleading. It is not about bracketing all 
moral considerations. It is about excluding justifications which refer to a certain 
kind of moral reason, namely one which appeals to a conception of the good. 
Thus, anti-perfectionism does not “create a moral void that opens the way for the 
intolerant.” 72  In  fact,  it  explicitly  constrains  the  intolerant  by  securing  the 
priority of the right. 
6. Anti-Perfectionism and the Minimal State 
Thus we should not understand anti-perfectionism as bracketing all moral 
considerations. Instead we should stipulate that it excludes a certain sort of 
moral consideration. In the following section I will sketch, and subsequently put 
aside a further misunderstanding about anti‐perfectionism, that it entails the 
minimal state. 
It has often been assumed that anti-perfectionism as a political morality will 
necessarily lead to the non-interventionist minimal state. Although I am not 
primarily concerned with the practical implications of the debate, I think this 
myth needs dispelling. One reason that this assumption holds is because many 
proponents of the minimal state are also anti‐perfectionist.73 The main reason, 
however,  is  connected  to  the  misleading  nature  of  the  term  neutrality  as 
discussed  above.  As  some  have  thought  that  anti-perfectionism  simply  means 
71  Sandel (1994: 1777). Quoting Rawls at (2005: 146). 
72  Sandel (1994: 1794). 
73 For a famous example, see Nozick (1974) 
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inaction, then it might seem to imply that the state should only be concerned 
with the protection of life and property. 
However, this assumption is mistaken. There is nothing necessarily non‐ 
interventionist about anti-perfectionism. As I have repeatedly emphasised, anti‐ 
perfectionism does not place restrictions on what states can do. Instead it places 
restrictions on what reasons can be used to justify what states do. Thus, as 
Larmore points out, anti-perfectionism does not prevent a state from enacting 
welfare legislation, wealth redistribution, positive discrimination, and so on, so 
long as in doing so the state is not appealing to the superiority of certain forms of 
human flourishing.74 Such welfare measures are perfectly consistent with the 
principles of the right if justified in the correct way (that is, without an appeal to 
the human good). It might even be possible to justify traditionally perfectionist 
state measures without an appeal to the good. For example, a government might 
fund state run museums by appealing to an educative aspect without further 
reference to human flourishing. That is, such an education might be necessary to 
uphold the principles of right.75 I will argue in chapter 7 that we can propose a 
broad, interventionist state whilst restricting its justification to principles of the 
right. 
7. The Right and the Good 
Having  demonstrated  precisely  what  anti-perfectionism  is  committed  to,  I  will 
now introduce two different aspects of morality - the right and the good -   and 
discuss how they are relevant to the perfectionism/anti‐perfectionism divide. 
The dialectic between the perfectionist and the anti-perfectionist concerns the 
proper sphere of morality for political action. We can distinguish between two 
74  Larmore (1987: 44) 
75 Rawls argues that perfectionist considerations can play a role when constitutional essentials 
and issues of basic justice are not at stake. Thus he can justify such funding of state museums on 
perfectionist grounds. Notwithstanding the ambiguity as to what counts as a constitutional 
essential or an issue of basic justice, I want to argue that perfectionist action should be 
prohibited at any level of the political structure. Thus, if I want to allow state subsidisation of 
museums and so on, I must justify it for anti‐perfectionist reasons. I don’t offer the brief sketch 
above as a definitive way in which one might do so. 
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spheres of morality here, “the right” and “the good”. The distinction between 
these two aspects of morality has been clouded in the debate by a lack of clarity 
about what the respective positions refer to. I shall attempt to briefly lay out the 
correct distinction in as precise a manner as possible 
The good contains all moral principles/demands etc. that are justified by an 
appeal to considerations of the human good. It concerns concrete conceptions of 
how human beings should lead their lives. That is, it stipulates ideals of the good 
life – which conceptions of the good are morally valuable, and which are 
repugnant. In this way, the good points to states of affairs are which are valuable 
for individuals. It refers to a view about what living a good human life amounts 
to. 
The right, on the other hand, contains those principles/demands etc. that can be 
justified without an appeal to considerations of the human good. It refers to the 
principles which govern our interaction with other people. As such, it contains 
judgements which make no reference to a view of human flourishing. So, for 
example, one might hold that freedom from coercion is valuable irrespective of 
the role such freedom plays in leading a good life. In this way, the right can be 
dubbed deontological. It contains principles which hold without reference to 
considerations about the good. 
As I hope is obvious, anti-perfectionism and perfectionism maps on to the right 
and the good respectively. Thus, the anti-perfectionist says that we must restrict 
the justification for political action to the right. The state must only act for, and 
its institutions should only be justified by reference to, reasons that do not 
appeal to any theory of human good. The state may uphold justice, rights and so 
on – where no further appeal is made to human flourishing -‐‐ but it can only 
concern itself with how citizens lead their lives insofar as such a concern can be 
justified by considerations of the right. State action should not include any 
appeal to considerations of the good. The perfectionist, on the other hand, argues 
that political action is permissible in both spheres. As well as securing justice, the 
perfectionist  believes  that  it  is  the  state’s  responsibility  to  promote  morally 
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valuable ways of life, and discourage morally repugnant ones. Importantly, the 
justification for this is precisely that such ways of life are valuable, and the others 
repugnant. In fact, she might appeal to considerations of human flourishing in 
order to justify the principles of justice themselves. That is, the pure 
perfectionist will not even recognise the difference in spheres. For such 
perfectionists,  there  is  just  one  sphere  –  morality  –  which  is  fundamentally 
oriented around human flourishing. 
As such, the debate between the anti-perfectionist and the perfectionist concerns 
whether the state should play a role in helping people to live valuable lives. The 
anti-perfectionist says no. The state should allow its citizens to select and pursue 
their conceptions of the good themselves. The perfectionist says yes. It is not 
important  to  simply  ensure  that  people’s  choices  are  free.  Instead,  the  state 
needs to make sure that its citizens are choosing correctly. 
In restricting political morality to principles of right, the anti-perfectionist claims 
that, to use Rawls’s phrase, the right is prior to the good. This means that 
conceptions of the good are constrained by the principles of the right. Such 
conceptions are only permissible insofar as they can  be  pursued  consistently 
with such principles. This links back to  what  I  said  earlier.  The  priority  of  the 
right places restrictions on which ideas of human flourishing can be legitimately 
pursued.76 This was the second sense in which I argued anti‐perfectionism is 
importantly non-neutral. Thus, says Rawls, we should conform our conceptions 
of  the  good  to  the  principles  of  justice.77  If  our  conceptions  do  not  so  conform, 
then we should expect them to be restricted by the principles of justice. 
We can understand anti‐perfectionism as arguing that principles of a political 
morality should be restricted in their justification to the sphere of  morality 
which we might call the right. On the other hand, perfectionism argues that no 
such  restriction  holds.  Political  institutions,  state  action,  and  so  on,  can  be 
justified  by  an  appeal  to  either  the  right  or  the  good.  Furthermore,  the  anti- 
76  Rawls (2005: 176 n.2) 
77  Rawls (1999: 27). 
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perfectionist argues that the right is prior to the good, in the sense that the 
principles of the right restrict the pursuit of the good. 
8. The Asymmetry Objection 
This brings up the question of how we can justify making such a separation 
within a political morality. That is, why restrict state action to the right? Why be 
anti‐perfectionist, and disallow judgements concerning human flourishing to 
play a role in justifying the  state  and its actions?  The ideals that  the anti‐ 
perfectionist wants to be excluded from the political sphere are largely 
teleological. Yet, he allows the state to act on deontological ideals. However, both 
come from a common moral core, so it is arbitrary to exclude one but not the 
other. Raz asks how we can divide morality into a part that is politically relevant, 
and a part that is not; if both deontological and teleological concerns stem from a 
common source, there is a prima facie case for requiring political action to take 
notice of both.78 Call this the asymmetry objection. 
Can those who advocate anti-perfectionism avoid this criticism? In order to do 
so, they must rehabilitate the separation between the two spheres, and argue 
successfully that one is an appropriate sphere for politics and that the other isn’t. 
If they are successful, then anti-perfectionism can argue that conceptions of the 
good should be excluded from the political sphere. It wants to maintain that the 
state should restrict itself to securing the background conditions necessary for 
free choice, for example the upholding of justice, rights, liberty, equality and so 
on, without getting involved in how people should lead their lives within a just 
state.79 
In order to do this, the anti-perfectionist must contend with Raz’s accusation that 
both the good and the right come from the same moral core, and that to select 
one as appropriate for political morality, and one as inappropriate, is arbitrary. 
He must justify the exclusion of the teleological but not the deontological from 
78 ibid. p. 137 
79 Swift (2006: 157) 
 
 
50 
the  political  sphere. He  must  justify  the  state  securing  the  background 
conditions of justice (despite the fact that this may rule out certain conceptions 
of the good), whilst forbidding it from acting on judgements concerning concrete 
conceptions of the good life. 
9. The Burdens of Judgement 
Rawls justifies such a separation by appealing to the burdens of judgement. He 
says that rationality underdetermines agreement on the good. That is, rational 
people will not agree about what the good life consists in. To quote Rawls at 
length: 
Religious and philosophical doctrines express views of the world and of 
our life with one another, severally and collectively, as a whole. Our 
individual and associative points of view, intellectual affinities, and 
affective attachments, are too diverse, especially in a free society, to 
enable those doctrines to serve as the basis for lasting and reasoned 
political agreement. Different conceptions of the world can reasonably be 
elaborated from different standpoints and diversity arises in part from 
our distinct perspectives. It is unrealistic – or worse, it arouses mutual 
suspicion and hostility – to suppose that all our differences are rooted 
solely  in  ignorance  and  perversity,  or  else  in  the  rivalries  for  power, 
status, or economic gain.80 
Thus, in sufficiently democratic circumstances, there exists the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. That is, under democratic institutions, where we are afforded a good 
measure of individual freedom, we will not converge on a single conception of 
the good. There will be significant disagreement between individual citizens, or 
communities, as to what constitutes human flourishing. This is due to the 
differing standpoints from which we make such judgements. To quote Rawls 
again: 
80  Rawls (2005: 58) 
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The diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical and 
moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere 
historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of 
the public culture of democracy. Under the political and social conditions 
secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of 
conflicting and irreconcilable – and what’s more, reasonable – 
comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist if such diversity 
does not already pertain.81 
Hence it is a “fact” of reasonable pluralism. Such disagreement about the good 
isn’t a fluke or coincidence. It is a fact about the exercise of reason under 
sufficiently democratic institutions. The level of freedom granted in such a 
society entails that each of us are subject to diverse affinities, associations and 
attachments, and that this will inevitably lead to intractable disagreement about 
the good: 
Thus it is not in general unreasonable to affirm any one of a number of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We recognise that our own doctrine 
has, and can have, for people generally, no special claims on them beyond 
their own view of its merits. Others who affirm doctrines different from 
ours are, we grant, reasonable also, and certainly not unreasonable. Since 
there are many reasonable doctrines, the idea of the reasonable does not 
require us, or others, to believe any specific reasonable doctrine, though 
we may do so. When we take the step beyond recognising the 
reasonableness of a doctrine and affirm our belief in it, we are not being 
unreasonable.82 
Rawls argues that such reasonable citizens recognise the burdens of judgement, 
and accept their consequences in directing the legitimate use of state power. 
Reasonable citizens are folk who recognise themselves as free and equal citizens 
possessing  the  two  moral  powers,  who  desire  to  honour  the  fair  terms  of 
81 ibid. p.36. 
82 ibid. p. 60. 
 
 
52 
cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society. Democratic society 
is marked by reasonable pluralism. That is, reasonable citizens will disagree 
about where the human good lies. Furthermore, each of them will recognise that 
others’ differing conceptions of the good are reasonable also. As such, there will 
be a diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines. 
The sources of such disagreement between reasonable persons are the burdens 
of judgement. These are the problems involved with the correct and 
conscientious exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary 
course of political life.83 There are three kinds of judgement which draw such 
burdens: (i)  judgements of  rationality –  balancing ends and estimating  their 
appropriate place in our way of life; (ii) judgements of reasonableness – 
assessing the strength of others’ claims against our own claims, against the 
claims of another and against the claims of our common practices and 
institutions; and (iii) judgements of reasonableness as it applies to our beliefs or 
schemes of thought.84 
Rawls lists six possible sources of disagreement between reasonable citizens, 
which constitute the burdens of judgement: 
a. The evidence bearing on a case might be conflicting or complex, and thus 
hard to assess. 
Even if we were to agree which considerations are relevant, we might 
disagree about their weight. 
The indeterminacy of concepts means that we must have to rely on 
interpretation. 
To some extent, the way that we assess evidence, and weigh moral and 
political values, might be shaped by our total experience over a whole life 
up until now. Our total experiences must always differ. 
We might disagree about which normative considerations are relevant, 
and how much force they hold. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
83 Ibid. p. 56. 
84 ibid. 
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f. Any system of social institutions is limited in the values that it can admit. 
Thus some selection must be made from the full list of values that might 
be realized.85 
As a result of such burdens of judgement, reasonable persons do not all affirm 
the same view about what constitutes human flourishing within a democratic 
society. There is a plurality of conceptions of the good in society, and such 
diversity can only be overcome by the oppressive use of state power.86 Thus, 
such conceptions cannot serve as the basis for lasting and reasoned political 
agreement. Reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgement set limits on 
what can be reasonably justified to others, so they endorse some form of liberty 
of conscience and freedom of thought.87 
Thus, according to Rawls, we should subscribe to anti-‐‐perfectionism. There 
exists intractable disagreement between individuals regarding what constitutes 
human flourishing. Such disagreement is the inevitable result of democratic 
institutions. Hence we should not justify any form of political institution and so 
on by an appeal to such conceptions.88 
10. The Priority of the Right 
The priority of the right, justified by the burdens of judgements, should lead us to 
anti-perfectionism. Disagreement of the good is inevitable and intractable, so we 
should restrict political action to the right, and conform our conceptions of the 
good to such a restriction. 
However, it is a common misconception that anti‐perfectionism both doesn’t 
care about, and doesn’t make room for human flourishing. This is incorrect. The 
anti‐perfectionist does not forbid individuals to shape their lives as they see fit 
85 ibid. pp. 56-‐‐57. 
86 Ibid. p.54. 
87 Ibid. p.61. 
88 This is because, for Rawls, political power must be legitimated by appeal to those who are 
subject to it. There are other non-Rawlsian arguments for anti-perfectionism, which I will discuss 
later. 
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(within the constraints of justice). Rather she says that deciding where one’s 
good lies, and subsequently pursuing such a good, should be a private matter. 
Anti-perfectionism is a political ideal. It appeals to the political sphere. The anti‐ 
perfectionist does not say that individuals, or non-political institutions cannot 
pursue their own understanding of the good life. Far from it, such folk are free to 
pursue their conceptions of the good insofar as they are compatible with the 
principles of the right, as per the priority of the right. (Rawls calls such 
conceptions “permissible” conceptions of the good.)89 What the anti‐perfectionist 
insists is that what guides us in private life is, at least sometimes, inappropriate 
for political justice. Thus, we are free to pursue our conception of the good 
privately, insofar as doing so does not contravene the principles of justice.90 
Furthermore, Rawls argues that no less than five “ideas of  the  good”91  can  be 
found in his form of anti-perfectionism. As well as permissible conceptions of the 
good, he argues that rationality, the primary goods, political virtues, and the well-
ordered society are present in his political conception of justice.92 However, as an 
anti-perfectionist theory, where any of these conceptions of the goods are 
promoted, they are done so not by an appeal to human flourishing,  but  by  an 
appeal to the need to maintain justice. They are political goods, not human 
goods, and thus do not presuppose any conception of the good. They constitute 
what is good for individuals as citizens. 93 They say nothing about human 
flourishing. As such, any promotion of these goods is justified by an appeal to the 
right. Thus, for example, the political virtues are promoted because they are 
needed to uphold justice. They are not promoted because such virtues are said to 
constitute human flourishing. Again, recall my  discussion  earlier  in  the  chapter. 
The  issue  is  what  reasons  are  being  used  to  justify  action.  In  the  case  of 
promoting such goods, Rawls is not appealing to human flourishing, but to the 
89 See, for example, ibid. pp. 190-194. 
90 Again, this demonstrates the misleading nature of the term neutrality. Anti‐perfectionism is 
not neutral between all conceptions of the good. It is not neutral between the would-‐‐be rapist 
and the keen gardener. It is only neutral between those that do not contravene the principles of 
right. See my discussion of Sandel in section 7. 
91 This is Rawls’s phrase. (2005: 176). Importantly, these are not conceptions of the good. As I go 
on to point out, they say nothing about human flourishing. 
92 ibid. pp. 176‐200.  
93 ibid. p. 188. 
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need   to   uphold   the   principles   of   justice.   Hence,   such   promotion   is   not 
perfectionist. 
Thus, the anti-perfectionist does not forbid individuals to pursue their own 
conception of the good. It says that it is up to persons individually or collectively 
to decide upon their conceptions of the good, and their pursuit is legitimate 
insofar as it does not contravene the principles of the right. 
11. Asymmetry and the Circumstances of Politics 
Thus, anti-perfectionism, justified by an appeal to the burdens of judgement, can 
allow individuals to shape their lives as they see fit, even if it does not promote 
any conception(s) of the good. However, Jeremy Waldron, in his book Law and 
Disagreement, has cast doubt on whether the burdens of judgement can secure 
anti-perfectionism as Rawls claims. 
Waldron points out that if we think it plausible that the burdens of judgement 
lead to reasonable disagreement amongst citizens concerning the truth of 
conceptions of the good, then it could be inferred that for the same reasons 
reasonable people might also disagree about the principles of right: 
Nowhere, does [Rawls] infer that for the same reasons [the burdens of 
judgement], in a well ordered society, reasonable people might be 
expected to disagree fundamentally about the basic terms and principles 
of their association.94 
Waldron is questioning why the right isn’t also subject to the burdens of 
judgement on Rawls’s account. Rawls mentions that reasonable people realise 
that they cannot reach agreement on conceptions of the good, so endorse some 
form of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. But perhaps some 
reasonable  people  don’t  value  such  liberties  highly?  Why  is  reasonable  and 
workable  political  agreement  in  judgement  on  the  truth  of  the  principles  of 
94  Waldron (1999: 152) 
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justice possible, but such agreement in judgement on the truth of conceptions of 
the good impossible? If Rawls allows that people will not affirm the same 
comprehensive doctrine, why not allow that they might not affirm the same 
conception of justice? If reasonable disagreement exists about the good, then 
surely it exists about the right as well? Waldron claims that if we cannot reach 
consensus about the good under free institutions, then we also cannot reach 
consensus about the right. If disagreement exists, then it exists in both spheres of 
morality. As Waldron argues, pluralism about the good “is not the only pluralism 
with which we have to deal in a modern society”. 95 
This is a strong objection, and one that I agree with. Dissensus clearly exists 
amongst reasonable people regarding the principles of justice, thus if we idealise 
away such disagreement, as Rawls does, then we could also idealise away 
disagreement on the good. But if we did this, then Rawls would no longer have 
an argument for anti-perfectionism. Recall the Razian charge sketched above. 
This argued that the anti-perfectionist must secure a non-arbitrary separation 
between the right and the good. Rawls attempts to do this by claiming that the 
good is subject to intractable disagreement. However, if Waldron is correct, and 
disagreement about the right is also inevitable, then again there is no way of 
separating the two. Once more, restricting political action to the right would be 
arbitrary. If both are subject to disagreement, what justifies permitting states to 
act upon principles of right, but not upon conceptions of the good? But, if we 
were to idealise away disagreement on the right, then it would be arbitrary not 
to do so with the good, and thus again no separation can be made. 
Thus, how might an anti-perfectionist respond? Firstly, one might drop the 
Rawlsian line and argue that disagreement about the good is not the only reason 
one might be an anti‐perfectionist.96 That is, an anti‐perfectionism might say that 
regardless of whether there is consensus or dissensus about human flourishing, 
there  is  something  prima  facie  illegitimate  about  using  state  apparatus  to 
promote the good. I shall not pursue this line of thought in my thesis. 
95 ibid. p. 158. 
96 Some perfectionists, such as Wall (1998), seem to assume that the Rawlsian justification is the 
only justification for anti-perfectionism. This is incorrect. 
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Instead, I want to construct an anti‐perfectionist account of political morality in 
the face of this disagreement. In Law and Disagreement, Waldron discusses the 
“circumstances of politics”.97 The circumstances of politics are the combination 
of two factors; (1) the persistence of deep and broad disagreement about what is 
to be done and why; and (2) the need for action in concert in the face of this 
disagreement. Waldron starts by saying, correctly, that there are many things 
that can only be achieved through coordinated action.98 The circumstances of 
politics, then, constitutes the “felt need among members of a certain group for a 
common framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the 
face of disagreement about what that framework, decision or action should be.”99 
Thus the circumstances of politics include not just the disagreements endemic to 
political activity, but also the need to construct an account of justice in the face of 
these deep and broad disagreement between citizens on matters of politics and 
morality. As Waldron says, the two aspects of the circumstances of politics go 
together. Disagreement would not be an issue if there was no need for 
coordinated action, and such action would not give rise to politics if people did 
not disagree about what form it should take.100 In a nutshell, people feel the need 
for a common framework, even in the face of disagreement about what that 
framework should be. This is because they need a framework to mediate the 
different moral outlooks and other disagreements that exist amongst them.101 
The circumstances of politics are a feature of the world that cannot be “idealised 
away”.102 The burdens of judgement entail that disagreement is pervasive in 
modern liberal society. If we were to imagine that this was not the case as a 
starting point for a political morality, then we would not be constructing a theory 
that applies to us as members of modern society. As Simon Hope argues, if we 
want our account of justice to guide our action we should not idealise away 
97 ibid. 101 ff. 
98 ibid. 101. 
99 ibid. 102. 
100 ibid. 
101 The circumstances of politics should not be thought of as pre‐political in a Hobbesian sense. 
Such circumstances have never existed. Instead it should be thought of as the activity of 
interpreting and reforming existing structures. 
102  Hope (2010: 140). 
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important features of the world to which such an account is tied.103 Instead, we 
should use the circumstances of politics – the need for collective action in the 
face of pervasive disagreement -‐‐ as the point from which we need to come up 
with an account of what justice demands. How are we to proceed, or what can we 
agree  to  implement,  despite  the  fact  that  there  are  a  multiplicity  of  ethical 
outlooks found amongst us? 
A situation of deep disagreement is the material from which an account of justice 
must be constructed. Citizens require a common framework, within which they 
can adjudicate between the claims of conflicting ethical outlooks, in order to 
achieve the things that we can only achieve together – whether that be 
something practical like an efficient transport system, or something moral, such 
as a workable welfare system. Yet at the same time, we disagree about what 
those things should be. As I have already mentioned, we should not idealise away 
the fact that when constructing our account of justice, we find ourselves in a 
situation of pervasive disagreement. As Waldron puts it, “our common basis for 
matters  of  justice  has  to  be  forged  in  the  heat  of  our  disagreements,  not 
predicated on the assumption of a cool consensus that exists only as an ideal.”104 
Obviously, these disagreements are not between a handful of people. In the 
circumstances of politics, we have millions, or perhaps billions, of people, with 
different perspectives. The challenge is for this vast number of people to work 
together to achieve a mutually acceptable framework. Thus, in the circumstances 
of politics, people must compromise or trade‐off or vote and so on. We must 
construct our principles of justice in the face of disagreement about what form 
they should take. Any attempt to construct a political system will fail unless folk 
cooperate and compromise.105 
103 ibid 
104 ibid. p.106. 
105 Waldron’s focus is on liberal politics. Obviously there are other political responses to 
disagreement; one group could oppress or subjugate another. There were still politics in Nazi 
Germany and Stalinist Russia. There just weren’t liberal politics. 
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The question is, how will the circumstances of politics play out in a 
heterogeneous, pluralistic society like ours? What will philosophically, culturally 
and religiously diverse individuals agree to include in the framework that will 
guide and constrain them? 
I will argue that citizens will agree to construct an anti-perfectionist account of 
justice that takes the form of a set of constraints. I shall justify restricting 
political action to the right by arguing that although disagreement is endemic in 
both spheres, there is a possibility of convergence on a minimal set of principles 
of justice, even if people happen to disagree. I shall further argue that there is no 
possibility of such convergence on judgements of human flourishing. This will be 
the subject of chapter seven. 
However, before we get there, I need to narrow my focus. In chapter three I will 
argue that contextual perfectionism is the most plausible form of perfectionism, 
by arguing that the two most prominent ahistorical perfectionist accounts – 
Nussbaum’s overlapping consensus of functions argument and Hurka’s human 
nature argument  –  do  not work.  Then,  in  chapter  four,  I will introduce  and 
examine what is said to be the most plausible form of contextual perfectionism -‐‐ 
the liberal perfectionism of Joseph Raz. In chapters five and six, I will examine 
and ultimately reject two attempts to refute Raz, from Jonathan Quong and Brian 
Barry respectively. 
12. Why Anti-Perfectionism 
I shall conclude this chapter by briefly discussing why many see anti‐ 
perfectionism as an attractive view of political morality. I have discussed much of 
this above, but it is a good idea to draw it together. Firstly, and perhaps most 
importantly, anti‐perfectionism is said to respect agents as individual people 
capable of identifying, formulating and attaining their own view about human 
flourishing. That is, it allows citizens to freely select and pursue their own 
conceptions of the good, instead of using the state to dictate to individuals what 
is good for them.   If the state did promote a certain conception of the good, it 
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would be overriding the judgement of its citizens and hence would not treat 
them as moral agents of equal standing. Anti-perfectionism believes that 
judgement regarding human flourishing is a distinctively private matter, and 
should not be the concern of the state. Therefore, the state should not use its 
infrastructure to embody such judgements. Instead it should simply secure the 
principles of right, within which citizens can freely select their own (permissible) 
conceptions  of  the  good.  In  so  doing,  the  state  respects  its  citizens  as  free, 
independent, equal individuals who are responsible for their own lives. 
Furthermore, anti-perfectionism can allow its citizens such freedom, whilst still 
placing restrictions on how they use it. Thus, the anti-perfectionist can still 
outlaw rape, murder, theft and so on. This is because they contravene the 
principles of the right. That is, people are prevented from, and punished for, 
committing rape because this clearly violates a right to personal security, for 
example. Importantly, though, such action is not justified by an appeal to human 
flourishing. Instead, it appeals to the principles regulating human interaction 
which the right embodies. 
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3 
Universal Perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I made the distinction between universal or ahistorical 
perfectionism and contextual perfectionism. Universal perfectionism claims that 
there is some account of the good that applies cross‐culturally such that what 
constitutes a flourishing life is the same however a person is historically or 
geographically located. Contextual perfectionism, on the other hand, says that 
conceptions of the good are particular to certain cultures, and that someone who 
flourishes in our culture may not do so in another one. 
In this chapter I will examine the two paradigm accounts of universal 
perfectionism – Thomas Hurka’s human nature account 106 and Martha 
Nussbaum’s functioning approach.107 I will argue that both depend on formal 
accounts of the good in order for them to apply cross‐culturally. However, it is 
precisely this formal nature of the good that renders their universal accounts of 
perfectionism implausible. 
2. Hurka’s Human Nature Account of Perfectionism 
I will begin with Thomas Hurka. Hurka defines the good life in terms of human 
nature.  He  says  that  “certain  properties  …  constitute  human  nature  or  are 
definitive of humanity” and that the flourishing life “develops these properties to 
106  See Hurka Perfectionism (1993). 
107 See Nussbaum ‘Aristotelian Social Democracy’ (1990), Woman and Human Development 
(2000), Frontiers of Justice (2006) and ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism’ (2011). 
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a high degree.”108 The perfectionist tradition, which I briefly mentioned at the 
beginning of chapter 1, understood perfectionism in this sense. As Hurka 
mentions, the likes of Aristotle, Marx and Nietzsche hold something like the 
human nature account.109 Although they disagree about what constitutes human 
nature, or what properties humans should develop, they agree that an account of 
the good lies in human nature. Hurka terms his human nature approach narrow 
perfectionism, and contrasts it with broad perfectionism, which holds that we 
should develop certain capacities, achieve certain ends etc. where these are not 
specified by our human nature. 110 
A key question for Hurka is ‘in what kinds of property does [perfectionism] take 
our nature to exist?’111 Obviously it cannot be all of them. There are countless 
human properties, and most of them are trivial, or worse. The secretion of bodily 
fluids is a human property. It would seem absurd to say that humans who 
develop this property by sweating and using the toilet often are thereby 
flourishing. Thus, as Hurka says, a plausible account of perfectionism must pick 
out a particular    subset    of    human    properties    that    should    be    
developed    by 
individuals.112 
Hurka argues that there are two tests that a plausible account of human nature 
perfectionism must pass: 
1. “We need to specify a concept of human nature that picks out a subset of 
human properties by using criterion that is intrinsically appealing and 
true to the perfectionist idea.”113 “Our nature, as defined, must seem in 
itself morally significant.”114 
2. Only properties that seem worth developing in their own right should fall 
under this concept of nature. 
108  Hurka (1993: 3). 
109 ibid.     
110 ibid. p. 4. 
111 ibid. p. 9. 
112 ibid. 
113 ibid. p. 10. 
114 ibid. p. 9. 
 
 
63 
To offer a concept of human nature that gives us properties that on their own 
seem morally trivial (and hence fails on the second task) is to fall foul of what 
Hurka calls the “wrong‐properties objection.” Thus, we need to come up with 
both a plausible account of human nature, and a set of nontrivial properties that 
follow from specifying human nature in this way. 
So what is the most promising account of human nature going forward? That is, 
what account of human nature can give us a set of valuable properties, whilst 
also being plausible in its own right? Hurka offers, and rejects two views. 
First he discusses human nature as offering those properties that are distinctive 
of humans, or possessed only by them.115 It identifies properties that are unique 
to humans, and not shared with members of the animal kingdom. At first this 
might seem an attractive proposition. Humans are uniquely rational, so 
perfectionism would instruct agents to develop this rationality, through 
performing complex tasks and so on. But, as Hurka argues, this concept of nature 
falls to the wrong properties objection. Although it might pick out some valuable 
properties, it also picks out a number of trivial ones. To use Hurka’s examples, 
humans are the only beings who start fires, despoil the environment and kill 
things for fun. It would seem absurd to say that developing these properties 
would constitute a flourishing life.116 
However, as well as falling to the wrong-properties objection, the distinctiveness 
approach also fails to pass the first test specified above. The distinctiveness view 
relies on facts about nonhuman animals. The claim that rationality is unique to 
humanity is reliant on facts not just about humans, but also nonhuman animals. 
We can only stipulate whether some property is distinctive of human beings by 
making claims about nonhuman animals. But, says Hurka, how can facts about 
nonhumans affect our nature and our good. If we discover beings on a far away 
115 ibid. p. 10. 
116 ibid. p. 11. 
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planet who have always been rational, does that mean that rationality has never 
been good for us?117 
Having rejected the distinctiveness view, Hurka discusses the essence view. This 
view equates human nature with those properties that are essential to humans. 
These essential properties are such that they would be possessed by humans in 
all possible worlds. They are possessed necessarily by human beings. Again, we 
can look at rationality. Such a view says that rationality is essential to human 
beings, such that a being who lacked it was not fully human. Thus, perfectionism 
would   say   that   to   flourish   is   to   succeed   in   pursuits   that   develop   our 
rationality.118 
The main advantage over the distinctiveness view is that the human nature as 
essence approach does not depend upon facts about nonhuman animals. To say 
that some property is essential to humans appeals only to facts about humans.119 
It also seems to point to the right kind of properties. It seems to pick out 
properties that are fundamental to us. That “realize what, at bottom we are.”120 
Thus, the human nature as essence view seems to stipulate a plausible account of 
what human nature is, and thus passes the first test. 
However, like the distinctiveness view, the essence view falls to the wrong 
properties objection. Although it might pick out some attractive properties, it is 
far too inclusive. Human beings are necessarily occupiers of space. However, 
again, it would be odd to suggest that this is something we should develop in our 
account of flourishing.121 
Thus,  both  the  distinctiveness  view  and  the  essence  view  cannot  succeed. 
Nevertheless, Hurka does think that the essence view has promise because it 
fulfils the first task above – it gives us an account of human nature that seems 
117 ibid. 
118 ibid. 
119 ibid. 
120 ibid. p. 12. 
121 ibid. 
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morally significant. However, it needs to bolstered by some other device in order 
for it not to fall foul of the wrong-properties objection.122 
Hurka spells out six classes of essential properties for humans, namely: 
a. Those shared by all objects – for example, being red if red. These are the 
properties essential to a human qua object. 
Those found only in physical objects – for example, occupying space. 
These are the properties essential to a human qua physical object. 
Those found only in living things – for example having living flesh. These 
are the properties essential to a human qua living thing. 
Those found only in animals – for example having a body structured for 
functions of growth, movement and so on. These are the properties 
essential to a human qua animal. 
Those found only in humans – for example exercising rationality. These 
are the properties essential to a human qua human being. 
Those found only in individual persons – for example having developed 
from some particular sperm and egg. These are the properties essential to 
a human qua individual.123 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Hurka then asks, which of these types of essential properties do we want in our 
concept of nature? Firstly, he rejects the final class, and it is fairly obvious why. 
Hurka’s account is looking for properties that are common to all humanity. 
Therefore, it cannot include properties that are essential only for individual 
human beings.124 Hurka also rejects the second and third classes of essential 
human  properties.  Properties  shared  with  numbers  and  stones  can  have  no 
moral significance.125 
However, he says the remaining three classes of property – those essential to 
humans qua living things, qua animals and qua humans should be included in an 
122 ibid. p. 14. 
123 ibid. I will assume, for the sake of argument, that this list is exhaustive. 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid. p. 15. 
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account of human nature. The best perfectionism, he claims, develops those 
properties that are essential to human beings as living things. He calls this the 
“essence‐and‐life” view. It has an advantage over the essence view alone in that it 
does not fall to the wrong‐properties objection. It rules out those properties that 
are essential to humans, but seem of no moral significance, such as occupying 
space.126 However, it also retains intuitive moral significance of the essence view 
alone. 
3. Physicality and Rationality 
Thus, Hurka has settled upon the most plausible account of human nature, the 
essence‐and‐life view, and has explained how it rules out trivial properties like 
occupying physical space and so on. But, now we need to look at what properties 
it rules in. What are the properties that are essential to human beings qua living 
thing, qua animal, and qua human? The intrinsic appeal of the essence‐and‐life 
view of human nature is that perfectionism tells us to develop what we 
essentially are. But until we actually specify what those properties are, it is 
completely uninformative. 
Hurka wants to defend what he calls an Aristotelian theory of human nature. 
This theory tells us, he says, that “humans share with other animals certain 
bodily essential properties, but are also essentially rational in both  the 
theoretical and practical senses of “rational.””127 Applying this theory of human 
nature  to  perfectionism,  we  are  told  to  develop  our  physical  nature,  our 
theoretical rationality and our practical rationality. 
Turning to the first, human beings necessarily have bodies, and these bodies 
necessarily have a determinate structure. No being without a functioning 
respiratory, nervous, muscular system, etc. can count as a human.128 These 
systems each have their own characteristic activity. For example, our respiratory 
system extracts oxygen from the air. In order to remain alive, each system must 
126 ibid. p. 16. 
127 ibid. p. 37. 
128 ibid. 
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function to a minimal degree. In order to achieve physical perfection, it must do 
so to a sufficient degree. The basic level of physical perfection is a healthy body, 
where all of our systems function to a reasonable degree.129 
To achieve higher physical perfection, we must perform rigorous bodily activity. 
When we exercise, our systems perform their characteristic activity to a higher 
degree, for example, our respiratory system extracts oxygen at a more rapid rate. 
Thus, the highest physical perfection is often found in athletes. As Hurka says, 
“when a human runs 100m in 9.86 seconds … something physically splendid 
occurs.” Importantly, this physical good is intrinsic. When Usain Bolt runs 100m 
in under ten seconds, he achieves many nonphysical goods, a sense of personal 
achievement, for example. However, the physical feat of running such a race in 
such  a  time  is,  in  itself,  good.  Achieving  great  athletic  feats  is  of  intrinsic 
perfectionist worth.130 
As Hurka points out, few of us are able to perform incredible athletic tasks, and 
thus cannot achieve the highest physical perfection.131 However, this does not 
cast doubt on including physical perfection in his account of perfectionism. Most 
of us can preserve our bodily health, and engage in some athletic tasks. I don’t 
achieve as high a physical good as Lionel Messi by playing seven aside every 
Sunday night. But I do achieve modest physical perfection. 
The remaining two properties essential to humans as living things are 
theoretical and practical rationality. Hurka claims that humans are essentially 
rational in both senses. They are rational because they can form and act upon 
sophisticated beliefs and intentions whose contents “stretch across persons and 
times and that are arranged in complex hierarchies.” 132 This is what 
distinguishes us from animals. Animals can have isolated perceptual beliefs, but 
such beliefs lack explanatory understanding. Likewise, they can have local aims, 
129 ibid. p. 38. 
130 ibid. p. 39. 
131 ibid. 
132 ibid. 
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but they lack the ability to predict patterns of action that stretch through time 
and involve other animals. 
Perfectionism says that the flourishing life is one that develops theoretical and 
practical rationality to a reasonable degree. But how does one go about doing so? 
The first important thing to note is that Hurka’s account is purely formal. It does 
not say that humans essentially have beliefs about some specific subject matter, 
or necessarily pursue some end.133 So, this form of perfectionism cannot tell 
agents to develop their rationality by doing some particular activity, or forming 
some particular belief, where this is informed by the value of the content of that 
activity or belief. Instead, it must measure the value of beliefs and actions by 
appealing to their formal quality – do they develop our theoretical rationality 
and/or practical rationality? It is this formal nature that determines the intrinsic 
value of an item of knowledge, form of activity etc. 
Thus Hurka’s perfectionism instructs us to pursue ends that develop our 
theoretical and practical rationality. However, these two forms of rationality 
admit of degrees. Some lives that develop them are better than others. 
Aristotelian perfectionism favours beliefs and actions that are general, unified 
and complex. 
Generality takes two forms; extent and hierarchical dominance. An item of 
knowledge is the more valuable the greater its extent.134 Knowing that there is 
only one telephone box on Albert Drive, Glasgow is not as valuable as knowing 
that E=MC². This is because the latter is much more extended than the former. 
The state of affairs it describes includes far more objects. Similarly, an action is 
the more valuable the greater its extent. I achieve more if I manage to repair the 
structure of the Forth Road Bridge than I would if I threw a stone into the river. 
Again, this is because my achievement is more extended; it affects a great many 
people and for a considerable time, whereas the throwing of a stone does not. 
133 ibid. p. 114. 
134 I am following Hurka here in slipping between the use of “belief” and “item of knowledge.” As 
he points out on p. 202 n.2, if belief p turns out to be false, this negates p’s quality. 
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Furthermore, a piece of knowledge is the more valuable the greater its 
hierarchical dominance. In knowing that E=MC² I can discover many other 
truths, which then become subordinate to it in my theory of the world. However, 
in knowing the number of telephone boxes on Albert Drive I can discover very 
little. Similarly, an action is more valuable the greater its hierarchical 
importance. In order to repair the bridge, I must dedicate a large chunk of my 
time to it, and I must pursue many other ends as subordinate means to it. This is 
not the case with the throwing of the stone. This is accomplished in little time, 
and with just a few bodily movements.135 
In short, a belief or piece of action is extended if “its content stretches across 
time and objects, including persons.” It is hierarchically dominant if “it has many 
other [beliefs or actions] subordinate to it in a rational hierarchy, either because 
it is used to explain them … or because they are means to it.”136 Thus, Hurka’s 
perfectionism   instructs   agents   to   develop   their   rationality   by   pursuing 
knowledge, and performing actions, which are more extended and dominant. 
Hurka’s perfectionism favours lives that are organised around a single end, or in 
which large parts have a single end.137 Such  a  life  is  unified  in  a  way  that  one 
lived only day‐to‐day is not. This in itself is a formal claim. The very organization of 
a unified life gives it value regardless of the value of the ends pursued within it. 
Obviously, in reality, no lives are fully unified. But, the more  unity  found within a 
life the greater level of perfection achieved. The value of a unified life is entailed 
by generality. A single life-‐‐defining end has subordinate to it everything else that 
a person accomplishes in her life. Thus, a life of spontaneity can be just as 
unified as a life involving meticulous planning. A unified life also involves 
considerable extent. A single end or goal will sit at the top, or at least near the 
top, of an agent’s hierarchy of ends and will extend across time. 
135 ibid. pp. 115-‐‐6. 
136 ibid. p. 116. 
137 ibid. p. 121. 
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Hurka’s account also favours activities that are complex, intricate and 
challenging.138 This because such activities stretch our capacities, and demand 
more rationality. When Lionel Messi plays football, he solves sophisticated 
tactical problems, such as how much weight to place on a pass or how much 
bend to put on a free kick. Similarly, philosophers are engaged in challenging 
projects and, if they succeed, achieve much more than were they to do something 
else. 
Again, this demand for complexity follows from generality. Difficult activities 
usually involve more hierarchical dominance. In order to score, Lionel Messi 
must pursue a series of subordinate activities aimed at being well‐placed to take a 
shot on his strongest foot, for example. He must time his run so that he beats 
the offside trap. He must let the ball run across his body so that he is positioned 
to strike the ball with his left foot. He must increase his speed in order to out run 
the defender, and so on. Complex activities also involve extent. What sets players 
like Lionel Messi apart from the likes of you or I, is his ability to consider the 
game as a whole. When he plays a pass, his thought is not simply ‘I am passing 
the ball to another member of my team.’ Instead he is thinking of how this pass 
will lead to further stages of play. He has the ability to consider how this pass 
might lead to a goal being scored a number of stages of play down the line. 
As well as dominance and extent, difficult activities also involve precision.139 
When I take a shot, I aim to hit the ball somewhere to the left of the goalkeeper. 
When Lionel Messi takes a shot, he aims to hit it in the top left hand corner, a 
couple of inches inside the post, out of the reach of the ‘keeper. He has my 
intentions as well as many more that I cannot muster. 
Obviously these three aspects of complexity can come apart. To use Hurka’s 
examples, painting by numbers involves great precision, but lacks extended 
states or dominance. Politics can be extended but is often not precise etc.140 The 
best activities score high on all three. They can be ‘higher’ activities, such as 
138 Ibid. p. 123ff. 
139 ibid. p. 124. 
140 ibid. p. 125. 
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chess, but they need not be. Everyday pursuits, such as gardening, score high on 
generality, unity and complexity. 
4. Rational Wrongdoers: Rejecting Hurka 
To sum up, Hurka’s perfectionism tells us to develop those properties that are 
essential to humans qua living things. He identifies these properties as physical 
prowess, theoretical rationality and practical rationality. Hurka’s account is 
formal; he does not say anything about the substantial content of the ends that 
best develop the three areas of perfection. However, he can still make 
judgements about the quality of ends. He says that the best ends, and thus those 
that develop our human properties to a high degree, are those that are dominant 
and extended, are part of a unified life, and involve great deals of complexity. 
How would Hurka respond to the challenge of Rawls’s burdens of judgement, 
and the circumstances of politics we find ourselves in? At the end of the previous 
chapter I mentioned the vast dissensus that exists about the good (and justice), 
and claimed that the task of the political philosopher is to construct a political 
morality in the light of this disagreement. Although Hurka does not address this 
challenge, I suspect his response would be: when it comes to politics, it is beside 
the point whether people converge on any account of the good. The test is 
whether or not we can come up with a plausible account of human flourishing. If 
we can, then we have reason to promote it through political institutions, 
regardless of whether it is subject to a consensus. In politics what matters is 
what is true, not what people believe to be true. I have come up with a promising 
account of human flourishing, and we should use the state to promote it. 
I shall leave aside the general question of whether truth should trump belief until 
chapter seven. However, here I want to argue that Hurka does not in fact offer a 
promising account of human flourishing. I will argue that the formal nature of 
Hurka’s account renders it implausible. 
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For Hurka, in order to judge whether a life is flourishing, and to what degree, we 
should not look at the substantive quality of the lives pursued. An individual is 
flourishing if she develops her physical nature, and her theoretical and practical 
rationality, whatever ends she seeks in developing them. When we look at her 
ends, we should ask, are they general, are they part of a unified life, do they 
involve complexity? If the answer is yes, then she is flourishing, regardless of 
what those ends are. It is this formal account that permits pluralism. The 
footballer, chess player, carpenter, teacher, care worker, businessman and so on, 
are all flourishing. Their pursuits, although vastly different in their substantive 
content, all develop their physical nature and/or rationality to a high degree. 
However, as Hurka himself recognizes141, these properties can be developed in 
pursuit of intuitively bad ends. Imagine the great Machiavellian villains of film 
and literature, from Iago to Michael Corleone to Stringer Bell. All use great 
cunning in order to perform bad acts. In The Godfather II, Michael Corleone 
organises and carries out a plan to execute his brother Fredo. This plan involves 
the use of a great deal of rationality, both theoretical and practical. From the 
moment in Cuba that Michael  discovers that Fredo has  betrayed him to the 
moment when Al Neri shoots Fredo on a fishing boat in Nevada, Michael “form[s] 
and acts on sophisticated beliefs and intentions, ones whose contents stretch 
across persons and times and that are arranged in complex hierarchies.”142 
The “accomplishment” of killing Fredo is greatly extended. It affected many 
people and for a considerable time. It is also dominant. Michael committed a 
significant amount of time to the plan, and took a number of subordinate steps to 
achieve it. Hence, the act of killing Fredo was distinctly general. It was also 
carried out as part of a unified life. For Michael, honour is paramount. He lives 
his life largely according to this code of conduct. Michael organized the killing of 
Fredo because Fredo had betrayed him. The act of killing Fredo also involved 
great complexity. Michael had to solve sophisticated tactical problems, such as 
when to carry out the execution, how to shield it from his children, who to 
141 See ibid. pp. 20, 62 and 134. 
142 ibid. p. 39. 
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instruct  to  carry  out  the  murder  and  so  on.  There  was  also  great  precision 
demonstrated by Neri in carrying out the brutal shooting. 
Thus, in organising and following through with Fredo’s killing, Michael Corleone 
developed his theoretical and practical rationality. According to Hurka’s account 
of perfectionism, Michael is flourishing. In developing these properties, he is 
achieving some perfection, despite his actions being intuitively bad. The formal 
nature of Hurka’s perfectionism means that we cannot make any evaluative 
judgements about individual ends beyond saying that they are general, unified or 
complex. We cannot say that Michael is not flourishing by having his brother 
killed. Indeed it seems that we must say that he is flourishing. 
Hurka does say that the Michael Corleones of this world are wrong, but he does 
so by focusing on other agents. Hurka says that his perfectionism is “agent 
neutral.”143 That is, it requires each human to care equally about the perfection 
of all, rather than merely his own. According to agent neutrality, each 
individual’s duty to develop his own rationality is constrained by an equal duty 
to promote rationality in others. Thus, if an act does more to set back the 
perfection of another than it does to advance the agent’s then the act is wrong. 
Thus, Michael Corleone should not kill Fredo, as in doing so he removes Fredo’s 
ability to achieve any perfection. Meanwhile Michael can develop his rationality 
in other ways; killing Fredo is not Michael’s only path to perfection. 
However, I do not think this appeal to agent neutrality is enough to save Hurka’s 
account. Firstly, it implies that where there is no affected other, or there is less of 
a negative effect on her than there is a positive effect on the agent, then what 
seem like intuitively bad aims are permitted. Imagine someone who exercised 
great rationality, as well as their physical nature, in the poaching of wild animals. 
Although the end might not be greatly extended, it might be dominant, requiring 
meticulous planning and subordinate ends. It might also be part of unified life, or 
even a dominant end. The traps he sets might also require great ingenuity and 
143 ibid. p. 62. 
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precision. According to Hurka, such a life is not wrong. In fact, it achieves a great 
deal of perfection. 
This takes me onto my second, more fundamental criticism. Intuitively, when we 
say that Michael Corleone is wrong in executing Fredo, it is not only because it 
stops Fredo from flourishing. We also think that developing one’s rationality by 
planning and committing murder is wrong because it stops Michael flourishing. A 
plausible perfectionism does not simply say that the pursuit of intuitively bad 
options is wrong only because it affects other people’s ability to achieve 
perfection. It also says it is wrong because in doing so, you are not flourishing. 
Even if we take perfectionism to be agent-‐‐neutral, and instruct agents to care 
equally about the flourishing of all, it seems counter intuitive to claim that the 
only reason that Michael Corleone’s actions are wrong is because it stops others 
from flourishing. Perfectionism is, after all, about good human lives. 
Hurka can’t say that Corleone is not flourishing. In fact, he is committed to the 
view that Corleone actually achieves some perfection, even if killing Fredo is all 
things considered wrong (due to agent neutrality). This is something he readily 
admits: 
If Aristotelian perfection consists in exercising rationality, and people can 
exercise rationality while harming others, they can achieve perfection 
while harming others. More specifically, they can achieve perfection by 
using complex means to carry out a long‐term plan aimed at harming 
many people.144 
So not only is Hurka unable to say that Corleone is not flourishing, he must 
commit himself to saying that he is. Again, this is counter‐intuitive. It seems 
absurd to say that Corleone is living a good human life (even if, all things 
considered, he should not live the life he leads due to its effect on others). It is 
counter  to  the  perfectionist  tradition  to  say  that  wrongdoers  can  flourish. 
Perfectionism  is  meant  to  offer  an  account  of  good  human  lives.  If  Hurka’s 
144 ibid. p. 134. 
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perfectionism says that the Corleone’s of this world live good human lives, then 
surely it is defective. 
In claiming that Corleone is flourishing, Hurka’s account must give intrinsic 
worth to the ends that he pursues. As we’ve seen, Hurka’s account is formal. It 
tells us to pursue ends which develop our physical nature and rationality. As 
such, it measures the value of these ends by the degree to which they help us do 
so.145 Thus, ends which are, for example, extended, dominant, part of a unified 
life and complex have great intrinsic worth. As I pointed out above, organising 
and carry through with the plan to kill Fredo contained all those properties. So, 
according  to  Hurka,  the  act  of  organising  the  execution  of  Fredo  has  great 
intrinsic worth. Again this is highly counter‐intuitive. 
One might respond at this point by asking, why place so much emphasis on 
intuitions? Hurka’s account might not be faithful to the perfectionist tradition, 
but it is coherent. This response must fail, because Hurka himself appeals so 
strongly   to   intuitions   in   defence   of   his   perfectionism.   Hurka   says   that 
perfectionism must cohere with our intuitive moral judgements. 
It must show, first, that the general perfectionist ideal, that of developing 
human nature, is attractive when considered by itself as a potential 
foundation for morality … second, the defence must show that the ideal 
has attractive consequences, both at the middle level, where it identifies 
the properties whose development is intrinsically good, and  at lower 
levels, where it makes particular claims about which activities are best and 
right.”146 
But, as we have seen, claims about which activities are best can only be formal, 
allowing for the execution of a family member to be of value. But this is not an 
“attractive consequence” for any morality. Hurka appeals to intuitions in order to 
defend   his   perfectionism,   but   those   very   intuitions   render   his   account 
145 ibid. p. 115. 
146 ibid. p. 31. My emphasis. 
 
 
76 
implausible. Even if he has answered the wrong-‐‐properties objection, he falls 
foul of what might be called the “wrong-activities objection.” His account of 
human nature identifies properties that can be developed in intuitively immoral 
activities, and thus must say that lives which contain many such activities are 
flourishing. 
As well as not being able to cohere with our intuitive moral judgements, Hurka’s 
account is not true to the perfectionist tradition of which he takes himself to be a 
part. As I have said, Hurka’s perfectionism is agent neutral. It tells agents to care 
equally about the perfection of others as their own. The reason that it is wrong 
for Michael Corleone to execute Fredo is because in doing so he removes Fredo’s 
ability to flourish. The reason that Hurka adopts agent neutrality is that  he 
rejects a moralistic view of human nature. Hurka thinks that it is implausible to 
claim that the rational person is necessarily virtuous. 147 As I have said, Hurka’s 
account of human nature is purely formal – it says nothing about the substantial 
content of our ends. Thus, Corleone can develop his human nature through 
committing wrongdoing. However, if we were to reject moralistic accounts of 
human nature, and subscribe to an agent‐relative account of perfectionism, then 
we cannot condemn the killing of Fredo. If all one is concerned with is advancing 
one’s own rationality, and rational folk are not necessarily virtuous, we could not 
say that the Michael Corleone’s of this world are wrong. Hence, if we are to reject 
moralism, we must adopt agent‐neutrality. 
However, in rejecting a moralistic account of human nature, can Hurka really 
claim to be Aristotelian in any meaningful sense? He says that according to his 
Aristotelian perfectionism, wrongdoers can achieve perfection.148 Aristotelian 
perfectionism tells us that in order to flourish, we must develop our rationality, 
and this can be achieved through pursuing immoral ends. However, a true 
Aristotelian would deny this. Aristotle’s perfectionism is not formal. As Rosalind 
Hursthouse has shown, the practically rational person is necessarily virtuous 
147 ibid. p. 19. 
148 ibid. p. 134. 
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according to Aristotle.149 One cannot be truly rational unless one has other 
regarding virtues. Michael Corleone is not flourishing. However general, unified 
or complex his plan to kill Fredo is, this cannot be good for him. This is because 
to be truly rational, in an Aristotelian sense, one must be virtuous. These other‐ 
regarding duties are central to Aristotle’s account of human nature. Hence, it is 
questionable whether Hurka’s perfectionism is actually Aristotelian. 
In conclusion, Hurka believes that we flourish when we develop our physical 
nature and our practical and theoretical rationality. However, Hurka rejects a 
moralistic account of human nature. He does not think we are necessarily 
virtuous. His account of human nature is purely formal. Hence, in pursuing 
immoral activities in sufficiently rational ways, individuals can achieve 
perfection, even if such an activity is wrong all things considered. But this 
concession seems fatal to Hurka in two important ways. Firstly, it seems to run 
counter to our intuitions. The idea that Michael Corleone is living a good human 
life seems utterly implausible. This is a particular problem for Hurka because he 
defends his account of perfectionism by an appeal to intuitive moral judgements. 
Secondly, in rejecting a moralistic account of human nature, and subscribing to 
formalism, Hurka disposes of a central tenet of Aristotelian perfectionism – the 
claim that rational people are necessarily virtuous. It seems questionable 
whether   a   perfectionism   stripped   of   this   central   element   can   be   truly 
Aristotelian. 
Thus I argue that Hurka’s form of universal perfectionism must fail. 
5. Nussbaum’s Account of Cross-Cultural Goods 
What   about   the   other   prominent   ahistorical   account   of   perfectionism   – 
Nussbaum’s  function  account?  Is  this  a  more  plausible  form  of  universal 
perfectionism than Hurka’s? 
149  Hursthouse (2006) 
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Nussbaum argues for a universal account of flourishing by stipulating a cross‐ 
cultural consensus on an abstract list of human goods. She further claims that it 
is then the job of states across the globe to secure the conditions necessary for 
the pursuit of such goods for all citizens. Like Hurka, Nussbaum appeals to a 
formal account of what’s good for humans. I will argue that similarly, this formal 
nature of the good renders Nussbaum’s account implausible, albeit for different 
reasons. 
Again, we should return to the problem I posed at the end of the previous 
chapter. Nussbaum rejects the basic claim of Rawls’s account of the burdens of 
judgement. She denies that the burdens of judgement apply to all areas of the 
good (let alone the right). Whilst it might be true that there is vast disagreement 
about substantive judgements about which activities, goals, careers etc. are of 
value, there still exists a cross cultural consensus on a number of abstract good 
types. It is thus the job of states worldwide to enable its citizens to pursue 
substantive tokens falling under these good types. 
Nussbaum calls her account of justice the capabilities approach.150 The central 
question for the capabilities approach is not “how much does person X have in 
the way of resources?” or “how satisfied is person X?” Instead it is, “what is 
person X able to do and to be?”151 When constructing a political morality we 
should look at whether a person is capable of pursuing certain goods (or 
“functions”), not whether or not she is satisfied with what she does, or whether 
she has a certain level of resources. Someone could be satisfied doing something 
incredibly mundane, like counting blades of grass.152 Further, someone could 
have a lot in the way of resources, without them enabling her to pursue valuable 
options. I might have a lot of money when there is no food to buy. 
Thus, Nussbaum believes that there is a certain group of core abstract goods, and 
that it is a necessary condition of any account of political morality that it delivers 
150 Aristotelian Social Democracy’ (1990), Woman and Human Development (2000), Frontiers of 
Justice (2006) and ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism’ (2011). 
151  Nussbaum (2000: 70). 
152 See chapter 5. 
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to citizens the ability to pursue these goods. This necessary condition is one of a 
threshold. We must provide citizens a certain basic capability to function in each 
of the core areas.153 
Nussbaum’s account is perfectionist because these goods are distinctly human 
goods. For Nussbaum, “certain functions are particularly central in human life, in 
the sense that their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of 
the presence or absence of human life.”154 If a life lacks these goods then it is not 
truly human. It is not worthy of the dignity of the human being.155 
The idea that a life without such goods lacks human dignity has broad cross-‐‐ 
cultural  support,  according  to  Nussbaum.  She  gives  the  example  of  tragic 
artworks: 
Think of a tragic character, assailed by fortune. We react to the spectacle 
of humanity so assailed in a way very different from the way we react to a 
storm blowing grains of sand in the wind. For we see a human being as 
having worth as an end, a kind of awe-inspiring something that makes it 
horrible to see this person beaten down by the currents of chance – and 
wonderful, at the same time, to witness the way in which chance has not 
completely eclipsed the humanity of the person … insofar as we are able 
to respond to tragic tales from other cultures, we show that this idea of 
human worth and agency crosses cultural boundaries.156 
Thus, according to Nussbaum, that a life without certain core goods lacks dignity 
is intuitively felt, and this feeling is cross‐cultural. We all agree that a person who 
is incapable of pursuing certain goods is not truly human. 
It  is  this  broad  cultural  consensus  that  makes  these  goods  truly  human. 
Nussbaum argues that these are abstract goods that are endorsed by people who 
153   Nussbaum  (2000:  70) 
154 ibid. pp. 71 -72. 
155 ibid. p. 72.   
156 ibid. p. 72-73. 
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have  vastly  different  views  about  what  a  complete  good  human  life  would 
entail.157   They are goods that all cultures accept. Hence, Nussbaum argues, they 
are subject to an overlapping consensus, understood in a Rawlsian way. 
People may sign on to this conception as the freestanding moral core of a 
political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view 
of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or 
even any particular view of the person or of human nature.158 
Nussbaum denies the basic claim of the burdens of judgement argument. 
Provided it is sufficiently abstract, shorn of any metaphysical underpinnings, a 
conception of the good can be endorsed by people with otherwise diverse 
pursuits. Even though there is vast disagreement about which tokens fall under 
each abstract type, there is convergence on the good. To use more Rawlsian 
jargon, an account of human flourishing can be free‐standing. 
So what are these goods? Nussbaum has altered her list since she first proposed 
the capabilities approach. The latest is as follows: 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not 
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living. 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive 
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be 
secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic 
violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproduction. 
157 ibid. p. 74. 
158 ibid. p. 76 
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4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, 
think, and reason—and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way 
informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no 
means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. 
Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, 
religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in 
ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to 
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being 
able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their 
absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, 
and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by 
fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of 
human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails 
protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.) 
7. Affiliation. 
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of 
social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. 
(Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that 
constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting 
the freedom of assembly and political speech.) 
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being 
able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that 
of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis 
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of  race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national 
origin. 
8.   Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants, and the world of nature. 
9.   Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over One’s Environment. 
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices 
that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, 
protections of free speech and association. 
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable 
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; 
having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; 
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In  
work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical 
reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual 
recognition with other workers. 159 
Nussbaum claims that all of these abstract good types are subject to a cross‐ 
cultural consensus. However, as I have mentioned above, there will be great 
disagreement about the substantive tokens that embody these goods, even 
within cultures. A Catholic and a Jewish person agree that religion is a good 
whilst disagreeing about the correct form it should take. The city banker and the 
avant-garde artist might have vastly dissimilar careers, but both value the right 
to seek employment on an equal basis with others. It is the abstract types which 
individuals converge upon cross‐culturally, thus making the list freestanding. 
However, there is no consensus on which substantive tokens fall under these 
goods. This is shown by the fact that different cultures subscribe to different 
159 Nussbaum (2006: 76-78). 
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belief   systems,   value   different   forms   of   interpersonal   relationships,   have 
different forms of governance, and so on. 
Nussbaum claims that practical reason is of central importance in her list of 
abstract goods. This good suffuses the other goods on the list, making them 
distinctly human. It is for this reason that her account focuses on providing the 
means necessary for individuals to pursue these goods, rather than providing 
them with the goods themselves. Individuals should be free to choose to pursue 
or forego such goods. I may decide to fast, according to my religion. That is fine, 
according to Nussbaum, just so long as there is food for me to eat if I choose to. 
Thus,  it  is  the  capability  to  achieve  these  goods  that  is  the  ultimate  goal  of 
politics.160 
Like Hurka’s human nature account, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach relies to a 
large extent on intuitive moral judgements. She appeals to cross-cultural 
intuitions about human dignity in order to posit the idea of a truly human life. In 
turn, her list of goods relies on intuitive support. Each of the abstract goods on 
the  list  are  said  to  be  intuitively  valuable,  and  subject  to  a  pan-cultural 
consensus. 
This is Nussbaum’s universal account of perfectionism. She believes that there is 
a list of abstract goods which are subject to an overlapping consensus. All 
individuals, whatever their cultural background, endorse these goods as part of a 
truly human life. It is then the job of the state to ensure that each and every 
citizen is capable of achieving them. However, the convergence is on abstract 
types of good, not substantive tokens. 
6. No Real Consensus: Rejecting Nussbaum 
Like Hurka, Nussbaum relies on a formal account of the good. She claims that 
consensus  exists  on  abstract  good  types.  There  is  no  consensus  on  the 
160 Nussbaum (2000: 87). Note that a threshold capability should be secured for each abstract 
good. No amount of economic growth justifies failing to secure a threshold level of bodily 
integrity. See Nussbaum (2000: 81). 
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substantive content of the tokens that fall under these types. As in the case of 
Hurka’s perfectionism, I believe that the formal nature of her account renders it 
implausible. 
My reason for rejecting Nussbaum’s account of universal perfectionism largely 
comes from the work of Simon Hope.161 As we have seen, Nussbaum believes 
that individuals cross‐culturally converge on abstract types. Regardless of the 
substantive content of our respective lives, both the Inuit and I agree that 
imagination, play, bodily integrity and so on are valuable. However, we will 
disagree about the value of the “culturally particular substantive token[s]162” 
that fall under the abstract goods. I might find football valuable whereas he does 
not. He might find Mushox Fighting valuable, whereas I do not. Although there is 
convergence on the abstract element of the good, we do not agree about what 
falls under it. Similarly, whilst a Catholic and Jewish person agree that religion is 
good, they disagree about which form of life embodies such an abstract element. 
Thus, Nussbaum claims that there is an overlapping consensus on abstract type 
but not on substantive token. 
But, as Hope points out, in order for Nussbaum’s account to work, any culturally 
particular substantive token must be valuable to the extent that it embodies one 
of the abstract elements of the human good.163 It is these abstract goods that are 
subject to an overlapping consensus. The justification should run from the 
abstract type to substantive token. Thus, the reason I watch football is because of 
“play.” The reason that a Catholic takes mass is because of “religion.” Although 
the Inuit and I pursue different goods, we do so for the same reason. This is the 
same with the Catholic and Jewish person. Although their activities and beliefs 
are vastly different, they pursue them for the very same reason. 
However, as Hope points out, this is false. No-one does anything for an abstract 
type. I do not watch football due to some abstract good “play.” I do so because it 
is a specific game, governed by certain laws, shaped by social norms, and so on. If 
161  See Hope (2013a) and (2013b). 
162  Hope (2013b: 142) 
163 ibid. 
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I pursued it due to the abstract good, then I’d see value in watching golf. But I 
don’t. This is the same with the Catholic and Jewish person. They pursue their 
faiths due to their substantive content; they believe that a certain set of religious 
practices are correct, for example. Again, if a Catholic pursued Catholicism due to 
the abstract good, then she’d necessarily see value in pursuing other faiths. But 
she doesn’t; “the fact that I see the value in worshipping this deity in this way 
constitutes no obvious point in favour of seeing any value in worshipping any 
other deity in any other way.” 
When looking at reasons to pursue football or Catholicism, the justificatory work 
is done by the culturally specific substantive understanding of the good, rather 
than so abstract type like “play” or “religion.” Thus there is no real consensus on 
the good. The reason that people value certain ends is not because they embody 
certain abstract types. Instead, it is the substantive, culturally specific content 
that gives us reason to pursue them. 
Thus, Nussbaum’s universal account is also doomed to failure. She claims that 
there is a list of truly human goods that all cultures accept. She says we should 
enable all citizens to best realise those goods. However, when we actually look at 
the reasons that people pursue ends in particular cultures we see that they are 
not doing so due to some abstract type, whatever it might be. Instead, they 
pursue those ends as culturally-specific substantive tokens that embody those 
goods. Once we look at what people actually pursue under these abstract 
categories – particular sports, faiths, relationships, careers etc. – we see that 
there is in fact no agreement on the human good. 
7. Conclusion 
It would appear that the two paradigm universal accounts of perfectionism must 
fail, and for similar reasons. In order to appeal cross-culturally, they had to be 
fairly formal. However, Hurka’s formal account of human nature led to the 
implausible   suggestion   that   the   cunning   wrongdoer   achieves   perfection. 
Nussbaum, on the other hand, relied on an abstract list of goods that she claimed 
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represented a pan-cultural consensus. However, when we actually look at why 
people pursue ends within cultures, we see that they do not do so because they 
embody one of Nussbaum’s abstract goods. 
Thus,  it  seems  that  the  contextual  argument  for  perfectionism  is  the  most 
plausible. In the next chapter I will clarify exactly what a contextualist account of 
perfectionism is committed to, before going on to examine arguments against it. 
 
87 
4 
Contextual Perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I argued that universal perfectionism was untenable as an 
account of human flourishing. The two most prominent cross‐cultural accounts 
of perfectionism, offered by Thomas Hurka and Martha Nussbaum, were both 
implausible. For the remained of my thesis, I shall be focusing on contextual 
perfectionism. My target in particular will be the social forms argument of Joseph 
Raz164 and Steven Wall165. 
The contextual argument claims that the reasons we have for promoting a 
certain conception of the good may be embedded in the conventions or social 
practices of the society in which it is to be promoted.166 Thus, as Raz and Wall 
argue, the reason that we should promote autonomy in modern liberal societies 
is that our social practices are such that in order for us to prosper in society we 
must be autonomous. Autonomy is a necessary condition for leading the good life 
within such social forms. By contrast, if we were to live within social forms in 
which autonomy hindered flourishing then the state would have no reason to 
promote it.167 Thus, this form of perfectionism is contextual. The reason we have 
to promote the good is tied to the society or culture within which it is to be 
promoted. It argues that whilst there is reason for us to promote autonomy in 
164 Raz The Morality of Freedom (1986) ‐ hereafter MF. Further discussion of aspects of the 
contextual argument can be found in ‘Facing Up’ (1989), Ethics in the Public Domain (1994) – 
hereafter EPD, Engaging Reason (1999) – hereafter ER, Value, Respect and Attachment (2001) – 
hereafter VRA, and The Practice of Value (2003) – hereafter PV. 
165  Wall Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (1998). 
166 The phrase “the contextual argument” was first coined by McCabe (2001). 
167 Note that the social forms argument is not an argument for perfectionism per se. It is an 
argument for a certain kind of perfectionism. I shall explain how we might understand such 
contextuality later. 
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our society – one that endorses the idea that we should be free to chart our 
course through life - this ideal is only valid for people living in our circumstances 
or circumstances like ours. Governments of societies which are not autonomy‐ 
supporting  have  no  reason  to  promote  such  free  choice. This  form  of 
perfectionism reflects the idea that it makes no sense to talk about people from 
vastly different societies sharing a conception of the good; the mediaeval peasant 
and the modern western student live in such different circumstances that it is 
implausible to say that their flourishing consists in pursuing the same goods. 
The plan for this chapter is as follows. In the first part I will explain the social 
forms  argument  in  detail.  I  shall  then  distinguish  between  three 
contextual  perfectionism;  a  weak  variety,  a  moderate  variety  and 
variety.  I  will  demonstrate  how  Raz  and  Wall  take  themselves  to 
forms  of 
a  strong 
hold  the 
moderate form of contextualism. I shall then go on to explain that this is 
untenable and they must instead embrace the weak variety. I shall conclude by 
giving a Razian response to the claim that weak contextualism is only contextual 
in the most trivial of senses. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify exactly what 
the contextual perfectionism is committed to. 
2. The Social Forms Argument 
In this section I will outline the social forms argument of Raz and Wall168. The 
argument begins with an account of well-being. Both Raz and Wall’s political 
philosophy is grounded in well‐being; how good or successful one’s life is from 
an individual’s point of view. Social institutions are justified insofar as they 
promote valuable lives. Well‐being is largely a function of success in valuable 
goals. A goal is shorthand for something that we care about. It can be a career, a 
relationship, a pursuit, a leisure activity, and so on. Such goals guide our action, 
colour our perception of our environment and play a large part in our emotional 
responses. 169      In  order  to  count  as  valuable,  these  goals  cannot  be  mere 
preferences, needs or desires. Although we usually desire our goals, they must be 
168 I shall use the term “Razian” to refer to the Raz/Wall argument for contextual perfectionism. 
In the following I shall highlight where there lie differences between the accounts if appropriate. 
169 Raz MF p.290. 
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valuable independently of this fact.170 We must think our goals are valuable in 
order for their pursuit to contribute to our well‐being. But this is not enough. 
The goals themselves must be independently valuable. In saying so, Raz steers a 
“middle‐course between the subjectivist conception of welfare [where all that is 
required for the pursuit of a goal to contribute to one’s wellbeing is that the 
agent finds it valuable]… and a strong objective conception of well-being 
according to which whether a person is content in his situation or not has 
nothing to do with his well‐being”.171 This can be demonstrated by bringing forth 
the common example of political philosophy -‐‐ the grass‐counter. In A Theory of 
Justice John Rawls discusses an individual “whose only pleasure is to count 
blades of grass in various geometrically shaped areas such as park squares and 
well-trimmed lawns.”172 Even if such an individual both cares about and enjoys 
this pursuit, success in it does not contribute to his well-being according to Raz. 
This is because the pursuit of grass-counting is not valuable (for Raz). As he 
argues, “satisfaction of goals based on false reasons does not contribute to one’s 
well-being.”173 
Valuable goals are nested within complex hierarchies. Some goals are wider, 
more comprehensive and  permeate all  areas of  our lives. Thus,  a long  term 
relationship with a spouse will dictate many if not most of our derivative goals. 
Others, however, are more short term or immediate. Well‐being concerns 
success in our more comprehensive goals. An individual who is very successful in 
pursuing his immediate goals, but rarely succeeds in his more comprehensive 
goals is not really flourishing. Thus, when making judgements of well-being we 
look  at  success  or  failure  of  an  individual  in  pursuing  his  comprehensive, 
independently valuable, goals.174 
170 It is this objectivity which makes the Razian argument perfectionist. Well‐being and 
flourishing are equivalent. What is objectively good for an individual is what makes him or her 
flourish. Well‐being is not simply success in our goals. It is success in our independently valuable 
goals. See chapter 1. 
171 Raz MF p.308. As Lecce notes, Raz’s conception of autonomy is a “complex dynamic” between 
choice and intrinsic value. (2008: 107). Our choices must be valuable in order for them to 
contribute to our flourishing, but we must also believe this to be the case. 
172  Rawls (1999: 379). 
173 Raz MF p. 302. 
174 ibid. pp. 292 ‐293. 
 
 
90 
These goals, argue the Razians, are the “fruits of society”.175 That is, one can only 
conceive of a goal if it is based on the social forms existing in society. Such social 
practices are the shared forms of behaviour latent in our culture,176 as well as 
our attitudes towards them/perception of them.177 Also included are shared 
beliefs, folklore, high culture and shared metaphors,178 along with the economic 
conditions of the society. 179 Cultures are “conglomerations of interlocking 
practices which constitute the range of life options open to one who is socialised 
in them…only through being socialised in a culture can one tap the options which 
give life meaning.”180 
Why can we only pursue goals that are based on social conventions? The Razians 
give three reasons.181 Firstly, some goals are brought into existence by the social 
forms themselves.182 Thus, for example, one can only play football in a  society 
which recognises football as an activity governed by a certain set of socially 
constituted rules. Although an individual might have acted  in  similar  ways  at  a 
time before the game was invented – she could have kicked a football around a 
lawn with a group of friends -‐‐ she would not have been playing football in the 
sense that it is a complex set of socially recognised practices. Secondly, pursuits 
that are practiced cross‐culturally  acquire  different  significance  depending  on the 
society in which they are pursued.183 Engaging  in  the  same  activities  will have 
different significance depending on the social practices and shared beliefs prevalent 
in the societies involved. The practice of freely choosing one’s spouse is fairly 
conventional in modern western societies. However, in some non-western   
societies   this   would   be   seen   as   very   uncommon.   Thirdly,   one   can acquire 
and maintain goals only through constant familiarity with one’s social 
175 Raz EPD p. 133. 
176 Raz MF p.308. 
177 ibid. pp. 309 ‐10. I shall use the terms “social forms”, “social practices” and “social 
conventions”  interchangeably. 
178 ibid. p.311. 
179 Wall (1998: 165). 
180 Raz EPD p. 177. 
181 I shall not be assessing the plausibility of these claims here. McCabe (2001) gives reasons for 
doubting them. 
182 Wall. (1998: 165) 
183 ibid. 
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forms.184 The knowledge needed to achieve goals depends on learnt patterns of 
behaviour. Know-how is transmitted through example and habituation. One is 
successful in pursuing these goals only by exercising the knowledge derived 
from exposure to existing social forms.185 
So, claims the Razian, one can only have a goal if it is based on the social forms. 
Further, as we’ve seen, success in one’s goals is the key determinant of well- 
being. Therefore, well‐being depends largely on success in socially defined and 
determined pursuits. 
So what are the social forms of the here and now?186 Wall has six candidates: 
1. Geographic mobility – People in modern societies change their place of 
residence often. Children frequently leave their home town and settle 
elsewhere. Adults rarely stay in the same location for the entirety of their 
working life. Accordingly, communities and neighbourhoods are not as 
permanent as they have been. 
Technological and economic innovation – Innovations in productive 
forces are rapid. Entire industries are transformed and replaced. Citizens 
in such societies must make adjustments to technological change. 
Familial and social mobility – Family structures have changed from how 
they were fifty years ago, and rates of divorce and remarriage are higher 
than they were. This is due to greater levels of choice. Accordingly, people 
are more likely to marry across class, religious or ethnic lines. 
Secularization  –  Modern  western  societies  do  not  contain  a  single, 
authoritative religion enforced by the state. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
184 Raz MF pp. 311-3. Despite the fact that the Razians think there are three reasons here, it could 
plausibly be said that the first two are really just aspects of this third one. I thank Simon Hope for 
this point. 
185 McCabe (2001: 498). The Razians allow that folk can experiment within a society. Nothing 
above suggests that people necessarily conform. But, the distance travelled from the existing 
practices is precisely what is significant in such a situation. Convention and innovation are 
measured against a baseline which must always make reference to the existing forms. See MF 
312-3 and EPD p. 42. 
186 One might inquire as to what should be understood as the “here and now.” Wall (1998: 167) 
emphasises that his account should be taken to apply only to “modern western societies,” ruling 
out centralised tyrannies, theocentric societies and so on. He leaves it an open question as to 
whether his account could be extended to such non-‐‐western cultures. 
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5. Value pluralism – Modern western societies contain a plurality of views 
about the best way to live one’s life. People in such societies tend to 
believe that all such views are both valuable and incompatible. 
6. A commitment to human rights – Modern western societies profess a 
commitment to human rights, and make a reasonably sincere effort to 
protect them. For example, they usually respect freedom of conscience, 
freedom of association, freedom of movement etc.187 
If the six candidate social forms above really are prevalent we can see that as 
well as providing options, the social forms ground reasons for individuals under 
them to value autonomy. That is, the six forms above are characteristic of an 
autonomy supporting culture. In modern western society, autonomy holds a 
privileged position such that, according to the Razians, we must be autonomous 
in order to flourish in such societies.188 The principle of autonomy tells us that 
“the free choice of goals and relations [are] an essential ingredient of individual 
well‐being”.189 Autonomy is an idea of self‐creation; individuals should make 
their own lives to a sufficient degree. The autonomous agent is part author of his 
own life. He controls, again to a sufficient degree, his own fate, fashioning it 
through successive decisions throughout his life. 190 Thus, the principle of 
autonomy tells us that well‐being consists in the successful pursuit of self‐chosen 
valuable goals and relationships.191 Importantly, however, the autonomous life 
need not be regimented, united and so on. Autonomous pursuits may be diverse 
and heterogeneous, and individuals can change their minds often. 192 
Furthermore, despite the seemingly grand description of autonomy, the pursuits 
need not be heroic either. A life largely spent reading science fiction novels is just 
as autonomous as one spent volunteering, or another dedicated to the study of 
particle physics, just so long that it is freely chosen. 
187 Wall (1998: 166‐67) 
188  Raz (1986: 391). Wall (1998: 168). 
189 Raz MF p. 369. 
190 ibid. 
191 ibid. p. 370. 
192 ibid. p. 371 
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Importantly, the autonomous life is not one choice amongst several. It is not 
itself an option. Instead, it is a condition of choice. If he wants to flourish, one 
cannot but be autonomous in our society.193 This is because the social forms 
prevalent hold a personal choice and self-direction to be vital. Hence, in order to 
prosper in such a society one must be autonomous. It is a necessary (though not 
sufficient  –  the  goals  selected  using  one’s  autonomy  must  be  independently 
valuable) condition for well-being, and thus flourishing. 
Wall gives several examples as to why the social forms make autonomy 
necessary for a flourishing life. Firstly, technological innovation, along with 
geographical and social mobility, gives us choices; about where to live and with 
whom, what job to take, and so on. The idea of flourishing at play demands that 
we make those choices. Secondly, due to secularization there is no authority to 
tell us what goals we should pursue. Accordingly, it is necessary for individuals 
to develop convictions of one’s own if they are to flourish. Thirdly, a commitment 
to human rights – by protecting them from coercion -‐‐ secures individuals room 
for individual choice.194 Finally, the conventions in our society dictate that there 
exists a plurality of options of which we cannot say that one is better than the 
other, or that they are of equal value. As such, we have reason to pursue each of 
them. Autonomy tells us to choose between options and decide how to lead our 
lives without relying on someone else if we wish to flourish.195 Again, dwelling 
on the fact that the mediaeval peasant did not live under such social forms, we 
can say that he had no need to be autonomous. 
Hence we have a conception of well-being which combines autonomy and value 
pluralism. This is how the Razian argument is perfectionist. Flourishing or well‐ 
being (which are equivalent to the Razians) is a function of success in the pursuit 
of valuable options. These options are derived from the social forms of one’s 
society. Autonomy is a condition of prosperity in modern societies. Hence, states 
should promote autonomy (and secure a plurality of valuable options) so to 
better enable citizens  to flourish/be  capable of flourishing.  The social  forms 
193 ibid. p. 391. 
194 Wall (1998: 168-‐‐69). See also Raz MF pp. 369-‐‐70. 
195 Wall (1998: 169) 
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make autonomy a necessary condition for flourishing. Our social conventions 
bring together autonomy and the good life. Thus, we have perfectionism; 
autonomy is a condition of flourishing in modern societies, hence governments 
have reason to secure it for its citizens. 
As such, the Razian denies that the burdens of judgement apply to the good. Even 
in pluralistic societies like ours, there is consensus on the value of autonomy. 
Autonomy is necessary for flourishing, so we should promote it through our 
political apparatus. 
The social forms argument is a contextual form of perfectionism. It holds that 
there is reason to think that the good human life is the life of autonomy, and that 
there is reason to endorse our state’s promoting that life. However, there is only 
a reason to do so in virtue of the way in which our social forms are the forms of a 
pluralistic modern society. If we did not live under such social forms there would 
be no reason to promote autonomy. The mediaeval peasant does not need 
autonomy. This is because he does not live under social forms which make it 
necessary for flourishing. Accordingly, there would be no reason for the society 
in which the peasant lives to promote autonomy. 
3. Three Forms of Contextual Perfectionism 
Thus we have the contextual argument for perfectionism. There is reason to 
promote autonomy in modern societies because we live in an environment in 
which it is necessary for human flourishing. However, were we to live under 
different social forms – which did not embody an autonomy supporting culture – 
there would be no reason for our governments to promote such a conception of 
the good. 
In this section I want to get clearer about how a perfectionist political morality 
might be contextual. I shall do so by identifying three different forms of 
contextuality with regards to promoting the good. The discussion above was not 
explicit between these forms of contextuality. In so doing, I will outline three 
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forms of contextual perfectionism – a weak, moderate and strong variety. In the 
following  two  sections  I  will  demonstrate  how  both  Raz  and  Wall  take 
themselves to subscribe to the moderate form of contextualism. 
The first form of contextuality with regards to promoting the good can be called 
contextualism about reasons. This position says that the reasons we have to be 
perfectionist are embedded in the social forms of our society. Thus, in an 
autonomy supporting environment there is  a reason for the state  to uphold 
autonomy, through minimising coercion, providing a variety of options, and so 
on. However, in a society which cared little for free choice between options there 
would be no reason for us to act in such a way. This form of perfectionism simply 
says that our reason to promote the good is embedded in social conventions. 
The second form of contextuality I shall call contextualism about the role of 
autonomy in flourishing. It might be claimed that autonomy is necessary for 
flourishing everywhere. I must be autonomous, at least to some degree, in order 
to live a good human life. Contextuality about the role of autonomy denies this. It 
says that autonomy is only necessary for flourishing in certain societies. The 
mediaeval peasant does not have to be autonomous in order to flourish. This is 
because autonomy is not a necessary condition for living a good human life in his 
society. Contextualism about the role of autonomy argues that not only is our 
reason to promote autonomy tied to our social forms, this is because autonomy 
might not be necessary for flourishing in societies unlike ours. 
The third form of contextuality that I will mention is contextualism about human 
flourishing. One might agree that that autonomy is not necessary for flourishing 
in all societies, whilst still arguing that the activities, relationships, careers, 
pursuits etc. that constitute human flourishing are objectively valuable. That is 
autonomy might be necessary for, say, intimate relationships in one society, and 
not in other. However, in both societies intimate relationships are part of what it 
is to flourish. Contextualism about human flourishing denies that the human 
good is objective in this way. It says, instead, that flourishing itself is particular to 
social and historical conditions. Not only are the means necessary to achieve 
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flourishing different according to social forms, what constitutes a good human 
life similarly differs. This form of contextualism says that not only is autonomy 
necessary for us to flourish, the goods we select using our autonomy are good in 
virtue of our social forms. 
Contextualism about reasons is a minimum requirement for the social forms 
argument. In order to be counted as contextual it must say that our reasons to 
promote autonomy must be embedded in our social conventions. However, we 
might ask to what extent Raz or Wall are committed to the two other claims 
above. Hence we have three readings of the social forms argument: 
Weak contextual perfectionism: Our reasons for promoting autonomy are 
embedded in our social forms. However, autonomy is necessary for flourishing 
everywhere, such that if a society is not autonomy-‐‐supporting the individuals 
within it will not flourish to a sufficient degree. Furthermore, what constitutes 
the good life is not peculiar to social forms.196 
Moderate contextual perfectionism: Our reasons for promoting autonomy are 
embedded in our social forms. Furthermore, autonomy is not necessary for 
flourishing everywhere. There may be some societies where non-‐‐autonomous 
people are able to sufficiently flourish. However, even though our means for 
flourishing may differ what it means to live a good human life is not peculiar to 
social forms. 
Strong contextual perfectionism: Our reasons for promoting autonomy are 
embedded in our social forms. Furthermore, autonomy is not necessary for 
flourishing everywhere. There may be some societies where non-‐‐autonomous 
people are able to flourish. Furthermore, what it is to flourish is also dictated by 
the social forms. 
196 One might wonder whether this weak form of contextualism is plausible. If autonomy is 
necessary for flourishing in all societies, why might our reasons to promote it be embedded in 
our social forms? I will turn to this question later in the chapter. 
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Are we to understand the Razian social forms argument as a weak, moderate or 
strong form of contextualism? It is to this problem that I now turn. 
4. Raz, Wall and Strong Contextualism 
I shall begin by looking at whether Raz or Wall subscribe to the strong form of 
contextualism. Do they think that human flourishing is contextual such that what 
counts as a good human life differs from society to society? 
Wall does not explicitly consider this question, so it is hard to establish his 
position. However, I think there is good reason to deny that he thinks that the 
human good derives from the social forms. Wall claims that the value of 
autonomy is derived from elsewhere. 197 He says that it derives from its 
contribution to the fully good life.198 However, one might ask from where the 
good life in turn derives its value. If autonomy derives its value from its 
contribution to human flourishing, from where does human flourishing derive its 
value? Perhaps the value of human flourishing is explained by reference to the 
social forms? If this were the case, then we should embrace the strong form of 
contextualism. Wall appears to reject this. By describing it as an “ultimate end”, 
Wall is claiming that the good life gets its value from itself, and not from 
something else.199 That is, the good life is valuable in itself. Thus autonomy 
derives its value from the good life, which is itself a source of value. In denying 
the claim that flourishing derives its value from the social forms, Wall rejects the 
strong form of contextual perfectionism. 
Does Raz think that human flourishing is contextual? In The Morality of Freedom, 
he writes: 
Given that the well-being of the agent is in the successful pursuit of 
valuable goals, and that value depends on social forms, it is of the essence 
of value that it contributes to the constitution of the agent's personal well‐ 
197 Wall (1998: 145) 
198 ibid. 
199 ibid. 
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being just as much as it defines moral objectives. The source of value is 
one for the individual and the community. It is one and the same from the 
individual and from the moral point of view. Individuals define the 
contours of their own lives by drawing on the communal pool of values. 
These will, in well-ordered societies, contribute indiscriminately both to 
their self-interest and to other aspects of their well‐being. They also 
define the field of moral values. There is but one source for morality and 
for  personal  well‐being.200 
It might be read from this that Raz believes that the human good is derived from 
the social forms of liberal societies. It looks as though he is claiming that the 
social practices and beliefs of one’s society is the source of all value, including 
conceptions of the good. It would be incorrect to understand Raz in this way. In 
Engaging Reason, he distinguishes between goods which are socially created, and 
goods which are not socially created, but access to which is culturally 
conditioned.201 Raz places autonomy in the latter category.202 He argues that 
when the concept of autonomy emerged, it enabled us to understand a good that 
has always existed. That is, autonomy as a value is not new. However, access to it 
through the new concept is. So, autonomy is not socially created. Instead, our 
social forms give us access to it. The social forms did not create autonomy. It 
merely allowed us to become aware of it, and to come to understand and enjoy 
it.203 But, if a good can exist independently of any particular society, then  it 
cannot derive its value from social forms. That is, autonomy must derive its value 
from elsewhere.204 However, he also draws a distinction between two different 
sorts of socially created goods.205 On the one hand there are local goods which 
we can only enjoy in the societies in which they exist. Raz gives fashions and 
manners  as  examples  of  such  goods.  However,  there  are  also  temporally 
unbound socially created goods. These goods are created by social practices, but 
200 Raz. MF. Pp. 318-‐‐9. 
201 Raz ER pp. 146-‐‐153. 
202 ibid. p. 309. 
203 ibid. p. 151. 
204 Autonomy cannot be the source of value as it is a conditional good. That is, according to Raz 
and Wall, it is only of value in pursuit of worthwhile options. This suggests that the value of 
autonomy is derived from the goods which it realizes. More on this later. 
205 ibid. pp. 147-‐‐9. 
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once they come into existence they are eternal. They do not need the social 
practices in which they were created to sustain them. They can be enjoyed 
outside of the cultures in which they were created. The goods which constitute 
human flourishing – our pursuits, relationships, careers, interests etc. -‐‐ largely 
belong in this temporally unbound socially created category.206 That is, the goods 
that contribute to flourishing are not particular to social forms. Although they 
are created through social forms, such goods exist independently of them. They 
are of value across cultures and time periods. If this is the case then human 
flourishing is not particular to the social forms. Accordingly, like Wall, Raz rejects 
the strong form of contextual perfectionism. 
5. Raz, Wall and Moderate Contextualism 
I have already claimed that in order to count as a contextual argument at all the 
social forms argument must subscribe to at least the weak form of contextual 
perfectionism above. I have also explained that neither Wall nor Raz subscribe to 
the strong form of contextualism. In this section I will demonstrate how both 
Wall and Raz propose a moderate form of contextualism. Both appear to claim 
that autonomy is not necessary for flourishing in all cultures. In the following 
section I will suggest that the Razian must make the claim that autonomy is 
transcendent. I will argue that by doing so this moderate position is not tenable, 
and that the social forms argument must be understood as a weak form of 
contextual perfectionism. I will then put forward the claim that this position is 
contextual in only the most minimal or trivial form. I shall conclude by offering a 
response on behalf of the Razians. 
Both Raz and Wall claim that autonomy is not necessary for flourishing in all 
societies, thus committing themselves to what I have called moderate 
perfectionism. I shall start with Wall. At one point he seems to suggest that 
autonomy is necessary for flourishing everywhere. In attempting to ascertain the 
intrinsic value of autonomy, Wall appeals to our intuitions. He gives the example 
206 I say largely as certain pursuits, such as an appreciation of nature, belong in the non-socially 
created but culturally conditioned category. 
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of Person A and Person B. Person A chooses projects that suit his nature and 
reflect his understanding of what is valuable and worthwhile. He leads a good, 
morally decent life. Person B finds taking decisions annoying and does not enjoy 
choosing her pursuits, relationships, and so on. Instead, she has a wise and good 
friend who takes these decisions for her, which in turn leads Person B to also live 
a good, morally decent life. Reflecting on this case, Wall asks whether Person A 
and Person B live equally good lives. He argues: 
Most of us strongly think “no”. Even if we think that Person B leads a 
better life than people who do a worse job of running their own affairs, 
we think that Person B lacks something that Person A has. Person B leads a 
good life, but she does not lead her own life, whereas Person A leads a 
good life that is his own. This makes Person A’s life better. And this 
intuition is best explained by the truth of the claim that autonomy is an 
intrinsic value.207 
This seems to suggest that Wall regards autonomy as necessary for flourishing 
universally. However, this would only hold if Person A and Person B lived under 
different social forms. Wall does not say whether this is the case. However, from 
a number of other points in his book, we must conclude that he is talking about 
two individuals within the same society – our society. Elsewhere Wall is pretty 
explicit in claiming that autonomy is not necessary for flourishing in all cultures. 
For example: 
The  social  forms  argument  is  indexed  to  modern  western  societies. 
Accordingly,  even  if  it  is  valid,  it  cannot  establish  that  autonomy  is  a 
necessary component of a fully good life for all people in all societies.208 
It cannot be concluded that a fully good life is possible only in a society 
with autonomy‐supporting social forms.209 
207 Wall (1998: 147). Emphasis added. 
208 Wall (1998: 172). Emphasis added. 
209 ibid. p. 178. 
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Hence I shall take him to subscribe to at least the moderate form of contextual 
perfectionism. 
Turning to Raz. In response to the claim that it must be the case that people who 
lack personal autonomy cannot be completely well off, or have a completely good 
life, he argues: 
I think that there were,  and there can be,  non-repressive societies, and 
ones which enable people to spend their lives in worthwhile pursuits, 
even though their pursuits and the options open to them are not subject 
to individual choice. Careers may be determined by custom, marriages 
arranged by parents, child‐bearing and child‐rearing controlled only by 
sexual passion and traditions, past-time activities few and traditional, and 
engagement in them required rather than optional. In such societies, with 
little mobility, even friends are not chosen. There are few people one ever 
comes in contact with, they remain there from birth to death, and one just 
has to get on with them. I do not see that the absence of choice diminishes 
the value of human relations or the display of excellence in technical 
skills, physical ability, spirit and enterprise, leadership, scholarship, 
creativity, or imaginativeness, which can all be encompassed in such 
lives.210 
Again, this is pretty explicit. He suggests that a non‐autonomous life need can be a 
flourishing life. Perhaps one can live a fully good life outside of an autonomy‐ 
supporting environment. 
Raz actually goes further than this. He argues that the transcendent claim – that a 
life without autonomy cannot be fully good – is unintelligible. He writes: 
You cannot just add autonomy, that is, free choice, to the same life. 
Autonomy is not something we have on top of everything else. It is an 
aspect of the other values in our lives. The careers, relationships, and 
210 Raz ‘Facing Up’ p. 1227. 
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other pursuits in our societies are partly constituted by the fact that they 
have to be chosen to be engaged in as they ought to be engaged. The fact 
that they were freely chosen is part of what makes them into what they 
are.211 
The autonomous life is a framework within which we make choices about what 
to do with our lives, who to enter into relationships with, what to do in our spare 
time, etc. However, those options are bound up with the fact that they are 
autonomously chosen. That we choose our jobs, our friends and our 
commitments freely means that our careers, relationships and pursuits cannot 
be understood as existing within a non‐autonomous environment. We cannot 
talk  about  the  same  life  with  and  without  autonomy.  The  fact  that  one  is 
autonomous and the other is not entails that they are vastly different lives. 
Raz’s rejection of autonomy as a necessary condition for flourishing across 
cultures is twofold. On the one hand he suggests that a non‐autonomous life can 
be fully good. On the other, he claims that it makes no sense to compare such a 
life with an autonomous one. The alternatives are incommensurate.212 Thus, as 
with Wall, Raz subscribes, to the moderate form of contextual perfectionism. 
6. The Transcendent Value of Autonomy 
I have argued above that both Raz and Wall subscribe to the moderate form of 
contextual perfectionism. This strand accepts that our reasons for promoting 
autonomy are embedded in our social forms, rejects the claim that autonomy is 
necessary for flourishing everywhere, and denies that flourishing itself is tied to 
the social forms. 
In  this  section  I  want  to  suggest  that  this  moderate  form  of  contextual 
perfectionism is untenable by claiming that in order to refute an objection from a 
non‐liberal, the Razian must stipulate the transcendent value of autonomy. I shall 
211 ibid. p. 1228. 
212 ibid. 
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argue that in doing so they can no longer consistently subscribe to the moderate 
form of contextualism. That is, if autonomy is such that one cannot live a fully 
good life without it, then we can no longer say that it is not necessary for 
flourishing.213 Thus I will argue that, due to both this and the Razian rejection of 
the strong strand, they must endorse the weakest form of contextualism. 
One objection that might be levelled against the Raz position is that autonomy is 
not part of the good life. Autonomy actually gets in the way of a truly good life.214 
An advocate of this view claims that the extensive system of rights and liberties 
that an autonomy supporting environment requires prevents individuals from 
attaining the true human goods of, for example, community and collective 
responsibility. He denies that the autonomous life is of value. Take, for example, 
what has been called the East Asian criticism of liberal societies.215 One such 
objection claims that: 
East Asian societies wish to pursue such collective goals as social 
harmony and cohesion, moral consensus, integrity of the family and 
economic development, and that these involve different kinds of rights 
and greater restrictions on individual freedoms than is common in liberal 
societies.216 
The claim is that liberal societies prevent individuals from attaining key human 
goods. Thus, such a ‘non-liberal’ argues that the autonomous life is inferior to 
one lived in a society in which free choice and self‐creation are not seen as 
valuable. He says that it is all very well that our society is autonomy supporting. 
213 This is Raz’s definition of a transcendent (or what he calls a “universal”) good. (1989: 1227). It 
is this definition of transcendent that I will be operating with in what follows. 
214 This objection should not be confused with the MacIntyrean “anti-liberal” objection 
introduced (though not endorsed) by McCabe (2001: 513). The anti‐liberal does not deny that 
autonomy is of value. He simply thinks that the social forms of modern liberal capitalism cannot 
properly support autonomy, because they promote it in isolation from the other values that we 
need to have in place to flourish. I thank Simon Hope for this point. 
215 See, for example, Bauer and Bell (1999) and Parekh (2000: Chapter 4). 
216 Parekh (2000: 139). 
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This gives us no reason to favour continuing to uphold its social forms. This is 
because the goals which the forms create are not valuable.217 
How could Raz respond to this objection? Does he have to engage in the “messy 
business”218 of assessing the comparative worth of an autonomous life and a 
non-autonomous life? A defender of Raz might answer in the negative. We have 
already seen above that he claims that it makes no sense to compare the value 
two lives – one autonomous, one non‐autonomous. They are so unlike one 
another that it is impossible to regard one as superior to the other. Thus, the 
non‐liberal objection does not work. Just as Raz cannot (and does not) say that 
an autonomous life is superior to a non‐autonomous life, the non‐liberal cannot 
say that it is inferior. The two lives are simply incommensurate. 
Does Raz have the conceptual equipment to get himself off the hook?219 I don’t 
think it does. In Engaging Reason, Raz discusses what he calls “mixed-value 
goods”.220 Mixed value goods are intrinsic goods which display a variety of 
distinct values. An example might be the good of watching a live football match. 
Its goodness consists in its combination of distinct goods; aesthetic goods such 
as skill on the ball, tactics, flair, and so on, and emotional goods such as 
excitement, tension, atmosphere, camaraderie, etc. However, the good of 
watching a live football match is not simply an aggregate of the distinct goods it 
consists of. As Raz says, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.221 The 
experience of watching a football match is a different form of the good; it is not 
the mere sum of its parts. Raz argues that what makes for a good experience of 
watching a live football match consists in these constituent goods present in the 
right way and in the right proportions.222 The goodness of the match lies in the 
way that the different values are combined together. Mixed value goods can be 
217 The East Asian values challenge could itself be understood as a contextual claim. It could be 
taken as “autonomy is a necessary means to flourishing for you. It is not for us.” The challenge I 
have in mind is stronger, along the lines of “we do not think that autonomy is necessary for 
flourishing, and we are right.” 
218  McCabe. (2001: 514). 
219 I develop this response from a remark made by McCabe in ibid p. 516. 
220 Raz ER pp. 182 – 201. 
221 ibid. p. 186. 
222 ibid. 
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compared to a food dish. The individual ingredients might be good (for example, 
healthy, tasty etc.), but the goodness of the curry consists in how the ingredients 
are combined together. You wouldn’t get the same good by eating each 
ingredient alone in succession.223 Further, we don’t know what a mixed-value 
type is until we know what makes for a good token of the type.224 However, once 
we have a grasp of the mixed‐value type, we can rank different tokens of it. We 
can say that this football match was better than another because it had better 
mix of the aesthetic and emotional goods than another. Perhaps whilst the latter 
had a great atmosphere, the level of skill on show was relatively poor. In the 
former case both were present to a high degree. Thus it was a better match. This 
is what Raz calls the inherent standard argument.225 We can rank goods without 
some precise scheme. 
I would like to argue that individual human lives are mixed value goods. That is, I 
think that an individual life is an intrinsic good which displays a variety  of 
distinct values. A good life consists in various goods present in different 
proportions. There are many such constituent  goods; the pursuits, activities, 
relationships etc., of which I spoke of earlier. Each individual life would be a new 
token of the good – consisting in different goods being present in different 
proportions. It would not be simply a sum of its parts. However, if we accept that 
a human life is a mixed value good, then we can rank them using the inherent 
standard argument. We can say that Jim’s life is better than Stephen’s as its 
constituent parts are in a more optimal proportion, and so on. 
However, once this is accepted Raz can no longer claim that an autonomous life, 
with its constituent goods, cannot be judged superior to a non‐autonomous one. 
Using the inherent standard argument, we can rank two different human lives. In 
which case, Raz can say that the autonomous life consists of a better mix of 
constituent  goods  present  in  the  right  way  and  in  the  right  proportions.226 
Although  the  non‐autonomous  life  might  realise  some  goods  –  for  example,  a 
223 My thanks go to Simon Hope for this helpful analogy. 
224 ibid. 
225 ibid. 
226 ibid. 
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concern for the common good – taken as a whole, with its attendant goods, it is 
inferior to an autonomous one. Thus, perhaps Raz does have to  engage  in  the 
messy business of comparing an autonomous life to a non-autonomous one, and 
he can come out on top. That is, in order to refute the non‐liberal objection, the 
Razian needs to argue that an autonomy‐supporting environment is superior to 
one which does not support free choice and self-direction. He is able to do this 
using the inherent standard argument.227 
However, once this is established, it is unclear whether the Razian can still 
maintain that autonomy is not necessary for flourishing. Recall that to say that 
the autonomous life was transcendently valuable was to say that one cannot live 
a fully good life without it. But this is exactly what the Razian response to the 
non-liberal objection is claiming. In order to refute the non‐liberal objection, the 
Razian needs to stipulate that a life lacking autonomy is not fully good. However, 
in so doing, it looks as though he must maintain that autonomy is necessary for 
flourishing. If this is the case, then it looks as though moderate contextualism, 
which says that autonomy is not necessary for flourishing everywhere, is not a 
tenable position to take. Raz and Wall must, after all, subscribe to the weak form 
of contextual perfectionism. If autonomy is such that one cannot live a fully good 
life without it then it is necessary for flourishing. If it is necessary for flourishing 
then one cannot subscribe to moderate contextualism. In fact, recall the earlier 
quote from Raz, where he is discussing possible fully flourishing non‐ 
autonomous lives. Despite what he is trying to demonstrate, he uses the qualifier 
“non‐repressive societies”228 which suggests that at least some autonomy is 
necessary to flourish. 
7. Is Razian Contextualism Trivial? 
The non-liberal objection must lead the Razian to drop his rejection of the 
autonomy  as  a  necessary  condition  of  flourishing.  He  must  now  say  that 
227 A Razian might respond by saying that the autonomous life and the non-autonomous life are 
not different tokens of the same type, but actually different types. I don’t think that this is 
plausible. 
228 Raz ‘Facing Up’ p. 1227. 
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autonomy is necessary for flourishing across cultures. Thus he must subscribe to 
what I have called the weak form of contextual perfectionism, which argues that 
although autonomy is necessary for flourishing across social forms, the reasons 
we have to promote it are embedded in the social conventions of modern 
societies. I will end this chapter by introducing the claim that the weak form of 
contextual perfectionism is only “contextual” in the most trivial of senses, 
entailing that strong contextual perfectionism is the only form of contextualism 
worthy of the name. I shall then offer a Razian response to this criticism, 
concluding that even if one must drop the contextuality of the role of autonomy 
in  flourishing,  he  can  subscribe  to  a  weak  form  of  contextualism  which  is 
contextual in two very real (and non-trivial) senses. 
As I have already said, the weak form of contextualism argues that although we 
can say that autonomy is necessary for flourishing cross‐culturally, the reason 
we have to promote it is embedded in the practices our society. If we did not live 
under autonomy‐supporting  social forms then there would be no reason for us to 
promote it. However, if we stipulate that a life cannot flourish without some 
degree of autonomy, is this true? That is, would there not be a reason for us to 
promote autonomy in an environment which did not support it? We might argue 
that, with regards to perfectionism, reason tracks value. That is, when the 
perfectionist argues that the state should promote such‐and-such a conception of 
the good, she is doing so for the reason that this is the correct form of human 
flourishing.229 Similarly, if we argue that a life without any autonomy cannot be 
flourishing, then the reason that we instruct our states to promote it is that it is 
better that one is autonomous than if one is not. But then, we do have reason to 
promote autonomy in societies which do not have autonomy supporting social 
forms. 
Thus, the reason to promote autonomy is not embedded in our social forms. The 
reason for promoting autonomy in modern societies is that it is necessary for 
human  flourishing  across  cultures.  As  an  autonomous  life  is  necessary  for 
229 In fact, Raz holds this view for all reasons. He argues for the value/reason nexus, which says 
that the only reason for any action is that it or its consequences have good-making properties. 
See Chapter 4, ‘On the Guise of the Good’, in From Normativity to Responsibility (2011). 
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flourishing within any set of social practices, then this reason is not contextual. 
There is just as much of a reason to promote autonomy in societies completely 
unlike ours. As such, the Razian argument does not really differ from the 
universal strand put forward by the likes of Hurka. One might respond to this by 
saying that the reason is still contextual in the sense that there is a coincidence of 
reasons -‐‐ our society happens to support autonomy, which is necessary for 
human flourishing. I completely agree. However this seems to be only contextual 
in the most trivial of senses. It certainly is not the sense of contextualism which 
Raz and Wall desire. They want to be able to say that there might be no reason to 
promote autonomy in a non‐autonomy supporting environment. However, their 
acceptance of the transcendent value of autonomy, which was necessary in order 
to defeat the non-liberal objection, renders this impossible. Thus, it seems that 
the only true contextualist perfectionism is the strong variety, which claims that 
not only is autonomy necessary for flourishing only in modern societies, the 
nature of the human good itself derives from their social forms.230 
Is this correct? Can we not preserve contextualism if we claim that autonomy is 
necessary for a flourishing life across cultures? That is, can we maintain that our 
reason for promoting autonomy is contextual such that we might have no reason 
to do so in a non‐autonomy supporting environment, whilst still claiming that a 
life without autonomy cannot be fully good? This would involve both judging 
that the mediaeval peasant’s life is not flourishing and saying that there is no 
reason for autonomy to be promoted in his society. I have suggested that if 
reason tracks value this is impossible. I think the Razian can deny this. 
Firstly231, note that the value to be promoted is autonomy. With that in mind, 
perhaps the Razian could say that precisely because the good life is the 
autonomous life, it cannot be forced onto the non-autonomous. That is, the 
reason that autonomy should not be promoted in non‐autonomy supporting 
societies is that such interference would actually run counter to the ideal being 
230 The strong form of contextual perfectionism is not vulnerable to the non‐liberal challenge, as 
one can deny that the goods which are present in non‐autonomy supporting societies are actually 
good for those which display social forms like ours. 
231 My thanks to Rowan Cruft for pressing this point. 
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promoted. If we were to attempt to promote autonomy in a non‐autonomy 
supporting environment, we would have to drastically alter the social conditions 
and conventions of the society in question. In doing so, we would be interfering 
with individuals in ways counter to the ideal of autonomy. That is, stipulating the 
good life as the autonomous life requires us to be tolerant  of  other  societies 
which do not embody an autonomy‐supporting environment. This is perfectly 
consistent with viewing the autonomous life as necessary for flourishing. Although 
the autonomous life is fully good and the non-autonomous life is not, the ideal of 
autonomy itself prohibits one from promoting it in societies which (erroneously) do 
not think it necessary for a good life. The only way to promote it would be 
fundamentally self-defeating. Hence, although the value of autonomy is 
transcendent, the reason to promote it is not. Here reason still tracks the good. It 
is simply that there is no value in pursuing autonomy, and hence there is no 
reason to promote it, in a non‐autonomy supporting environment.232 
Secondly, as I have already pointed out, Raz takes autonomy to be a good such 
that although its existence does not depend on the social forms, access to it is 
culturally conditioned. That is, our social forms allow us to have access to the 
good of autonomy (which is good independently of social practices). However, in 
the societies that we are discussing, the social forms do not allow access to such 
a good (as they are non-autonomy supporting environments). As such, 
individuals who live in such a society don’t have access to the good of autonomy. 
In fact, they do not even possess the concept of it. The good of autonomy is 
completely unknown. As such, they have no reason to value autonomy; how can 
one value a good of which they cannot know? Or rather, they have a reason to 
value autonomy, but we cannot offer them one. But, as we cannot promote 
autonomy non-autonomously (as explained in the previous paragraph) we can 
only promote it in ways that we can justify to them. But as they do not posses the 
concept, we cannot do so. Furthermore, if the concept of autonomy does not exist 
within such a society, it makes no sense to say that there is reason to promote it. 
To do so would be conceptually incoherent. This is perfectly consistent with 
232 For an insightful discussion of goods which it would be self-defeating to promote or pursue, 
see Elster (1983). 
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saying that autonomy is necessary for flourishing. The people in such a society 
are lacking something. However, there is still no reason to promote autonomy in 
this society as individuals within it do not even understand the concept of this 
good.233 
Thus, the Razian can respond to the charge of triviality. He can maintain the 
weak form of contextualism, where reasons are contextual but autonomy’s role 
in the good life is not. The reason for promoting the good is contextual in two 
senses. Firstly, it would be self‐defeating to attempt to promote autonomy in a 
society whose social forms do not support it. Secondly, it makes no sense to talk 
of promoting autonomy in a society which does not even posses the necessary 
concept. Although the moderate form – which both Raz and Wall claim to 
subscribe to - is untenable for them, this does not mean that they must either opt 
for the strong form, or drop contextualism altogether. 
233 One might say that there is a reason to change the social forms such that access to autonomy 
was guaranteed to these individuals. A Razian would simply respond by pointing back to the first 
response to triviality. 
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5 
Jonathan Quong on Raz’s Autonomy-Based Argument for Liberal 
Perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
The Morality of Freedom is Joseph Raz’s thesis on political morality. At the core of 
Raz’s account of political morality is the principle of autonomy. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, for Raz autonomy is essential for flourishing in modern, liberal 
societies. Thus, he holds an autonomy‐based doctrine of political freedom. 
In this chapter I will carefully set out Raz’s account of autonomy, showing how it 
lends support to a modified reading of the harm principle. I shall then focus on 
two arguments against Raz’s account from Jonathan Quong; the argument from 
contingency, and the manipulation objection. I shall argue that neither of his 
arguments is successful. I shall then introduce, and ultimately reject, Quong’s 
response to Waldron’s asymmetry objection (which I introduced in chapter 2). 
My aim in this chapter is not to defend the Razian position. Instead, I want to 
demonstrate why the Quong approach does not work. 
2. Autonomy 
The principle of autonomy tells us that “the free choice of goals and relations 
[are] an essential ingredient of individual well-being”.234 Put rather heroically, 
autonomy is an idea of self-creation; individuals should make their own lives.235 
The  autonomous  agent  is  part  author  of  his  own  life.  He  “controls  his  own 
234 ibid. p. 369. 
235 Note that this isn’t self-‐‐creation from nothing. It is self-‐‐creation in light of existing social forms 
etc. See chapter 4. 
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destiny”, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout his life.236 Thus, 
the principle of autonomy tells us that well-being237 consists in the successful 
pursuit of self-chosen goals and relationships. 238 Importantly, however, the 
autonomous life need not be regimented, united and so on. Autonomous pursuits 
may be diverse and heterogeneous, and individuals can change their minds 
often.239 Furthermore, despite the seemingly grand description of autonomy, the 
pursuits need not be heroic either. A life dedicated to train spotting can be just as 
autonomous as one dedicated to helping others, or another dedicated to the 
study of Shakespeare, just so long as it is freely chosen. 
In order to lead an autonomous life, Raz tells us, the conditions of autonomy 
must be secured. There are three components here: appropriate mental abilities, 
an adequate range of options and independence (understood as freedom from 
coercion and manipulation). 
Turning to the first, autonomous agents must have the abilities necessary to 
form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, and plan their execution. These 
include minimum rationality, the ability to comprehend means required to 
realize goals and the mental faculties necessary to plan actions. Thus, in order to 
live an autonomous life, an agent must actually use these faculties in choosing 
what life to lead.240 Raz mentions as examples cognitive capacities, such as 
reasoning abilities; emotional and physical make-up; health, physical abilities 
and skills; and character traits such as loyalty.241 
Turning to the second component of the conditions of autonomy, in order to be 
autonomous, an agent must not only be given a choice, he must be given a choice 
between an adequate range of options. There are a number of stipulations that 
Raz introduces for a range of options to be adequate. First, our option-set must 
not only include trivialities. To demonstrate why this is so, Raz discusses the 
236 ibid. 
237 Or flourishing. As I have mentioned previously, the two are equivalent for Raz. 
238 ibid. p. 370. 
239 ibid. p. 371   
240 ibid. pp. 372-‐‐3 
241 ibid. p. 408. 
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“Man in the Pit.”242 This individual has fallen down a pit, and will remain there 
for the rest of his life. He has an abundance of food, so is able to stay alive 
without suffering, but he can do little: 
His choices are confined to whether to eat now or a little later, whether to 
sleep now or a little later, whether to scratch his left ear or not.243 
The man in the pit can only choose between drastically trivial options. This, 
claims Raz, is not autonomy. Thus, in order for our choices to be autonomous, 
our option-set should include both those with pervasive long-term 
consequences, and those with little, short‐term consequences “and a fair spread 
between”.244 In order to live an autonomous life I should be able to choose both 
who I am to spend the rest of life with, and what I am going to have for breakfast. 
In this way, our control extends to all aspects of our lives. This requirement helps 
dispel the heroic air that on first glance seems to surround autonomy. The 
autonomous life does not only involve the grand decisions in life, such as 
choosing the career I am to embark on. It also involves the day-to‐day, hour‐to‐ hour  
short‐term  decisions  of  little  consequence,  such  as  choosing  whether  to have 
rice or chips with my Chinese takeaway. 
The second stipulation says that it is the variety of our available options, not the 
number, that matters for our autonomy.245 If one went out to eat at an Indian 
restaurant, which served thirty very slight variations of Chicken Madras, but no 
other dishes, they would not really be faced with a choice when ordering their 
meal. Similarly a choice between one hundred near identical careers is no real 
choice at all.246 Thus, in order for our choices to be autonomous, we should be 
faced with a sufficient variety of options. 
242 ibid. pp.373-‐‐4. 
243 ibid. p. 374. 
244 ibid. p. 374 
245 ibid. p. 375. 
246 In ‘Picking and Choosing’ (1977) Ullman-Margalit and Morgenbesser distinguish between the 
two concepts. When we choose between two options, we act in a way which is determined by the 
differences in our preferences over them. As they argue, “choosing is choosing for a reason, and 
this presupposes preference” (p. 758). This is not the case when we pick between two options. 
We pick when we are indifferent between the two. This need not be because the options are near 
 
 
114 
The third stipulation says that our choices should not be dominated by the need 
to protect one’s life. Again Raz demonstrates this by introducing a dramatic 
example – this time the Hounded Woman. 247 The Hounded Woman is an 
individual who has (somehow) found herself on small desert island inhabited by 
a “fierce carnivorous animal”248 which spends its time hunting her: 
Her mental stamina, her intellectual ingenuity, her will power and her 
physical resources are taxed to their limits by her struggle to remain 
alive. She never has a chance to do or even to think of anything other than 
how to escape from the beast.249 
The Hounded Woman, argues Raz, is not autonomous. The only choice she faces 
is whether to act in a way that will ensure her survival, or not. So, in order to be 
autonomous, our option‐set should not be dominated by the need to protect 
ourselves, or those around us. The example of the Hounded Woman might seem 
fantastical, but I think Raz is highlighting something important. Take Dan. Dan 
lives way below the poverty line and receives no state benefits. As such, his 
choices are wholly dictated by the need provide sustenance to himself and his 
family. He has little opportunity to take the important decisions in life, such as 
what  career  to  have  and  what  to  do  in  his  free  time.  As  such,  Dan  is  not 
autonomous. 
The fourth and final stipulation on the adequacy of options is that there must be 
a plurality of morally acceptable choices within our option‐set.250 Autonomy is 
not of value when exercised in pursuit of something morally repugnant. A choice 
between one acceptable option, and one or more evil options is no choice at all. If 
Simon is (somehow) faced with a choice between: (1) Cutting off his own hand, 
identical, as in the curry house example. It may be because you believe both options are equally 
acceptable or useful (p. 775). The second stipulation says that in order to be autonomous we 
must choose rather than merely pick. 
247 ibid. p. 374. 
248 Ibid. 
249 ibid. 
250 ibid. pp. 378 – 381. As we saw in the previous chapter, autonomy presupposes and is 
presupposed by such value pluralism. We cannot be autonomous without a choice between 
valuable options. However, there would be no need to be autonomous if there were only one 
correct way to live one’s life. 
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(2) Setting fire to a school, or (3) Taking a season ticket at Peterborough United, 
and subsequently chooses the season ticket, he is not autonomous with regards 
to that choice. His choice is dictated by the need avoid bad options. Thus, there 
needs to be an adequate number of morally acceptable options in order for the 
choice to be autonomous.251 
The third component of the conditions of autonomy is independence. Coercion 
can restrict autonomy by reducing the number of options available below 
adequacy. It can also invade autonomy by forcing one not to pursue a certain 
option whilst leaving others left to choose from. Manipulation does not directly 
interfere with options. Instead it “perverts the way that [a] person reaches 
decisions, forms preferences, or adopts goals.” 252 Thus both coercion and 
manipulation denigrate autonomy. Therefore, in order to secure the conditions 
of autonomy, the agent must be free from coercion and manipulation. That is, he 
must be independent. His will must not be subject to that of another.253 
Thus, the ideal of autonomy requires (i) that agents have the mental abilities 
necessary to exercise it, (ii) that there be an adequate range of morally 
acceptable options available to choose from, and (iii) that agents are free from 
coercion and manipulation. Personal autonomy is the ideal of free and conscious 
self-creation.254 In order for this to be realised, the conditions of autonomy must 
be secured. 
In light of this, respect for autonomy places three core moral requirements on us: 
251 Confusingly, Raz seems to use “acceptable” (MF p. 381) and “valuable” ( MF p.395) 
interchangeably. It seems apparent that there are many options that are morally acceptable, but 
not particularly valuable. A life dedicated to some trivial pursuit, such as counting blades of grass 
(to use the Rawlsian example), can be said to be acceptable, but perhaps not of value. The claim 
that autonomy is only of value in pursuit of morally acceptable options is controversial. The claim 
that autonomy is only of value in pursuit of morally valuable options is even more so. I will leave 
this question to one side. Note also, that in order for it to contribute to his well‐being, the 
individual must also believe that the option(s) he selects are valuable. See MF p.300. As Lecce 
notes, Raz’s conception of autonomy is a “complex dynamic” between choice and intrinsic value. 
(2008: 107). Our choices must be valuable in order for them to contribute to our flourishing, but 
we must also believe this to be the case. 
252 Raz (1986: 377-‐‐8) 
253 ibid. p378. 
254 ibid. p. 390. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
Refrain from coercion and manipulation. 
Help create the inner capacities required for an autonomous life. 
Help create an adequate range of morally acceptable options to choose 
from.255 
These duties are aimed at securing the conditions of autonomy. They go beyond 
just a duty of non‐interference.256 There are two further limits to this autonomy‐ 
based doctrine of freedom. Firstly, while autonomy requires the availability of an 
adequate range of acceptable options, it does not require the presence of any 
particular acceptable option among them. Secondly, while autonomy is 
consistent  with  the  presence  of  bad  options,  they  contribute  nothing  to  its 
value.257 
Thus, as a principle of political morality, the autonomy doctrine tells us that 
governments should construct principles etc. which enable us to fulfil our 
autonomy‐based duties to provide the conditions of autonomy for people who do 
not have them. The state should (i) refrain from coercing or manipulating its 
citizens and prevent others from acting in this way; (ii) help create the inner 
capacities required for an autonomous life; and (iii) help create an adequate 
range of morally acceptable options to choose from. Political action should be 
based upon our moral duties to provide others with the conditions necessary to 
lead  an  autonomous  life. Liberal  political  principles  are  grounded  in  an 
autonomy-based conception of human flourishing. Hence we have a form of 
liberal perfectionism. 
3. Autonomy and the Harm Principle 
255 ibid. pp. 407-8. Raz himself switches around the order here. 
256 On pp. 408-10, Raz claims that the conditions of autonomy are the same as positive freedom. 
This is untrue. One component of the conditions of autonomy is the absence of coercion, which is 
the same as negative liberty. Thus, the conditions of autonomy actually encompass both aspects 
of liberty. 
257 ibid. pp. 410-11 
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According to Raz, the three autonomy‐based duties lead to a modified version of 
the harm principle. Traditionally, the harm principle tells us that the only 
grounds for coercive state interference in individual or collective behaviour is 
the threat of harm to others. Raz’s own version is different. He argues that the 
only justifiable ground for coercion is the prevention of harm to anyone, 
including the person or people perpetrating the harm.258 Thus, the Razian harm 
principle  extends  to  harm  to  self.  It  is  a  paternalistic  reading  of  the  harm 
principle. 
How does Raz derive this version of the harm principle from the principle of 
autonomy? He begins by defining harm thus: 
To harm a person is to diminish his prospects, to affect adversely his 
possibilities…Roughly speaking, one harms another when one’s action 
makes the other person worse off than he was, or is entitled to be, in a 
way which affects his future well-being.259 
We harm other people, and ourselves, by setting back interests. Thus, if I were 
knock a passer-by to the ground, I would affect his ability to do a number of 
things, including living in a safe environment, free from physical violence, and so 
on. According to the harm principle, then, the state is justified in coercing me 
into leaving my neighbour alone. I would harm him by committing the assault, so 
the state can, and should, threaten me with fines, prison time, etc. in order to 
prevent me from doing so. However, as Raz emphasises, we not only harm 
people by acting in certain ways towards them, as in the example above. 
Sometimes we harm others by failing to do something.260  I also harm my 
neighbour if I fail to repay the £1000 he has lent me, and again the state is 
justified, assuming certain contractual obligations were in place, in forcing me to 
repay that money. 
258 ibid. pp. 412-413. 
259 ibid. p. 414. 
260 Ibid. pp. 414‐5. 
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Thus to harm is to set back interests, and this can be done by either acting in 
certain forbidden ways towards someone, or by failing to act in ways required. In 
short, we harm when we fail in our duty to others (or ourselves). As Raz has 
emphasised, the principle of autonomy gives us three clear duties: to refrain 
from coercion and manipulation; to secure the capacities needed for autonomous 
choice; and to create an adequate range of options. As such, failing to fulfil such 
duties causes harm. That is, if we do not secure independence, necessary 
capabilities and an adequate range of options, we harm individuals. Thus, the 
state is justified in using coercion in order to secure these conditions: 
If the government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people the 
harm principle allows it to use coercion both in order to stop people from 
actions which would diminish people’s autonomy and in order to force 
them to take actions which are required to improve people’s options and 
opportunities.261 
If failing to provide the conditions of autonomy harms its citizens, the state is 
required not only to prevent others from interfering with an individual's 
independence and to act in ways that aren’t coercive or manipulative. It is also 
required to secure the capabilities necessary for autonomy and to secure an 
adequate range of acceptable options from which to choose. Thus, not only 
should governments uphold a safe environment etc., it should also “redistribute 
resources…[and]… provide public goods and engage in the provision of other 
goods on a compulsory basis, provided its laws merely reflect and make concrete 
autonomy‐based duties of its citizens.”262 The harm principle extends beyond 
simply securing independence. Coercion may be used to provide the material 
conditions for autonomy. For example, as autonomy is only of value in pursuit of 
the good, the harm principle requires governments to use (if necessary) coercion 
in order to secure an adequate range of acceptable options between which to 
choose. 
261Ibid. p. 416. 
262 Ibid. p. 417. 
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As I have already mentioned, Raz’s harm principle differs from the traditional 
reading  by  allowing  coercive  interference  where  the  harm  is  done  to  the 
individual being restricted. 
A moral theory which values autonomy highly can justify restricting the 
autonomy of one person for the sake of the greater autonomy of others or 
even of that person in the future.263 
Such a paternalist reading allows that the state may coerce an individual both 
when he poses a threat to other people – for example, if we restrict the 
movements of a dangerous stalker in order to secure the independence of a 
victim family – and when we can increase his autonomy at a later date – for 
example if we tax an individual and use the resources to subsidise valuable 
options between which he can subsequently choose, thus exercising valuable 
autonomy. In both of these instances the state would be acting so to prevent 
harm, either to others or to oneself. 
Finally, as Raz emphasises, although coercion is required (through the harm 
principle) in order to secure the three conditions of autonomy, it cannot be used 
to discourage repugnant options.264 Although autonomy is not of value in pursuit 
of worthless options, their mere presence does not detract from one’s 
autonomy.265 Thus, so long as the third duty is enforced, and a plurality of 
acceptable options is secured, there is no need to coercively restrict the 
availability of worthless ones.266 This is not for any principled reason, however. 
Although the presence of bad options does not detract from autonomy, neither 
does it add to it.267 The reason that Raz does not allow the use of coercion to 
discourage bad options is that coercion is blunt and indiscriminate: 
263 Ibid. p. 419. My emphasis. 
264 Ibid. pp. 418-420. 
265 Ibid. p. 419. 
266 Raz does not seem to entertain the thought that by coercively promoting certain valuable 
options we necessarily coercively restrict access to alternative worthless ones. 
267 Ibid. pp. 378-381. 
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There is no practical way of ensuring that the coercion will restrict the 
victims’ choice of repugnant options but will not interfere with their other 
choices.268 
The sorts of methods used to deter folk from pursuing bad options – 
imprisonment, financial penalties, restriction of movement etc. – are unlikely to 
stop them from doing so without also infringing on their ability to pursue other, 
more worthwhile options. As Raz himself points out, imprisoning an individual 
for pursuing a repugnant option, for example, prevents him from almost all other 
autonomous pursuits.269 
Hence we have Raz’s autonomy-based perfectionist reading of the harm 
principle. The principle of autonomy – which is necessary for human flourishing 
-‐‐ requires that we secure the three conditions of valuable autonomy; 
independence, necessary capacities and an adequate range of options. Failure to 
do this causes harm, thus the harm principle requires that states enforce our 
duties to provide the three conditions. 
4. Quong’s First Objection: Contingency 
I shall now go on to present and assess Jonathan Quong’s two criticisms of Raz’s 
account – the contingency objection, and the objection from manipulation. In this 
section I will argue that the contingency objection – which argues that Raz’s 
harm principle is contingent on the wrong sort of factual considerations -‐‐ fails 
for two reasons. Firstly, I argue that either Raz would not or should not find the 
counter-examples problematic, as they are not counterexamples at all. Secondly, I 
argue that Quong fails to take sufficiently seriously the role that contingency 
plays in Raz’s political philosophy. In the subsequent section I will argue that 
Quong is wrong to claim that the harm principle must rule out perfectionist 
forms of political action. 
268 Ibid. p. 419 
269 ibid. p. 418. 
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As I  highlighted  in  the previous  section,  Raz  argues that  the  harm  principle 
cannot justify using coercion in order to prevent the pursuit of bad options. 
However, this is not because autonomy requires their presence. Instead it is 
because coercion is indiscriminate; there is no practical way to restrict access to 
unacceptable options  without also  interfering  with an  individual’s  pursuit of 
valuable ones. Jonathan Quong does not like this contingency.270 He seems 
uncomfortable with basing the harm principle on such an empirical premise. He 
argues that there would still be something wrong with coercively interfering 
with an individual so to remove bad options, even if we could do this without 
thereby interfering with the pursuit of good options. He does so by introducing 
two counterexamples: 
The brain chip: Suppose that technological advances have made it 
possible to control people’s preferences via a chip implanted in the brain. 
The chips are so precise that the only effect they have is to prevent us 
from choosing bad options. If we only select good choices, the chip 
remains inactive. If it senses that we are going to choose badly, it prevents 
us from doing so.271 
Albert, Carl and Betty: Albert wishes to get back together with his ex-‐‐ 
girlfriend Betty. The relationship was objectively bad for Albert: Betty is 
mean and manipulative, and Albert is better off without her in his life. 
Lonely, Albert decides to head to Betty’s house in order to rekindle their 
romance. Carl, a neighbour of Albert’s, finds out that he is about to do this 
and, realising that it is not in Albert’s best interest to patch things up with 
Betty, locks him in his house so that he is unable to see Betty. Albert was 
not going to do anything else whilst he was  locked  in  the  room  (apart 
from  see  Betty),  and  remains  there  until  convinced  that  he  should  not 
rekindle their romance.272 
270 Quong (2011: 53‐60). 
271 Ibid. p. 55. 
272 Ibid. 
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In both of the examples above, we are able to prevent the pursuit of the bad 
without infringing on the pursuit of the good. Thus, according to Quong, the 
Razian harm principle doesn’t apply here – as autonomy does not require the 
presence of bad options, and there is no value in pursuing them, preventing its 
pursuit causes no harm. Implanting the brain chips and locking up Albert is 
permitted on Raz’s account. Quong argues  that this is counterintuitive; “The 
examples suggest that there is something wrong with preventing people from 
choosing badly, even when this can be done without limiting their ability to 
choose valuable options.”273 This is because, argues Quong, the harm principle 
should instead be justified by an appeal to the moral status of individuals as free 
and equal persons.274 That is, even if we can prevent individuals from pursuing 
the bad without affecting their ability to select good options, we should not do so 
as this demeans them and treats them as morally inferior. 
How might Raz respond to this criticism? Firstly, he might argue thus: to harm 
someone is to fail to secure them the conditions of autonomy. One such condition 
is independence. Independence is contravened through coercion and 
manipulation, which subjects the will of one person to that of another,275 and 
expresses a relation of domination and an attitude of disrespect 276 . The 
counterexamples above demonstrate a clear case of the condition of 
independence failing to be fulfilled. In both the brain chip case and the Albert 
case, the individual is being subject to the will of another, and hence he is not 
independent. As such, assuming that no long term good would be realised by 
treating them in such a way (as permitted by the paternalistic aspect of Raz’s 
harm principle), restricting the access to repugnant options in the manners 
suggested by the counterexamples would not be permitted by the Razian harm 
principle. By acting in such a way, the condition of independence would not be 
secured. Thus, the counterexamples are not actually counter examples at all. The 
Razian harm principle would not permit such situations to occur. In both cases, 
273 ibid. 
274 ibid p 56. 
275 Raz (1986: 378) 
276 ibid. p. 418. 
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attempting to prevent the pursuit of bad options means that the duty to secure 
independence is not discharged. 
Unfortunately, this response is not available to Raz. As Quong notes when 
discussing such a reply, “if autonomous choice has no value when directed at bad 
options, why is it disrespectful or domineering to prevent people from making 
such choices?”277 In fact, Raz says elsewhere that it would be disrespectful to 
ignore moral considerations in such a way.278 We do not respect an individual by 
turning a blind eye when she pursues something worthless. Autonomy is a 
conditional good. It is valuable insofar as it promotes human flourishing. Thus, 
there is no reason to protect it when it does not so contribute. As such, Raz can’t 
appeal to the condition of independence in order to protect the autonomous 
pursuit of the non-valuable found in the brain chip and Carl and Albert cases. 
A second response Raz might give is to simply say that the counterexamples are 
not troubling. Quong’s argument seeks to show that Raz’s position gives 
counterintuitive results. He does this by relying on the attractiveness of the 
moral status view. As we have seen, Raz does not justify his harm principle by an 
appeal to the status of moral agents. He justifies it by an appeal to the principle 
of autonomy, and his principle of autonomy argues that it is only of value in 
pursuit of the good. As such, there is no reason to protect autonomous error, and 
Raz might not be bothered by the counter examples at all. He extends the harm 
principle to cover paternalistic action, and if the brain chip or Carl’s padlock are 
necessary to improve Albert’s autonomy in the long run, then those actions are 
justified by an appeal to the harm principle. However, if the actions are not 
required by autonomy – i.e. if they do not improve autonomy in the long run – 
the principle is silent on the matter. It might not require the absence of bad 
options, but neither does it require their presence. Quong might find this 
discomforting, but this is due to the fact that, as he himself admits, he justifies 
the  harm  principle  by  an  appeal  to  different  moral  concerns.  Raz, with  his 
autonomy-based reading of the harm principle, might be untroubled by these 
277 Quong (2011: 58). Regan (1989: 1084) and Lecce (2008: 130) both make a similar point. 
278 MF  p. 157. 
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counterexamples.279 In order to secure his point, Quong would need to vindicate 
the moral status view. But he does not do this.280 Instead, he starts from the 
conclusion that Raz is wrong.281 
Furthermore,  as  Quong  himself  highlights,  Raz  does  not  think  that  such 
contingency is a problem.282 He argues: 
It is an advantage of my argument that it does depend on contingent 
features of our world. The temptation to make abstract a priori principles 
yield    concrete    practical    policies    is    responsible    for    many    bad 
arguments.283 
Raz would argue that counterexamples such as the brain chip case (but not, as 
Quong points out284, the Albert case) “diverge from anything we have experience 
of sufficiently to make it impossible for us to say how the change would affect the 
merits of the issue.”285 This is enough for Raz to remain agnostic about whether 
it would be justified to coercively prevent the pursuit of the bad if you could do 
so without interfering with one’s ability to pursue the good. 
It seems that Quong sees this as a bit of a cop-out on Raz’s part. He argues that it 
is too strong to claim that it is impossible to have sensible normative intuitions 
about such cases. 
We often ask ourselves questions about how we would react if the world 
were different, sometimes in different ways that are not feasible or ever 
likely   to   happen….But   asking   such   questions,   and   considering   our 
279 Quong mentions this possibility. ibid p. 56. 
280 Nor does he do this in chapter three, where he appeals to moral status to argue for the 
wrongness of paternalism. 
281 In fairness to Quong, he does concede that this objection relies on intuitive reactions, and that 
it is not meant to provide decisive proof that Raz’s harm principle is flawed. ibid. p. 56. 
282 Quong (2011: 56-7). 
283 Raz (1986: 419) 
284  Quong (2011: 57). 
285 Raz (1986: 419) 
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intuitive reactions to these cases, can help clarify our thoughts, and is a 
standard part of everyday moral reasoning.286 
What would Raz say about this? I don’t think he would deny Quong’s basic point, 
that thinking about how we would react if the world were different might help 
clarify our thoughts. His point is different. As he says in a later piece of work287 
his approach to political philosophy is essentially historical or time‐bound. 
Political principles should be constructed to apply to the here and now. This is 
why he remains agnostic about situations where we can remove repugnant 
options without  affecting the pursuit  of  the  good. We  can  think  about these 
situations, and how we might react in them. But, we cannot draw any political 
principles from such thought experiments. This is because even if we can think 
about how we act in these imagined circumstances, they only apply to these 
circumstances, and not the ones we actually find ourselves in. There is a vast 
distance between us and the circumstances in which brain chips of the requisite 
sort are features of life. The “we” who hold the intuitions is not the “we” who will 
ever end up in the brain chip scenario. As Gregory Kavka says with regard to 
future people affected by a decision about a nuclear programme, we know 
neither who these people are, nor what they are like.288 It will not be us who find 
ourselves in such a position. As such, why should conclusions made in such 
hypothetical circumstances apply to us? Thus, I think Quong is wrong to reject 
this Razian response. Why should Raz’s theory be judged now on what it would 
say in some currently impossible brain chip scenario?289 
Hence, I do not think that Quong’s contingency objection is successful. Firstly, I 
argue that the Razian would not be troubled by the counterexamples. Secondly, I 
argue that Raz can maintain that rather than a hindrance, the contingency may 
286  Quong (2011:57) 
287 Raz (1994: 170-171) 
288  Kavka (1982: 103). 
289 Kamm (1996) appears to think that the more unlike the real world our cases are, the more 
plausible the principles derived will be. “Real‐life cases often do not contain the relevant – or 
solely the relevant – characteristics to help in our search for principles” (p. 10). I disagree with 
Kamm for the reasons that I spell out above. The fact that we cannot coercively prevent folk from 
pursuing bad options without a general invasion of autonomy is hugely relevant in selecting our 
principles of justice. 
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actually  be  a  benefit   of  his  account;   he  can  remain   agnostic  about  the 
counterexamples. 
5. Quong’s Second Objection: Manipulation and the Harm Principle 
In this section I will be discussing Quong’s second objection to Raz’s autonomy- 
based liberal perfectionism; that perfectionist political action is incompatible 
with an autonomy‐based harm principle. 
As we have seen, Raz has used the three autonomy‐based duties to justify a harm 
principle that allows coercion only to secure independence, the necessary 
capacities for autonomy and an adequate variety of options. However, as Raz 
points out290, manipulation interferes with autonomy in much the same way as 
coercion, so is subject to the same condition. Thus the harm principle covers 
cases of manipulation as well as coercion. Either is justified only to secure the 
conditions of autonomy. 
With this in mind, Quong claims that Raz needs to show that perfectionist 
policies are not manipulative (because otherwise they would violate 
independence).291 Quong focuses solely on subsidisation, but other methods 
might include incentives, rewards and so on. Quong seeks to show that such 
perfectionist action is manipulative. He does so by leaning on arguments used by 
Robert Nozick.292 He claims that perfectionist subsidies subject the will of 
citizens to that of the state.293 This is because the government places citizens in a 
choice situation that they would not have chosen to place themselves in. They 
would rather spend the money themselves than have the government take it 
from them and spend it on, for example, subsidising opera tickets. This is 
because allowing the government to take it from them would be “irrational”; it 
simply reduces what you can do with your resources.294 Thus such action is 
290 Raz (1986: 420). 
291  Quong (2011: 61) 
292  Nozick (1969). 
293 Quong (2011: 65-6). 
294 Ibid. p. 65. 
 
 
127 
manipulative, and interferes with autonomy. Hence, Quong argues that such 
perfectionist action is incompatible with the autonomy‐based harm principle. 
Perfectionist subsidies, for example, submit the will of the individual to the state 
and are manipulative, and thus interfere with autonomy. There appears to be a 
deep  tension  between  promoting  autonomy  and  securing  valuable  options 
through subsidisation.295 
One might object to Quong’s argument by denying that such state action is 
manipulative. However, I want to argue that even if we allow this, this seems to 
be a major misreading of Raz’s argument. Quong appears to think that Raz’s 
autonomy‐based harm principle prohibits all coercive action, and hence should 
also prohibit all manipulative action, such as subsidies. Raz agrees that 
manipulation should be subject to the same constraints as coercion.296 However, 
the Razian harm principle does not rule out all coercive interference. It only 
rules out coercive interference that is not aimed at securing the conditions of 
autonomy. Hence, coercion is justified when it is necessary to enable us to fulfil 
out duties of autonomy. The same is the case with manipulation. The state is 
justified in manipulating individuals – in subjecting them to the will of another – 
if this is necessary to secure the conditions of autonomy. This is precisely what 
perfectionist subsidies aim to do in Raz’s account. The state carries out such 
action in order to secure a variety of adequate options. To fail to do so would be 
to harm its citizens. Thus such perfectionist action is not only permitted, but also 
required by the autonomy-based harm principle. It is necessary to implement 
such subsidies in order to avoid harm. Far from being incompatible with the 
Razian harm principle, as Quong claims, such perfectionist action is required by 
it. Raz’s harm principle might be far removed from the traditional reading – and I 
suspect  that  this  is  Quong’  real  concern  –  but  as  stipulated  it  is  perfectly 
compatible with perfectionist political action. 
6. Quong’s Response to the Asymmetry Objection 
295 Steven Lecce (2008: 122‐3) and Mulhall and Swift (1996: 321-2) both press a similar point, 
albeit in far less detail. 
296 MF p. 420. 
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Thus I think Quong’s arguments against Raz’s  liberal  perfectionism  fail.  To  end 
this chapter, I want to return to the asymmetry objection, which I introduced in 
chapter two as a way of framing the debate between perfectionism and anti- 
perfectionism. Recall that this objection surrounded the issue of why it was 
legitimate to separate the right and the good at the level of politics. It argued that 
there is just as much disagreement between citizens about  issues  of  justice  as 
there is on conceptions of the good, so it is utterly arbitrary to forbid appealing 
to  perfectionist  considerations  in  constructing  political  principles  on  the  basis 
that these principles are more controversial than non‐perfectionist principles. 
How does Quong deal with this objection? It must be noted that Quong is 
committed to the Rawlsian political liberal project, so certain avenues -‐‐ such as 
denying that political principles must be acceptable to reasonable citizens -‐‐ are 
not available to him. Thus, Quong must maintain that political liberalism is not 
internally inconsistent in the way suggested by the asymmetry objection. He 
must  find  a  way  to  show  that  principles  of  the  right,  but  not  the  good,  are 
acceptable to reasonable citizens. 
He does so by claiming that the sort of disagreement that occurs surrounding 
issues of justice is different from the sort that occurs surrounding issues of the 
human good. As such, the asymmetry can be justified. 
Quong begins by distinguishing between the two forms of disagreement: 
Foundational disagreement: “Disagreements of this type are 
characterised by the fact that the participants do not share any premises 
which can serve as a mutually acceptable standard of justification.”297 
Justificatory disagreement: “occurs when participants do share premises 
that serve as a mutually acceptable standard of justification, but they 
nevertheless disagree about certain substantive conclusions.”298 
297  Quong (2011: 193) 
298 ibid. 
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Disagreements of the first sort occur where two individuals share no common 
underlying values. That is, such disputes are underpinned by a disagreement 
about the fundamental values that should guide the issue in question. Thus, 
when a hedonist and a strict Muslim argue about whether a life of thrill seeking, 
recreational drug use and casual sex is flourishing, and appeal to their 
comprehensive doctrines to support and condemn it respectively, they are 
having a foundational disagreement. There are no shared values underlying the 
dispute; the hedonist appeals to a view about good human lives that the strict 
Muslim explicitly rejects. A justificatory disagreement occurs where the  two 
sides agree on the fundamental values that guide the dispute, but disagree about 
their weight, ranking and so on. Thus, when a strict egalitarian and a proponent 
of maximin argue about the correct distribution of resources, both are 
nevertheless committed to the value of fairness which informs their particular 
distributive position. They are having a justificatory disagreement. 
With these definitions in mind, Quong’s argument for asymmetry goes as follows: 
1. Reasonable   disagreements   about   the   good   life   are   not   necessarily 
justificatory and will almost certainly be foundational. 
2. Reasonable disagreements about justice are necessarily justificatory and 
not foundational. 
3. The liberal principle of legitimacy (“our exercise of political power is fully 
proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principals and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason”299) is not violated when the state imposes a 
view that arises out of a justificatory disagreement 
299  Rawls (2005: 137) 
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Therefore 
4.   Claims of justice over which there is reasonable disagreement, if imposed 
by the state, do not violate the liberal principle of legitimacy in the way 
that perfectionist claims are likely to do.300 
Recall the example earlier of the discussion between the hedonist and the strict 
Muslim. This is a disagreement about the human good. It is also a case of 
foundational disagreement. Quong argues that disagreements about the good 
will tend to be like this. In such cases, the two parties disagree at the ultimate 
level of conviction or principles. They disagree about the “ultimate purpose of 
human existence”. There is no shared justificatory framework governing their 
interaction. There is no deeper standard of justification that both accept that 
could adjudicate between their respective positions. Rather, they disagree about 
what the standards of justification should be.301 
This is not the case for disagreements about justice. These, claims Quong, will be 
necessarily justificatory. When reasonable people disagree about issues of 
justice, such as in the situation mentioned above, where our two individuals had 
conflicting ideas about how resources should be distributed amongst citizens, 
there is a common normative framework that underlies the disagreement. This is 
the concept of reasonableness itself – a desire to abide by fair terms of 
cooperation amongst free and equal citizens, an acceptance of the burdens of 
judgement and a commitment to public justification.302 That is, in any case where 
disagreement occurs, both parties will be sincere, will accept reasonable 
pluralism, and will present their arguments in a free‐standing manner (that is, 
they will subscribe to the use of public reason in the political sphere). However, 
if the government were to side with one party, and implement a certain 
distributive pattern, it would still be offering the other party something which 
she  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  endorse. 303  That  is  because  she  is 
300 ibid. p. 204. My emphasis. 
301 ibid. pp. 205‐6. 
302 ibid. p. 207. 
303 Ibid. p. 208. 
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committed to the value appealed to in the dispute. This would be the case with 
any disagreement about justice, because political proposals appeal to values and 
principles that all reasonable people can be expected to endorse. In such a way, 
the principle of legitimacy is not violated even when people disagree about 
justice. In such disagreements, there is a shared normative framework – 
reasonableness.  All  the  values  appealed  to  in  such  debates  are  mutually 
acceptable. They simply disagree about their weight or ranking. 
According to Quong, when a government decides to implement some principle of 
justice, all reasonable people would accept it, even if they disagreed with it. But, 
this would not be the case with principles which appeal to the good. That is 
because disputes about flourishing embody foundational disagreements. If the 
government were to side with one party in the dispute about the rightness or 
wrongness of drug taking, it would be imposing one person’s view on another, 
because there is no framework ensuring that the values employed will be 
acceptable to other reasonable persons. As such, not all reasonable citizens will 
accept a state acting on a conception of the good.304 
Thus the burdens of judgement don’t apply equally. In the case of disagreements 
about justice, there is a shared normative framework that can bear the burdens 
of judgement. Principles of justice appeal to political values we all endorse, even 
if we disagree about their weight or ranking. If this argument works, then it 
might rescue Quong’s political liberalism from the asymmetry objection. All 
reasonable citizens will endorse principles of justice. They will not endorse 
principles of human flourishing. Therefore, the state can appeal to accounts of 
justice when constructing political institutions and so on. They cannot appeal to 
accounts of the human good. 
6. The Problem of Idealisation: Rejecting Quong 
Ultimately, I think Quong’s response fails. Recall that Joseph Raz denies that the 
burdens of judgement apply to either sphere. He believes that, within modern 
304 ibid. p. 208. 
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western societies, there is consensus that the good human life must include 
autonomy. Quong wants to argue that the burdens of judgement apply to the 
good, but not to the right. That is, he believes that there is consensus on the 
values that underpin disagreements about justice but not the values that 
underpin (or perhaps constitute) disagreements about the good. Thus he denies 
Waldron’s claim that it is inconsistent to believe that the burdens of judgement 
apply to judgements about flourishing but not judgements about justice. 
But why think that disagreements about justice will be necessarily justificatory? 
Why think that for every dispute about justice there will be a common 
framework of values underlying it? If we look at disagreements about matters of 
justice between actual people, we see that, at least sometimes, they are not mere 
disputes about the rankings of values. In real life, disputes about justice are not 
necessarily justificatory. They are sometimes foundational. Take, for example, 
the disagreement between social democrats and Nozickian libertarians about the 
redistribution of wealth. Social democrats believe that the better off should be 
taxed in order to secure some threshold level of income for the less well off. 
Nozick famously argued that compulsory taxation, beyond that needed to police 
the streets and protect the borders, was on a par with forced labour. Such a 
disagreement is surely foundational. There is no justificatory framework of 
shared values. Both parties explicitly reject the values that the other is appealing 
to in presenting their arguments. It is not a dispute about weight or ranking. It is 
a dispute about the very values themselves. The arguments appealed to are not 
mutually acceptable. 
But if disagreements about justice can be foundational, then Quong cannot 
maintain the asymmetry. A Nozickian libertarian will not accept a state decision 
to implement a system of wealth redistribution in order to secure a threshold 
level of resources for all. Such state action would be illegitimate, according to the 
political liberal. 
Quong would respond at this point by pointing out that the individuals that 
political  action  should  be  justifiable  to  are  not  actual  citizens.  Instead,  they 
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should be understood as an idealised group of reasonable citizens. That is, 
principles of justice do not need to be justified to actual citizens in our society, 
but to a fictional set of citizens who are already committed to “basic liberal 
norms” such as “the idea of persons as free and equal” or “fairness in the 
distribution of goods or advantages amongst citizens.”305 If we were to rely on 
actual citizens, then our political morality would be hostage to any number of 
bigots, crackpots and idiots. Hence, we should only make political principles 
justifiable to people already committed to abstract liberal values. Even if the 
likes of Nozick do not accept redistributive schemes, if they can be justified to 
reasonable citizens then they are legitimate. 
As I mentioned above, it is the concept of reasonableness that forms the shared 
normative framework that underlies disputes about justice. By idealising our set 
of citizens, we ensure that they are reasonable, and thus that any disagreements 
they have about justice will be justificatory. As Quong says, reasonable 
disagreements about justice are justificatory by definition.306 By adopting the 
idealised conception of the reasonable person, the claim that disagreement about 
justice  is  justificatory  is  inevitable.  Hence,  Quong  secures  asymmetry  at  the 
outset by constructing the constituency of persons in a certain way. 
But why should we construct the constituency of persons in this way?307 O’Neill 
points out that rather than bracketing true predicates, idealisation actually 
involves ascribing false ones.308 In Quong’s case, it defines the relevant set of 
individuals as people who are already committed to liberal values such as liberty, 
equality  and  fairness.  As  Quong  readily  admits,  this  does  not  reflect  the 
commitments and motivations of actual citizens in actual societies. 
But  if  his  account  involves  constructing  citizens  in  an  idealised  way,  what 
conclusions can us actual citizens take from Quong’s political liberalism? Quong 
305 ibid. p. 5. 
306 ibid. p. 214. 
307 My argument here develops ideas discussed by Onora O’Neill (1996: 39 – 44) and Simon Hope 
(2010: 138 – 140). 
308 O’Neill (1996: 41) 
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takes his political liberalism to be more than just an account of which principles 
of justice would be endorsed by idealised people. His account is also action- 
guiding. He believes that state power, in actual situations, cannot be wielded 
unless it can be justified to its citizens.309 But, in order for a theory to be action- 
guiding, it must start from how the world actually is. That is, in order to give us 
moral reasons to act in such-and-such a way, our theory must be informed by the 
circumstances in which we are instructed to act. If a moral theory misrepresents 
how the world is, it can’t guide action. But this is precisely what Quong’s theory 
is doing. It is idealising citizens; it defines them as individuals who are already 
committed to liberal values. This is a misrepresentation. It does not reflect the 
commitments and motivations of actual citizens in actual societies. What can be 
justified to reasonable citizens is not the same as what can be justified to us. 
Thus, what conclusions can we draw from Quong’s political liberalism? Quong’s 
theory gives reasons to act to people who live in a world where disagreement 
about justice is necessarily justificatory. But that is not the world we live in. Thus 
why should we think that, for example, a redistributive scheme of taxation 
(which actual people have foundational disagreements about) is legitimate? 
Disagreements about justice between actual citizens are not necessarily 
justificatory. Sometimes disagreements about justice do go all the way down, and 
there is no shared commitment to abstract ideals such as fairness. If that is the 
case then the principle of justice in question could not be endorsed by those in 
disagreement. Again, why would principles of justice which could be endorsed to 
reasonable people be applicable to actual people who do not have the same 
commitments? If we derive principles from situations vastly different to ours 
then those principles do not apply to us. Any plausible theory of justice must 
reflect how we as citizens actually are, otherwise it cannot apply to us. As Simon 
Hope notes “principles of justice must be world‐guided if they are to be plausibly 
action-guiding, and this, in turn, requires that certain features of the world are 
not idealized away.”310 If we formulate principles of justice on the assumption 
that citizens are already committed to basic liberal values, then the resultant 
principles will provide little guidance for those actual citizens who are not thus 
309  ibid. pp. 1-2. 
310  Hope (2010: 140) 
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committed. Therefore, I do not think that Quong can respond to my concerns by 
simply   saying   that   his   constituency   of   persons   rules   out   foundational 
disagreement about justice. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined Jonathan Quong’s response to the liberal 
perfectionism of Joseph Raz. In the first half of the chapter, I explained why 
Quong’s two objections -‐‐ the argument from contingency, and the manipulation 
objection – are not successful. In the second half of the chapter, I focused on 
Quong’s response to the asymmetry problem. I argued that his attempt to 
rehabilitate political liberalism, by arguing that the asymmetry was justified, 
must fail. 
In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  examine  and  ultimately  reject  Brian  Barry’s  sceptical 
account   of   anti‐perfectionism,   before   offering   my   own   response   to   the 
asymmetry problem in chapter seven. 
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6 
Brian Barry’s Sceptical Argument For Anti-Perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that Jonathan Quong’s response to the 
asymmetry problem does not succeed. He does not offer a workable response to 
Waldron’s claim that the burdens of judgement apply just as much to judgements 
about justice as they do to judgements about flourishing. When we look at actual 
citizens rather than idealised “reasonable people” conflicts about justice are at 
least sometimes foundational. That is, in such cases, there is no shared moral 
framework underlying the debate. 
How, then, can one maintain the asymmetry needed to vindicate anti‐ 
perfectionism? I think that the answer lies in a form of scepticism about the 
prospect of perfectionism being vindicated in modern, liberal societies. In the 
final chapter I will argue that Raz is incorrect to claim that there is consensus on 
the judgement that the flourishing life must involve autonomy. Furthermore, I 
will argue that although Waldron is right that disagreements about justice are 
sometimes just as deep as disagreements about the good, the asymmetry of anti‐ 
perfectionism can be justified by looking at principles we can endorse, rather 
than principles that we do endorse. 
However, before I do that I will examine a different kind of sceptical argument 
for anti-perfectionism, that of Brian Barry. Barry argues that that none of us can 
be certain that our conception of the good is the correct one, and that, according 
to the Scanlonian original position that he favours (which I will go on to outline), 
this   entails   that   anti‐perfectionism   should   be   embraced.   I   will   argue   that 
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although Barry’s account gestures towards the correct path to anti- 
perfectionism,   it   ultimately   fails   to   provide   an   answer   to   the   problem   of 
asymmetry. 
2. Barry’s Scepticism. 
Brian Barry’s argument for anti-perfectionism, in Justice as Impartiality, 311 
proceeds in two steps. Firstly, he argues for scepticism about the good -‐‐ that a 
history of pervasive disagreement regarding human flourishing suggests that no 
conception of the good can be held to be true with any certainty. Secondly, he 
argues that this scepticism about human flourishing entails that we should 
restrict political argument such that it cannot make use of perfectionist claims. 
This move from scepticism to anti‐perfectionism is secured by the Scanlonian 
reasonable rejectability principle, which I will explain in the next section. In 
short, he believes that we cannot give compelling arguments for any conception 
of the good that no‐one could reasonably reject. Thus, no conception of the good 
can be the basis for political institutions etc. Barry argues that the two steps, 
taken together, show that “no conception of the good can justifiably be held with 
a degree of certainty that warrants its imposition on those who reject it.”312 In 
this section I will explain Barry’s argument for scepticism. In the following 
section I will argue why he thinks that this scepticism should lead us to embrace 
anti‐perfectionism. 
As I have gestured to above, Barry’s argument for scepticism is empirical. He 
claims, using historical evidence, that the prospect of convergence on the good is 
non‐existent. He argues, via historical example, that there has long existed vast 
disagreement between individuals and groups about what the human good 
exists in. History shows us that people differ, sometimes drastically, about what 
constitutes a flourishing life. Further, he believes that this lack of consensus 
about  the  good  should  lead  us  to  be  sceptical  about  whether  any  such 
judgements can be said to be true. That is, if there are a number of different 
311  Barry (1995) 
312  Barry (1995: 169) 
 
 
138 
conceptions of the good held by people in society, how do we decide which, if 
any, is the correct account of human flourishing? 
Barry offers the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in post-‐‐Reformation 
Europe as a historical example of a lack of consensus about the good.313 Here we 
had two groups who disagreed vehemently with one another about what 
constituted a flourishing life. The two forms of Christianity had important 
differences – Protestants rejected Papal infallibility and the idea of 
transubstantiation for example – so a life of piety was different depending upon 
which religion an individual subscribed to. 
As evidence for how vehement the disagreement was, Barry points to the fact 
that neither Catholics nor Protestants had much success in managing to convert 
members of the other side through rational argument. Catholics, for example, 
were largely impervious to Protestant criticisms of their faith. In fact, Barry 
argues, even legal penalties were ineffective in producing a change in one’s 
conception of the good. Expanding the example to cases of religious conflict more 
generally, Barry argues that history teaches us that where people did convert, it 
was usually for self‐interested reasons. He points to (i) a desire to further oneself 
socially, economically or politically; and (ii) a desire to associate oneself with a 
more sophisticated, or more powerful cultures; as two key prudential reasons 
why people did convert.314 They rarely, if ever, converted from one religion to 
another  due  to  compelling  reasons  given  by  the  religion  to  which  one  is 
converting. 
Barry argues that this historical case for scepticism about religious conceptions 
of the good can be extended a fortiori to other, nonreligious conceptions.315 We 
should surmise that there has long existed vast disagreement about nonreligious 
conceptions of the good. He gives the example of his own “ecocentric ethic” – 
which favours “sacrificing a good deal of human want satisfaction … in pursuit of 
313 ibid. p. 170.     
314 ibid. pp. 170-71. 
315 ibid. p.171. 
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the ecological conception of the good.”316 This would obviously be a conception 
of the good that someone who cares little about the environment, favouring great 
want-satisfaction instead, would not subscribe to. The two conceptions of human 
flourishing are necessarily in conflict. 
As such, Barry would deny Raz’s basic claim that there is a consensus that the 
flourishing life must contain autonomy. If we look at history, especially recent 
history, we see that societies contain a multitude of disparate cultural groups. 
Some of these groups explicitly disavow the value of autonomy. Take, for 
example, the Amish community in the United States. They do not agree that 
autonomy is necessary for a flourishing life. In fact, they think that flourishing 
consists in preparing for heavenly rewards, rather than the free pursuit of 
options under conditions of freedom. Barry’s argument entails that contextual 
perfectionism is wrong to suggest that there is a consensus on the value of 
autonomy, even within societies. 
Barry thinks that his case for scepticism is compelling. To quote him at length: 
…the sheer weight of the evidence in favour of scepticism seems 
overwhelming. It is hard not to be impressed by the fact that so many 
people have devoted so much effort over so many centuries to a matter of 
the greatest moment with so little success in the way of securing rational 
conviction  amongst  those  not  initially  predisposed  in  favour  of  their 
conclusions.317 
Adapting an example given by Dudley Knowles, the magazine aisle of any 
newsagent indicates the vast number of diverse pursuits that people enjoy.318 
Along with such pluralism comes a lack of consensus on the good. Although there 
might be overlapping perfectionist claims amongst some of them, it would seem 
that there is no prospect of all of us adopting the same conception of human 
316 ibid. In the next section I shall go on to discuss what Barry takes to be reasonable 
acceptability. 
317 ibid. 
318  Knowles (2001: 47) 
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flourishing, no matter how many reasons are given to us. As Barry says early on 
in Justice as Impartiality, “we must anticipate that the normal state of affairs will 
be one in which there is no consensus on the nature of the good.”319 
Barry thinks that this lack of consensus on the good should lead us to be 
sceptical about whether we can hold any judgement about human flourishing 
with any degree of certainty. History teaches us that there is vast, intractable 
disagreement about what constitute objectively good lives. How, then, can we 
know which of those judgements is correct? If Andy believes that the 
autonomous life is the flourishing life and Graham believes that the deeply 
religious life is the flourishing life, and Andy offers arguments about the value of 
the free choice of options, whilst Graham tells us about the goodness of the pious 
life, how do we adjudicate between these claims? There is no independent 
standard to which we can appeal in order to decide which is the true conception 
of the good. 
Thus, the vast amount of disagreement about the good should lead us to doubt 
whether we can know if any conception of the good is true. 
3. From Scepticism to Anti-
­‐Perfectionism 
However, scepticism alone does not secure anti-perfectionism. As Barry 
highlights, one could recognise that his or her conception of the good cannot he 
held with any degree of certainty, whilst still looking to use the state to promote 
it.320 An additional premise needs to be added to secure a move from scepticism 
to the conclusion that we should endorse anti-perfectionism. This is the second 
step in Barry’s argument. 
This premise is provided by Thomas Scanlon’s reasonable rejectability principle. 
Barry adapts Scanlon’s argument for moral wrongness such that it forms the 
319 Barry (1995: 27). 
320 ibid. p. 172. 
 
 
141 
basis  of  an  account  of  justice.321 That  is,  for  Barry,  the  Scanlonian  original 
position is a device for selecting which political principles are legitimate and 
which illegitimate. Scanlon’s original test for moral wrongness was as follows: 
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour 
which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement.322 
For Scanlon, an act is wrong if it is incompatible with a set of rules accepted by 
all reasonable people. Barry adapts the principle so that it is a test for injustice. 
For Barry, an act is unjust if it is incompatible with laws and institutions which 
no-one could reasonably reject. 
Hence, the people in the “Scanlonian Original Position” according to Barry “are 
assumed to be motivated by the desire to find terms for living together that 
could not be reasonably rejected by other people who were similarly 
motivated.”323 A law or institution is unjust if it could be reasonably rejected by 
parties who, in addition to their own personal aims, were moved by a desire to 
find principles that others similarly motivated could also accept.324 In order for a 
principle to be invoked in political argument, it must be freely acceptable to 
everybody. Hence each of us has a veto on all proposed principles for regulating 
society.325 
It is only when we combine scepticism with such reasonable rejectability that 
anti-perfectionism can be secured. According to Barry, we can’t give compelling 
arguments for any conception of the good that no-one could reasonably reject. If 
our institutions are more favourable to some conception(s) of the good, and less 
favourable to others, we cannot expect those who stand to lose out to acquiesce 
321 Here I am relying on Barry’s own interpretation of Scanlon’s work. Whether or not Barry is 
faithful to Scanlon’s arguments is another matter. 
322  Scanlon (1982: 110) 
323 ibid. p. 165. 
324 ibid. p. 67. 
325 ibid. p. 69. 
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freely to them.326 This is because “no conception of the good can be held with a 
degree of certainty that warrants its imposition on those who reject it.”327 An 
individual in the Scanlonian original position will not accept the imposition of a 
rival conception of the good because no reasons can be offered to her which 
show that this conception is true and hers false. Any political arrangement that 
favours some conception of the good over others is hence unjust. Therefore, no 
conception of the good can be included as a justificatory premise when setting up 
political institutions etc.328 
Thus we have Barry’s two-‐‐step argument for anti‐perfectionism. Firstly, he says 
that we have good reason to be sceptical that any conception of the good can be 
vindicated. Secondly, he says that this lack of certainty about human flourishing 
entails that any claims about the good will not pass the Scanlonian test of 
reasonable rejectability. No individual will accept the imposition of a rival 
conception of the good precisely because that rival conception cannot be 
vindicated. Therefore, any principle that appeals to a conception of the good will 
be unjust. 
4. Why Barry’s Argument Fails 
In this section I will argue that Barry’s argument for anti-perfectionism is 
unsuccessful. I think that Barry’s argument falls foul of the asymmetry objection, 
and thus fails to explain why it is permissible to invoke judgements about the 
right,  but  it  is  impermissible  to  invoke  judgements  about  flourishing,  when 
constructing political institutions. 
Turning to the first step in the argument, the argument for scepticism. As we 
have seen, Barry gives an empirical argument for scepticism about the good, 
based on the history of pervasive disagreement regarding the correct account of 
human flourishing.  History has taught us that there is vast disagreement about 
what constitutes a flourishing life. We only need to look at examples like post‐ 
326 ibid. p. 164. 
327 ibid. p. 169. 
328 ibid. p. 168. 
 
 
143 
reformation Europe, to see that consensus on the good has never existed, at least 
in recent history. According to Barry this disagreement is evidence for 
scepticism. If a multitude of conflicting conceptions of the good are found within 
society, how can we know which, if any, are correct? 
However, I have already conceded the point made by Waldron that disagreement 
about justice is just as pervasive as disagreement about the good. If we look at 
actual people in our society, we see that they disagree not just about what makes 
for a good human life, they also disagree about how we should treat one another, 
what rights we have, how we should distribute resources and so on. I argued in 
the previous chapter that the distinction offered by Quong between justificatory 
and foundational disagreements does nothing to alleviate this problem. I claimed 
that plenty of people have foundational disagreements about justice. When the 
libertarian and the social democrat disagree about whether wealth should be 
redistributed, there is no shared moral framework underpinning their dispute. 
They fundamentally disagree about what justice requires. The social democrat 
believes that we should secure a threshold of income for all citizens through 
progressive tax policies, whereas the (Nozickian) libertarian believes that all 
compulsory taxation, beyond that needed to protect borders and ensure the 
streets are safe, is on a par with forced labour. 
Thus if we use disagreement as an argument for scepticism, then justice, as well 
as the good, is similarly vulnerable. That is, if we disagree about justice just as 
much as we do about human flourishing, and we are using disagreement as an 
argument for scepticism, then we have as much reason to be sceptical about the 
claims of justice as we do about claims of flourishing. If we cannot maintain the 
asymmetry of disagreement, and disagreement forms the basis of a sceptical 
argument, we have a similar asymmetry problem about scepticism. How can one 
be sceptical about claims of human flourishing but not about claims of justice 
when Barry is using disagreement, which is just as pervasive in both spheres, as 
an argument for scepticism? In order to maintain the asymmetry in scepticism, 
whilst disagreement can be seen as evidence for, or a consequence of, scepticism 
 
144 
about the good, it cannot be used as an argument for it as it also forms the basis 
of an argument for scepticism about morality more generally.329 
But then, if the Waldron point is vindicated, which I think it is, and disagreement 
about justice is just as pervasive as justice about the good, then why think that 
individuals in the Scanlonian original position won’t also reasonably reject 
putative principles of justice? If we disagree as much about claims of justice as 
we do about those of flourishing, and disagreement suggests that such claims 
cannot be presented in a way that cannot be reasonably rejected by those in the 
Scanlonian original position, as Barry claims, then it looks as though we will not 
be able to find principles that are just. Again, claims of justice will be just as 
vulnerable as claims about the good. 
Thus, if it is not unreasonable to reject principles which favour any conception of 
the good because we cannot know whether or not it is true, then it seems that it 
is not unreasonable to reject principles which favour any accounts of the right 
for the same reason. If Waldron is right to say that disagreement about the right 
is just as prevalent as disagreement about human flourishing, and I have argued 
that he is, and disagreement is used as an argument for scepticism, we have 
every reason to be just as sceptical about the truth principles of right as we do 
principles of justice. If it is not unreasonable to reject political arrangements that 
favour any conception of human flourishing because of the fact that we cannot 
know it to be true, then it is not unreasonable to reject political arrangements 
that favour any account of the right, and for the same reason. Further, because 
reasonable rejectability is the test for whether a law, institution etc. is just, it 
would appear that any putative piece of political action will be unjust, whether 
justified by an appeal to human flourishing or an appeal to the right. 
329 Barry suggests that a “strong a priori” (rather than an empirical) argument for scepticism 
about the good can be given. However, frustratingly, he doesn’t say what form it might take. 
Further, the reason he doesn’t offer it is due to “any chain of reasoning of this sort is, however, 
open to the objection by a dogmatist that it is too speculative to overcome his powerful sense of 
being privy to the truth.” ibid. 169. 
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This difficulty arises for Barry largely because he never explains what is involved 
in reasonable rejectability. He says that individuals in the Scanlonian original 
position are motivated to reach agreement, provided others do otherwise, but he 
does not tell us what constitutes a reasonable rejection. He does, however, say: 
How then are we to establish that there is no conception of the good that 
nobody could reasonably reject? The answer that I wish to defend is that 
no conception can be held with a degree of certainty that warrants its 
imposition on those who reject it. 
Thus, as I mentioned above, Barry appears to be saying that it is not 
unreasonable to reject conceptions of the good that cannot be known to be true, 
because they cannot be known to be true. However, if a lack of certainty is the test 
for reasonable rejectability then it follows that it is not unreasonable to reject 
any account of the right. This is because, by my argument above, we cannot hold 
accounts of the right with any degree of certainty either. 
So, it appears that Barry’s argument cannot overcome the problem of 
asymmetry. If we cannot justify political institutions by appealing to judgements 
that we cannot know to be true then we have just as much reason to forbid 
appeals to accounts of the right as we do to appeals to conceptions of the good. 
5. Conclusion 
Like Quong, Barry’s account fails to overcome the asymmetry objection. He 
believes that it is illegitimate to appeal to conceptions of the good when selecting 
political principles because we cannot know that any putative account of 
flourishing is true. His argument for such scepticism is premised on historical 
examples of disagreements about valuable lives. However, history also teaches 
us that there has been a lack of consensus on accounts of the right. If we are 
faithful to Barry’s reasoning, then we should be equally sceptical about the truth 
of principles of right. However, this would entail that it is also illegitimate to 
appeal to accounts of the right when selecting political principles. Therefore, 
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Barry’s account suggests that appealing to either sphere of morality would be 
unjust. 
Thus the problem of asymmetry cannot be overcome by taking either Jonathan 
Quong or Brian Barry’s route to anti-perfectionism. In the next chapter, I will 
offer my own argument for a n t i - perfectionism. In the first half of the 
chapter I will argue, contra Raz, that there is a lack of consensus on the good 
(or the right). I will then argue that despite disagreement being intractable in 
both spheres, we can construct an anti-‐‐perfectionist account of justice by 
focusing on what we can 
agree on, rather than what we actually happen to do so. 
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7 
Overcoming the Asymmetry Objection 
1. Introduction 
In chapter 3, I argued that universal forms of perfectionism were untenable. 
Against Hurka, I claimed that a purely formal account of human nature entails 
that cunning wrongdoers flourish, and that this is both intuitively implausible 
and unfaithful to the Aristotelian perfectionism that he takes himself to 
subscribe to. Against Nussbaum, I argued that her list of purported cross‐cultural 
“functions” were too abstract to give us reasons to value them. When we look at 
the reasons why people pursue certain ends we see that it is the substantive 
tokens they value rather than act types. I concluded that the most promising 
form of perfectionism proposed was the historical or contextual autonomy- 
based account of Joseph Raz and Stephen Wall. 
In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I clarified exactly what it was that Razian contextualism is 
committed to, and introduced – and ultimately rejected – two possible ways an 
anti-perfectionist might respond. I argued against both the Rawlsian line taken 
by Jonathan Quong and the sceptical line taken by Bryan Barry. I argued that 
both were unable to overcome the asymmetry objection. 
So how will my argument overcome the problem of asymmetry, and, contra Raz, 
justify instructing the state to act upon principles of the right whilst prohibiting 
it from promoting human flourishing? In this chapter I will put forward my own 
sceptical argument for anti‐perfectionism. However, the argument will be of a 
different sort to Barry’s. Instead of proposing a sceptical position as to whether 
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claims of human flourishing can be true or false, I will argue that Raz is wrong to 
suppose that there is consensus on the flourishing life involving autonomy. 
Unlike Barry, my argument will not involve the idealised view of citizens of 
liberal societies that plague his account. I argued that Waldron is correct to claim 
that the burdens of judgement apply equally to claims of justice and conceptions 
of the good back in chapter two. Indeed, it was a reliance on an idealised view of 
the  citizen  as  necessarily  committed  to  certain  liberal  norms  that  rendered 
Quong’s anti-perfectionism implausible. 
My argument will be that justice should not be constructed from idealised 
consensus about claims of justice, but instead from genuine pervasive 
disagreement about value more generally. I will argue that this diverse 
disagreement entails that we must construct an account of justice that operates 
as a set of constraints. That is, acceptance of the burdens of judgement means 
that we must focus on those principles of justice that reflective human beings can 
endorse rather than what they actually do endorse. As such, we will be left with a 
set of constraints which, whilst few in number, still allow for a wide scope for 
state action. 
I will begin by recalling the circumstances of politics, which I introduced in 
chapter two. These are the circumstances faced by citizens of modern liberal 
societies. They embody the desire of members of a community to work together 
within a shared framework, despite the fact that there is deep and broad 
disagreement between them about how this framework will be realised. I will 
argue that the social forms of modern liberal societies do not support 
perfectionist arguments in public life. That is, I will argue that our social forms 
do not indicate any consensus the good life as autonomy, as Raz claims. 
I will further argue that although I accept that disagreement is also pervasive 
with regards to principles of justice, as a natural result of the free exercise of 
reason, it is possible to maintain the asymmetry of allowing political justification 
to invoke judgements regarding the right but forbidding it from appealing to 
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conceptions of the good. I shall argue that an account of justice should be 
constructed as a response to disagreement about the good. We need to look for 
an account of justice that can pass a test of reflective endorsement in the 
circumstances of politics. I will argue that justice understood as a set of 
constraints  fulfils  this  requirement.  I  will  further  suggest  that  there  is  no 
prospect of any account of the good passing such a test. 
2. Overview of the Chapter 
Recall Waldron’s circumstances of politics from chapter two. The circumstances 
of politics are the combination of two factors; (1) the persistence of deep and 
broad disagreement about what is to be done and why; and (2) the need for 
action in concert in the face of this disagreement. It constitutes the “felt need 
among members of a certain group for a common framework or decision or 
course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about what 
that framework, decision or action should be.”330 The question is: how will the 
circumstances of politics play out in a heterogeneous, pluralistic society like 
ours? What will philosophically, culturally and religiously diverse individuals 
agree to include in the framework that will guide and constrain them? 
I wish to argue that a free-standing account of justice, understood in a loosely 
Rawlsian way331, will be constructed from the circumstances of politics. That is, 
the political system agreed to in the circumstances of politics will be such that it 
does not derive from, presuppose or include justifications based upon, claims of 
human flourishing. I shall argue that the circumstances of politics make anti‐ 
perfectionism inevitable. This is because the vast cultural diversity of modern 
liberal societies, where disagreement is deep and broad, means that there is no 
prospect of consensus on perfectionist judgements. The Razian is wrong to 
suggest  that  the  social  forms  of  modern  western  societies  –  geographic  and 
social mobility, technological innovation, secularization, value pluralism and a 
330 ibid. 102. 
331 Rawls (2005). However, as already stated, I do not idealise away disagreement about justice, 
as Quong, does. 
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commitment to human rights, to use Wall’s examples – give us consensus on the 
good life as the flourishing life. 
Against Raz, our account of justice should be constructed from endemic 
disagreement that exists in the circumstances of politics. There is no consensus 
on the good, and our account must pay attention to that. But, if we are to 
construct a political morality that can apply to us in liberal society, we should 
reject Quong’s idealisation about consensus on matters of justice. If we are to 
come up with an account of justice that can guide our action, it must describe 
citizens as they actually are, rather than what they would be in certain ideal 
circumstances. We must accept the severe disagreement that exists in post‐ 
imperial western countries. We must construct our theory of justice out of this 
disagreement. Justice is not just ‘there’ in the sense that there is some 
independent moral theory waiting to be discovered that can be bolted onto any 
society (more on this later). Justice must be appropriate to circumstances, and in 
modern, multicultural society, it must function as a way of adjudicating between 
the deep and pervasive ethical outlooks of the individuals that find themselves 
within it. It must be free standing. In order for individuals to be able to agree to 
construct such a theory, it must not appeal to any particular conception of the 
good. 
3. Is Disagreement Endemic? 
What was proposed in the previous section is nothing more than a brief outline. I 
will argue for this by considering  and rejecting the denial of the  two major 
premises;   that   disagreement   is   pervasive   and   endemic,   and   that   such 
disagreement should lead us to reject perfectionism. 
Turning to the first. The obvious rebuff from the Razian at this point might be -‐‐ 
why should I take Waldron seriously? It might be the case that if there was 
pervasive disagreement then we should reject Razian perfectionism, but what if 
such  disagreement  is  not  as  deep  and  as  broad  as  Waldron  claims.  The 
perfectionist  might  argue  that  Waldron  is  simply  overstating  the  level  of 
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disagreement between individuals in the circumstances of politics. On this 
response Waldron is wrong to suggest that there is vast dissensus concerning 
ethical outlooks (and ergo conceptions of the good) in modern liberal society, 
despite its multicultural nature. Instead, there are certain claims of flourishing 
that we can agree on in the circumstances of politics. We all agree that autonomy 
is a necessary part of a flourishing life in our society. If this is the case, then there 
is no problem in building such claims into our account of justice. It does not need 
to be free-standing if there is agreement upon certain aspects of the good. 
Thus, the Razian might deny the first aspect of Waldron’s circumstances of 
politics – endemic disagreement. He might say that our social forms can 
vindicate perfectionism. We don’t need to idealise in order to claim that people 
in modern liberal societies agree that flourishing involves autonomy. As we have 
seen, the Razians claim that there is a vast plurality of options available to us 
that, whilst we can’t pursue all of them within a single life, we recognise as 
valuable. Further, they say that these are selected under social forms that make 
free choice a crucial part of the good life. There is consensus within our society, 
and in the circumstances of politics, that autonomy is necessary for a flourishing 
life.  Hence,  we  can  construct  our  political  system  such  that  it  promotes 
autonomous lives through securing the conditions for autonomous choice. 
So, perhaps Waldron is wrong, and there are judgements regarding human 
flourishing upon which there will be consensus in the circumstances of politics. 
People  in  modern  western  societies  agree  that  the  good  life  must  involve 
autonomy. 
4. Securing Disagreement: A Wittgensteinian Argument 
How might one respond to the Razian denial of the first premise of my 
arguments? I want to argue, by using James Tully’s Wittgensteinian argument 
against modern constitutionalism, that the different cultural perspectives found 
within modern liberal society mean that disagreement about ethics is inevitable, 
and thus that consensus on judgements of human flourishing is impossible. 
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Tully begins by introducing an analogy from René Descartes. When we walk 
through an old city, the houses and buildings are a hodge-podge of different sizes 
and styles from different eras. The town hasn’t been laid out according to a plan. 
Rather, it has grown out, across time, into a messy combination of new and old. 
332 This analogy with an ancient city, which Descartes originally drew with 
modern constitutions, also applies to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, as 
Tully points out.333 In fact, Wittgenstein gives an extraordinarily similar example 
of his own in the Philosophical Investigations: 
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and 
squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from 
various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs 
with straight regular streets and uniform houses.334 
The point that Wittgenstein is making here is that language, like an old city, has 
developed in a multitude of forms, through use and practice, “overlapping in 
many ways in the endless diversity and strife of human activities.”335 As a result, 
Wittgenstein claims that language is too multiform to be represented in a rule 
that stipulates the essential conditions for its application in all cases. 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a 
clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspicuity.336 
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know 
your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no 
longer know your way about.337 
332 Tully (1995: 102) 
333 ibid. 103. 
334  Wittgenstein (1967: s. 18) 
335  Tully (1995: 104). 
336  Wittgenstein (1967: s. 122). Emphasis in original. 
337 ibid. s. 203. Emphasis in original. 
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Language is aspectival, says Wittgenstein. Our understanding of words and 
concepts differs depending on our starting point. There is no comprehensive 
theory that governs the application of language terms in every instance. This 
“craving for generality,” the attempt to group the meaning of words under a 
single rule, is a result of four particular “philosophical confusions,” two of which 
are particularly significant for my purposes.338 
First is the tendency to look for something shared by all the things that we 
commonly classify under a general term. Wittgenstein gives the example of the 
term ‘game.’ He says that we tend to think that there is some property common 
to all of the pursuits that fall under this term. This, he says, is false. Although 
there may be, and are, similarities that overlap between certain games, there is 
no overall property that applies to all uses of the term. He says that, instead, 
games form a family, the members of which share likenesses, much in the same 
way that certain members of a genetic family might share a gait or nose 
structure, whilst there being no characteristic that the whole family are endowed 
with. 
The second philosophical error is the preoccupation with the method of science. 
This is the tendency to reduce natural phenomena into the smallest possible 
number of laws and unify the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalisation. Things that should be treated separately are grouped together. 
This leads the philosopher into “complete darkness.”339 
According to Wittgenstein, there is no prospect of subsuming the use of terms 
found in a language under a comprehensive rule. Instead, we should recognise 
that our understanding of language is determined by the perspective from which 
we engage with it, and thus that language is aspectival in the sense that I will not 
be able to “find my way around” it from another’s perspective. 
338 Wittgenstein (1972: 17-‐‐20). 
339 ibid. p. 18. 
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Instead of following a rule, says Wittgenstein, understanding a term requires 
practice. Tully uses the example of playing tennis. 
The uses of general terms, he [Wittgenstein] concludes are intersubjective 
‘practices’ or ‘customs’, like tennis or the ‘practice’ of law. Our 
understanding of them consists in the ‘mastery’ of a ‘technique’ or 
practical skill ‘exhibited’ in being proficient players in the particular cases 
or ‘language games’ in which they are used. 340 
This grasp exhibited in being “proficient players” of a language game cannot be 
accounted for in terms of following general rules. The multiplicity of uses of a 
term is too various to be subsumed within a rule. Instead, to master a term is to 
acquire the complex abilities to use it correctly. A single, comprehensive theory 
governing the use of a general term in all situations is “unobtainable”.341 We have 
different people playing ‘language games,’ using the same term in a multiplicity 
of ways. 
Tully uses this Wittgensteinian argument to attack modern constitutionalism. He 
says that the common mistake of modern constitutionalism is that theorists have 
failed to recognise that their understanding of political terms is but one in a sea 
of different interpretations. Instead, they think that their definitions should 
determine the whole, such that the diversity within constitutions is masked or 
hidden.342 This failure to notice the multiplicity found in constitutional language 
has led to what Wittgenstein called “the contemptuous attitude towards the 
particular case.”343 Our “craving for generality” – the desire to subsume the use 
of political concepts under the same rule – has led us to ignore the vast diversity 
that exists in modern constitutions. As Tully points out “[understanding political 
concepts] … is not the theoretical activity of abstracting from everyday use and 
making  explicit  the  context-independent  rules  for  the  correct  use  of  [them]  in 
340 Tully (1995: 106). The original Wittgenstein quotes are from (1967: ss. 198‐201). 
341 ibid. p. 110.  
342 ibid. pp. 104‐5 
343  Wittgentstein (1972: 18) 
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every case, for the conditions of possibility for such a metacontextual political 
theory are not available.”344 
I want to argue that, as part of the language of constitutionalism, the 
understanding of terms like “the human good,” “human flourishing,” “a 
conception of the good” etc. is similarly multiplicitous. The meanings of these 
terms have developed through use and “practice” such that there is no universal 
rule governing their application. There are a number of diverse groups in 
modern, multicultural society, each playing their own language games with 
“human flourishing.” Our understanding of these concepts is aspectival; the 
meaning we give to these terms is a result of our own interaction with them 
amongst others similarly placed. No comprehensive rule can be given that 
governs the use of “human flourishing” within a society as diverse as ours. Just as 
with the term ‘game,’ there may be similarities between two different 
understandings of, for example, “human flourishing.” Both might argue that a 
flourishing  life  must  include  a  degree  of  autonomy.  But  there  is  no  overall 
characteristic of flourishing that applies to all cases. 
One might respond to the Wittgensteinian claim by arguing that there is some 
minimal understanding of the human good that governs all uses of the term. One 
could say that however it is substantively specified, all accounts of human 
flourishing propose something to live up to. That is, as I mentioned in the first 
chapter, all conceptions of the human flourishing specify some good that 
individuals should aim to achieve, however that might be spelled out in different 
accounts. Thus there might be some very formal definition of human flourishing 
that  can  be  governed  by  a  universal  rule,  even  if  there  is  no  substantial 
description falling under it. This is the teleological aspect of perfectionism. 
Yet this response will not help the perfectionist. Firstly, if it was the 
responsibility of the state to promote the good under such a formal definition, 
and there was a multiplicity of ways of spelling this out, then we would be left 
with  a  contradiction  whenever  citizens  held  inconsistent  conceptions  of  the 
344  Tully (2002: 544). 
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good. How could a state promote both an autonomous life and a non‐ autonomous 
life?345 Secondly, if the good was  understood  in  this  abstract  way, then surely 
such a perfectionism would be vulnerable to the charge made against Nussbaum 
in chapter 3; abstract goods are too detached from the thick concepts that 
surround and give one reason to value and pursue them. That something is 
worth aiming for gives us no reason to pursue it unless that something can be 
specified, and once this is done it will be subject to disagreement. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, ‘something to live up to’ is not the conception of 
human flourishing proposed by Razians. They believe that there exists consensus 
on the value of autonomy. 
The Razians understand a flourishing life to be an autonomous life, and this is 
certainly not common to all understandings of human flourishing, even within a 
single society. One only needs to look at diverse groups within liberal societies, 
each with their own language games, to see the Wittgensteinian argument play 
out in reality. There are a number of groups within western society – for example 
the indigenous peoples of North America and certain religious groups in Europe 
– for whom autonomy is not a value, as understood in the Razian sense. 
Individual members of these groups adopt their community’s spirituality, allow 
their parents to find them a spouse, have no desire to pursue a career and so 
on.346 The lives they lead, and the values they pursue, do not involve autonomy. 
For  them,  autonomy  is  not  necessary  to  flourishing.  They  see  community, 
spirituality and tradition as being integral to the human good. 
Thus it is this absence of general rules in language that accounts for the vast 
disagreement present in modern societies concerning conceptions of the good. 
Our understanding of terms like “human flourishing” is aspectival. There is a 
multiplicity   of   uses   for   it.   There   is   no   comprehensive   rule   or   shared 
understanding  governing  the  use  of  this  term  such  that  there  is  something 
345 Here I assume that where X and Y are inconsistent conceptions of the good, promoting X 
necessarily discourages Y. I find this an intuitively obvious claim. 
346 Importantly, it is not that these individuals shun the option of following another faith, picking 
their own spouse and pursuing a career – that would involve using one’s autonomy. It is rather 
that the reasons to pursue such goods are not even accessible to them. More on this later. 
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common in all uses of it. This is compounded by the fact that, both “human” and 
“flourishing” individually are similarly aspectival and ethically thick. People 
reasoning from different perspectives disagree about what the concepts “human” 
and “flourishing” mean.   When the two concepts go together the complexity is 
simply heightened. 
Modern liberal societies contain a multitude of diverse individuals playing a 
number of overlapping language games from which they come to understand the 
terms of morality. Our understanding of these terms comes from the standpoint 
from  which  we  approach  them.  We  grasp  them  as  individual  players  in  a 
language game. 
Thus, to try to come up with a singular understanding of “human flourishing,” as 
Raz does, shows a “contemptuous attitude to the particular” and masks the 
diversity within modern societies. There is no general rule governing the use of 
perfectionist  terms.  It  is  the  vast  disagreement  between  individuals  in  the 
circumstances of politics that explains this lack of a general rule. 
Were we to live in a homogenous society, where there was not a diversity of 
different perspectives, then we might be able to come up with a general rule 
governing the application of something like “a conception of the good” such that 
there were a consensus on what counts as a flourishing life. The social forms of 
such societies – and there are historical examples of isolated cultures which 
reflect this – might justify using the state to promote the good. But this is not our 
society. Our society is incredibly diverse. There are a number of different 
perspectives from which citizens approach concepts like human flourishing. 
Thus, there is vast disagreement between citizens of modern liberal  society 
about what flourishing entails. This disagreement is endemic. Raz is mistaken to 
claim that there is any shared characteristic of various understandings of human 
flourishing. 
Far from giving us consensus on the good, the social forms of modern society – 
globalisation,  mobility,  mass  communication  and  so  on  –  have  given  us  a 
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multiplicity  of  understandings  of  human  flourishing.  Any  attempt  to  claim 
uniformity or consensus on human flourishing is, at best, idealisation and, at 
worst, an attempt to assimilate cultural diversity. 
Thus the first premise is true. Disagreement about the good is deep and broad. 
Tully’s Wittgensteinian argument provides the philosophical backing for the first 
aspect of the circumstances of politics; disagreement on ethics, as well as on 
other matters, is permanent and endemic. 
5. Rejecting Perfectionism 
So what about the second premise of my argument, that this vast disagreement 
should lead us to reject perfectionism? Why should the first aspect of the 
circumstances of politics – disagreement – lead us to accept the second aspect – 
that we should construct a mutually acceptable political system and thus 
rejected disputed perfectionist reasoning? I suggested earlier that the correct 
liberal response to such disagreement is to construct a free standing account of 
justice that presupposes or draws upon no single conception of the good – 
precisely  because  of  this  disagreement  about  the  correct  understanding  of 
human flourishing. How might one go about denying that claim? 
One way might be to say that in politics, it is not important what people think, 
but who is right. It might be true that there is vast disagreement about the 
human good as the first aspect of the circumstances of politics claims, but not 
everyone can be correct. Even if people disagree pervasively about the human 
good, there is a correct way of understanding it, and it is this that we should pay 
attention to. We should set up our political system to reflect what’s right, not 
what people think. Respecting them properly entails treating them with the full 
range of moral reasons, as Raz says, not ignoring some of them. 347 Indeed, as I 
argued in chapter 4, Raz appears to believe that autonomy is transcendentally 
valuable, so he might allow that some people in modern society do fail to see the 
value in the autonomous life, but claim that they are mistaken, and we should 
347 Raz (1986: 157) 
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override their judgement, and attempt to encourage them to live autonomous 
lives.348 Thus accepting the first aspect of the circumstances of politics does not 
necessarily entail accepting the second. We can recognise that disagreement is 
deep and broad, whilst still insisting that only some people are right, and that 
thus, political action doesn’t have to be mutually acceptable. 
Does this response work? Two options are open to us. Firstly, we could take the 
Brian Barry route, and argue, along epistemological lines, that there are no true 
claims about human flourishing. The reason that we should go by what people 
believe over what happens to be true, when it comes to human flourishing, is 
that we cannot know what constitutes the good life. I argued that Barry’s account 
was inadequate because it used disagreement as evidence for scepticism about 
the good, and that as disagreement was also pervasive with regards to the right, 
this would also cast doubt on claims of justice. 
Instead, I wish to argue, along political lines, that there is something central to 
the  circumstances  of  politics  in  modern  multicultural  societies  that  makes 
consensus rather than truth paramount. 
I want to make this argument by returning to Tully. Tully believes that 
acceptance of the Wittgensteinian account teaches us an important lesson. We 
must recognise that our understanding of terms like “human flourishing” is just 
one interlocution amongst others in the intercultural multilogue of post-‐‐imperial 
society. This awareness, and the subsequent dialogues that must take place in 
the circumstances of politics, nurtures in us an attitude of diversity awareness. It 
explains why we must listen to members of other cultures and enter the 
conversation ourselves in order to “find redescriptions acceptable to all which 
mediate  the  differences  we  wish  each  other  to  recognise.” 349  It  is  these 
redescriptions which are embodied in the freestanding account of justice. 
348 Obviously, as I have mentioned previously, the nature of autonomy itself limits how we could 
encourage those who aren’t autonomous to adopt it as their conception of the good. 
349 Tully (1995: 111) 
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Thus it is the nature of modern society itself, coupled with Wittgenstein’s 
account of language, that should lead us to pay attention to what people happen 
to believe, and prize consensus over truth in the circumstances of justice. The 
“strange multiplicity”350 of cultural voices that have emerged in post-imperial 
western society means that any construction of political institutions or practices 
must take the form of an intercultural multilogue. 
This  multilogue,  says  Tully,  must  be  governed  by  the  three  conventions  of 
constitutionalism: 
1. Mutual   recognition   –   each   party   should   recognise   all   others   as 
independent and self‐governing.351 
Consent -‐‐ any constitution or amendment to it rests on the consent of the 
people, or the representatives of the people, who are touched by it.352 
Continuity – the cultural identities of all, as well as the forms of reasoning 
which comes with them, should be continuous throughout negotiations 
and the associations agreed to.353 
2. 
3. 
When constructing  our  account  of  justice,  we  must  be  faithful  to  these 
conventions of constitutionalism if we are to take the Wittgensteinian point 
seriously. Mutual recognition, consent and continuity ensure that any 
constitution agreed to must take seriously what the different agents, or groups of 
individuals, believe, regardless of what happens to be true. Wittgenstein’s 
account ensures that no speaker can set the terms of the discussion. To do so 
would be to assume that her ways should determine the whole.354 It would be a 
pernicious attempt to assimilate cultural diversity. Far from giving us consensus 
on the value of the autonomous life, our social forms constitute an irregular and 
messy assemblage of views. No one culture does nor should dominate politics. 
350 ibid. p.3.  
351 ibid. p. 119. 
352 ibid. p.122. 
353 ibid. p.125. 
354 ibid. p.104. 
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Why does the first aspect of the circumstances of politics entail the second? Why 
should disagreement call for mutual acceptability, governed by the three 
conventions of constitutionalism? Quite simply, due to the need to avoid 
hostility. As T. M. Scanlon has pointed out, without tolerance of people’s views 
we are condemned to hostility. 
Given that there must be disagreements, and that those who disagree 
must somehow live together, is it not better, if possible, to have these 
disagreements contained within a framework of mutual respect? The 
alternative, it seems, is to be always in conflict … tolerance expresses … a 
recognition of others as just as entitled as we are to contribute to the 
definition of our society.355 
People in the circumstances of politics have to live together. To deny some 
people’s beliefs by ignoring them when setting up our political institutions 
alienates them and denies them full membership of the political community.356 
This, says  Scanlon, will  inevitably lead  to conflict.  Instead all  interconnected 
members should be “equally entitled to be taken into account in defining what 
our society is and equally entitled to participate in determining what it will 
become in the future.”357 
This permanence of conflict can secure the move from disagreement to a 
rejection of perfectionism. Our account of justice must take as fundamental what 
diverse citizens think and leave aside what happens to be true – whether or not 
that can be discovered objectively. This is entailed by the Wittgensteinian 
argument; by realising that our understanding of the human good is but one 
amongst many in the circumstances of politics we come to recognise cultural 
diversity, and accept that our constitutional dialogue must be governed by the 
conventions of mutual recognition, consent and continuity. This secures a voice 
for all, in terms continuous with their own cultural standpoint. A failure to do so 
would result in some people pushing their constitutional mores on others, and 
355  Scanlon (2003: 193). 
356 ibid. pp. 193-‐‐4. 
357 ibid.  p. 190. 
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inevitably lead to conflict. By not favouring any conception of the good, we are 
taking all equally into account. 
Thus, our account of justice must pass a test of reflective endorsement. It cannot 
appeal to purported objective truths at the expense of the beliefs and reasoning 
of certain cultural, religious, ethnic groups. Thus any account of justice we 
construct must be universalisable. It must offer us principles that can be adopted 
by all within the scope of justice. 
So where does this leave us? So far I have argued that the two aspects of the 
circumstances of politics hold, and that thus we should reject Raz’s 
perfectionism. Deep disagreement about human flourishing plus the need for 
political action to be mutually acceptable to all entails that we cannot appeal to 
conceptions of the good when setting up political institutions and so on. Such 
reasons for action would not pass the test of reflective endorsement. 
However, rejecting perfectionism does not in itself give us anti-perfectionism. If 
it turns out that action which appeals to judgements about justice also cannot 
pass the test of reflective endorsement, then we may have to give up on an 
ethical basis for political systems altogether. I have accepted that disagreement 
is as endemic with regards to beliefs about justice as well as flourishing, so if 
reasons premised on conceptions of the good cannot pass muster, then perhaps 
neither can reasons premised on justice, and political philosophy is doomed for 
failure. The problem of asymmetry would once more rear its head. 
Thus  in  order  to  secure  the  move  from  a  rejection  of  perfectionism  to  anti 
perfectionism, I must show that at least some principles of justice can pass the 
test of reflective endorsement. 
6. Securing Anti-Perfectionism 
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We must construct our account of justice without recourse to a conception of the 
good. But, how are we to do so if, as I have accepted, we also disagree about what 
the correct principles of justice are? 
One way might be to take the purely procedural route of James Tully. Tully sees 
constitutional decision making as an “open ended dialogue.” 358 The 
circumstances of politics are permanent in the sense that a continuous dialogue 
about constitutional matters takes place on an intercultural common ground, 
where procedures are revisable and can be reformulated at any time. According 
to Tully, our account of justice consists of just what agents happen to agree upon 
in the ongoing circumstances of politics. Exactly what form this procedure would 
take – a direct democracy, a representative democracy and so on – is left open. 
But, the justification for political action is this ongoing dialogue – the procedure. 
It might just so happen that instructions to promote some account of flourishing 
emerge from the decision‐making procedure. But this would not entail 
perfectionism. The justification for promoting conception of the good x would be 
that it was agreed upon in a fair decision making procedure. This would be anti‐ 
perfectionist reasoning. 
However, I want to offer something a bit less formal than a purely procedural 
account of anti‐perfectionism. I shall do so by proposing a constructivist account 
of justice, as offered by Onora O’Neill in Towards Justice and Virtue. 
O’Neill’s account of justice hinges on a test of reflective endorsement that, whilst 
still abstract, is less formal than Tully’s. Like Tully, O’Neill insists that principles 
of justice should be justifiable to all within its domain. However, instead of 
premising this on the outcome of a fair procedure, like Tully does, O’Neill argues 
that in order for a principle to pass the test of reflective endorsement it must be 
“followable  by  all  others  within  the  relevant  scope”.359  The  test  of  reflective 
endorsement must take the form of universal adoptability. 
358 Tully (2002: 533) 
359 O’Neill (1995: 55). Emphasis in the original. 
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O’Neill argues that the test must be doubly modal – “reasons for action must be 
held capable of being followed or adopted by others.”360 The modality is two fold. 
The first aspect sets requirements: Principles of justice must meet certain 
standards. The second aspect tells us what those standards are: principles of 
justice must be followable by others. In order for a principle of justice to pass the 
test of reflective endorsement, it must be capable of being followed. 
In order to meet these requirements, a dictate of justice must be followable in 
thought and actionable in principle.361 For something to be followable in thought, 
it must be intelligible in the sense that, as our audience for political reasoning are 
diverse, it must be “followable on the basis of minimal assumptions about the 
characteristics of those for whom it is to be followable.”362 For something to be 
actionable in principle, it must be action guiding. It must aim to recommend or 
prescribe action, to warn against or proscribe action. Principles of justice must 
be real possibilities for those to whom they apply. 363 
Thus the double modality ensures that for principles to pass the test of reflective 
endorsement, they must provide reasons that their audience could adopt and act 
upon. They are not reasons that they will actually happen to adopt or would 
adopt in some hypothetical scenario. They are rather principles which could be 
adopted by agents on the basis of minimal assumptions about their characters. 
Why think that O’Neill’s doubly modal understanding of practical reason is the 
correct form of a test of reflective endorsement? Well, it avoids the pitfalls of the 
alternative forms that I gestured to in the previous paragraph. 
The first alternative is to appeal to what people actually will adopt and follow. 
That is, in order to pass the test of reflective endorsement, a principle must 
happen to be intelligible and actionable by actual people in the domain of justice. 
Our test of universalizability should be motivational rather than modal. This 
360 ibid. p. 57.     
361 ibid. pp. 57‐59. 
362 ibid. p. 57. 
363 ibid. 
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form is not acceptable for two reasons. Firstly, by justifying principles of justice 
by an appeal to what people actually happen to believe, we are basing our 
political system on judgements that cannot be vindicated. What is just would 
simply be a case of what people agree is just. There would be no independent 
standard for judging whether what we happen to believe is in fact correct. If such 
a form of reflective endorsement were to be proposed, and people happened to 
share the belief that people in the developing world were not worthy of our help, 
a rejection of cosmopolitan concern would be just. Secondly, as I have already 
argued, there is no consensus on matters of justice. I have accepted that 
disagreement about justice is just as endemic as disagreement about the good. If 
we were to attempt to construct principles of justice using people’s actual beliefs, 
and accordingly the reasons offered for accepting any putative principle were 
only intelligible to some, there would be no prospect of anything passing the test 
of reflective endorsement as universalizability. 
The second alternative to the doubly modal test of reflective endorsement is 
hypothetical rather than modal. If we were to construct agents in such a manner 
then they would adopt certain principles. Thus, for example, if we were to 
imagine that those in society share some minimal liberal beliefs about justice 
then they would endorse principles of justice that secure certain civil liberties, a 
system of rights, equality of opportunity and so on. Again this form of reflective 
endorsement is unacceptable, and for reasons I have already given. It involves 
idealised  consensus,  which  I  have  already  argued  will  result  in  unsuitable 
principles of justice for the real world. 
Thus, the doubly modal form of reflective endorsement is the most plausible for 
selecting our principles of justice. But can any pass such a test. That is, are there 
any political principles that could be adopted and acted upon by all within the 
domain of justice? Can we offer reasons for action that can be “fully public” or 
must  any  form  of  reasoning,  despite  the  deficiencies,  assume  idealised  or 
contingent beliefs as premises.364 
364 Archard et al. (2014: 223) 
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O’Neill believes that a fairly abstract but action-guiding account of justice can be 
given using this test of reflective endorsement. Firstly she explains the minimal 
assumptions or areas of ethical concern that structure agent’s activity. She 
argues that there are others apart from the agent (plurality); that those others 
are connected to the agent (connection); and that those others have limited but 
determinate powers (finitude).365 These assumptions about finitude – about 
capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities – are the characteristics that reasons 
for action must appreciate, but not go beyond, if they are to count as intelligible 
for agents. 
Given these assumptions, what principles pass the doubly modal test of reflective 
endorsement? The account of justice that O’Neill gives operates as a set of 
constraints. She believes that individuals in the circumstances of politics would 
reject a principle of injury. That is, they would not construct any institutions or 
practices which would lead to either direct or indirect injury. 
A principle of injury could not pass the test of reflective endorsement. If it were 
adopted by all, then some would succeed in acting on it and therefore others 
would become their victims, and hence unable to act on it.366 In such a case, 
attempted universal adoption would, in fact, injure the capacity to act of some 
thus making it impossible for them to adopt.367 Therefore a rejection of the 
principle of injury will be endorsed by all. Further, the rejection of injury reflects 
the three areas of ethical concern mentioned earlier. It is because we recognise 
that there are others connected to us, who have vulnerabilities and limited 
capacities   that   we   reject   systematic   and   gratuitous   injury.   Finite   and 
interdependent beings need such constraints. 
365 ibid. p. 101. 
366 ibid. p.59. 
367 ibid. p. 164. 
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Direct injury involves action such as killing, wounding, maiming, threatening, 
coercing and so on.368 The rejection of such action would lead to the construction 
of legal orders which guarantee certain rights, political orders which limit the 
power of governments, economic orders which secure a tolerable level of 
subsidence,  social  orders  which  limit  subordination  and  dependence,  and 
information orders which regulate communication.369 
Indirect injury involves both damaging the social fabric, by undermining 
relationships or communities, and damaging the natural and man-made 
environments, which are the material bases of lives and action, thus 
creating vulnerabilities which facilitate direct injury.370 Again, institutions and 
practices will be constructed which limit such indirect injury. Pollution 
measures will be put in place, streets will be kept clean, private law will ensure 
that contracts are 
fulfilled and so on. 
Justice as the rejection of injury is an extremely abstract account. It is not a 
precise set of instructions for coming up with political institutions and practices, 
but a constraint on what can be included in an account of justice. It needs to be 
abstract in order to be shared by the diverse individuals who find themselves in 
the circumstances of politics. In order for it to be followable by all of these 
people it must not appeal to substantive values embodied in particular cultural 
standpoints. But it is still intelligible as it does not rely on any of these particular 
thick concepts. A rejection of injury is something that can be endorsed whatever 
particular cultural group you belong to. 
Justice as the rejection of injury underdetermines the form that political 
institutions or practices will take. Which particular institutions etc. are selected 
will vary with context. In some situations it might require a broad range of 
liberty rights at the expense of material equalities, so may result in a limited 
368 ibid. p. 168. 
369 ibid. p. 169. Obviously not all injury can be disallowed. As O’Neill herself suggests, coercive 
policing and penal systems directly injure miscreants. What is rejected is systematic and 
gratuitous injury. 
370 ibid. pp. 174-7. 
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welfare system. In others it might be vice versa. But the justification for such 
institutions will always be the rejection of injury, which will be the measure by 
which the effectiveness of the different practices is compared. Justice, says 
O’Neill, is “in the first instance a matter of living lives and of seeking and 
supporting institutions and policies that reject injury.”371 But although it doesn’t 
specify precisely which political system is the correct one, this account of justice 
is still action guiding. It provides a blueprint; principles of justice must meet 
certain standards. They must not allow systematic or gratuitous injury, either 
directly or indirectly. This account of justice operates as a framework for 
constructing more determinate principles and building specific political 
institutions.  It  provides  no  regimented  instructions,  but  does  place  a  big 
constraint on what can be done.372 
It is the modality of the test of reflective endorsement that justifies the 
asymmetry that caused such a problem for Rawls, Quong and Barry. The 
Wittgensteinian argument destroyed convergence on the right (as well as the 
good), but not the possibility of it. So long as principles are offered that could be 
adopted and followed then they pass the test of reflective endorsement, even if, 
in the event, people don’t actually do so. The test is modal not motivational. If the 
rejection of injury is something all subject to it could accept, then it passes the 
test of reflective endorsement. The modality of this form of practical reasoning 
ensures  that  mutual  acceptability  is  not  conditional  on  an  assurance  or 
expectation that all will actually adopt a principle. 
However, we cannot speak about perfectionist reasons that others could accept 
in a doubly modal test of reflective endorsement given the Wittgensteinian point. 
Consensus on the good is not merely non-existent in modern society, it is 
impossible. Principles of justice, such as the rejection of injury, make minimal, 
abstract assumptions about agents, reasoning and action – humans are finite, 
interdependent beings with vulnerabilities and limited capacities, and so on. It is 
371 ibid. p. 179. 
372 It should be noted that, despite the use of the term “constraints,” this account of justice does 
not entail the implementation of a minimal state. In fact, rejecting injury will likely provide a 
framework in which significant levels of government intervention are necessary. 
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this abstraction that allows such principles to cut across differing cultural, ethnic 
and religious groups within modern society. However, perfectionist accounts of 
agents, reasoning and action necessarily draw on substantive, rich background 
metaphysical accounts. Whereas the assumptions made by those who propose 
constructivist principles of justice are abstract and formal, those made by 
perfectionists are substantive and culturally specific. For example, in order for 
the principle of autonomy as the good life to be followable in thought and 
actionable in principle, we would have to make much more substantial 
assumptions about citizens in modern society – that they value choice, that they 
are free to pursue their own life plan etc. However, as soon as we do make such 
an assumption, we resort to an idealised view of human characteristics, and thus 
forego any claim to universalizability. As I have argued, it is patently clear that 
not everyone that falls within the domain of justice shares such a view of human 
beings. 
Furthermore, as well as demonstrating that agents value such goods, it must be 
explained why, and this will necessarily invoke a rich metaphysical worldview. 
So the burden of proof is on the perfectionist not merely to demonstrate that all 
agents value such a good but also that they all value it for the same reason. Such 
an account would be far too thick and local to cut across cultural groups. In order 
to do so, our assumptions about human beings must be minimal and formal. 
Perfectionist considerations are not. As we saw in chapter three, the prospects of 
a formal account of perfectionism are not good. As O’Neill says, anti-perfectionist 
constructivist accounts of justice offer “a reasoned way of thinking about the 
planning and construction of earthly cities and of lives that are or could be led 
and shared in them under various conditions without fantasizing that imaginary 
foundations are available or that permanent solutions are possible.373 O’Neill’s 
modal account of justice is formal. But such formality is not possible with an 
account of flourishing. Any attempt to construct perfectionist principles of justice 
will   involve   substantive   ethical   claims   that   could   not   pass   the   test   of 
universalizability. 
373  ibid. p. 211. My emphasis. 
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Thus the difference between constraints and a conception of the good is that 
whilst the former can be formal, the latter cannot. Justice as a set of constraints 
invokes minimal assumptions about human beings – that they are finite, 
interdependent beings with vulnerabilities and limited capacities. It does not 
appeal to anything beyond this. However, perfectionist accounts of justice, such 
as that offered by Raz, must appeal to a richer, more substantive account of the 
person. They must understand individuals as having a certain nature, or certain 
motivations, or holding certain values, and so on. Any principle that appealed to 
perfectionist judgements will fail to pass the test of universalizability. 
Two responses might be made by the perfectionist, neither of which is plausible. 
First they might try to come up with an account of the human good that is formal, 
not thick, and hence can cut across different cultural groups. Such an account, if 
successful, world not rely on a heavy‐duty metaphysical world view. However, I 
argued in chapter 3 that such a formal account of perfectionism cannot be given. 
We either take the Hurka route, and ground flourishing in human nature, 
allowing wrongdoers to flourish, or we adopt Nussbaum’s account of cross‐ 
cultural value, and fail to explain why individuals actually pursue ends. Second, 
they may bite the bullet and accept as true the heavy-duty metaphysics that 
backs up perfectionist claims. However, this would contravene the second 
demand of the circumstances of politics; that political action should be mutually 
acceptable. 
As well as an enforceable account of justice, O’Neill believes that the doubly 
modal test of reflective endorsement will demand required but unenforceable 
social virtues. She argues that even where no injury occurs, either directly or 
indirectly, agent’s capacities and capabilities for action can be undermined. In 
the circumstances of politics we will also reject principles of indifference and 
neglect. Again this is because they could not be universalised without 
incoherence. If we universalised indifference, nobody could rely on anyone else; 
personal relationships, joint projects and so on would wither away. 374 As we 
have  seen,  we  are  vulnerable  and  dependent  beings.  We  need  personal 
374 ibid. 194. 
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relationships and so on if life is to continue successfully. 375 Even in making the 
most minimal of plans, individuals cannot regard indifference as universalizable. 
Again, indifference can be direct, through a lack of concern for others, or it can be 
indirect, through a lack of concern for the shared social worlds or shared natural 
and manmade environments. Rejecting indifference would require virtues 
expressed directly through concern for individuals (care, love, solidarity, rescue), 
virtues expressed indirectly through concern for shared social worlds 
(toleration, trust, openness, patience) and virtues expressed indirectly through 
concern for shared manmade and natural environments (tidiness, respect for 
nature, eco awareness). 
Some required action is not a matter of justice. As O’Neill argues, living by 
principles of justice is not all that is required in action towards others to whom 
we are connected.376 Although only the principles of justice are enforceable by 
political institutions, we are still required to act in certain virtuous ways. 
This is nothing more than a brief sketch of how an account of justice could be 
constructed in the face of disagreement in both spheres. Obviously, a lot more 
detail would be needed in order to expand it into a complete account of just 
institutions. My aim has simply been to show that even in the face of 
disagreement in both spheres, we can construct an anti‐perfectionist account of 
justice. 
7. Conclusion 
As Bernard Williams points out, politics should not be simply applied ethics.377 In 
the circumstances of politics, a free-standing account justice is constructed not 
discovered, and as a liberal response to the lack of consensus on ethics and other 
375 As O’Neill stresses, the rejection of indifference is selective. We cannot avoid being indifferent 
to some, or even most, people. Unlike injury, which should be rejected when it is systematic and 
gratuitous, indifference should only be rejected when it is systematic. Gratuitous indifference is 
unavoidable. 
376 ibid. 191. 
377  Williams (2005: 77) 
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matters. It is needed to mediate between people who disagree pervasively about 
what forms of life are counted as valuable. Such people need to find ways of 
living together, and hence a political system is warranted. Our constitution 
should be appropriate to circumstances. It should not be an ideal model to which 
reality should correspond. 378 Politics should be shaped to accommodate 
diversity. The reality of this vast disagreement, which we must recognise if we 
are going to forego idealisation, entails that our theory of justice must be free 
standing. 
Justice should not be about discovering what is objectively correct and bolting 
that onto the political arena. Instead, it should be constructed from the “gritty 
realities” of human life.379 The existence of deep and broad disagreements 
constrains which bits of normative thinking we can bring in to the political 
sphere. Politics is about dealing with real people, we should construct standards 
of justice from available beginnings. Thus, the right has its source in the liberal 
response to the circumstances of politics. It is possible to maintain the 
asymmetry of allowing political justification to invoke judgements regarding the 
right whilst forbidding it from appealing to conceptions of the good by arguing 
that this response invokes those principles that we could not accept in the 
circumstances of politics and thus gives us a set of constraints. However, these 
constraints  are  not  algorithmic.  A  rejection  of  injury  underdetermines  what 
political system should be put in place. 
This  is  my  argument  for  anti‐perfectionism  in  modern  liberal 
Disagreement  about  human  flourishing  is  vast  and  intractable  in 
imperial  west.  This  disagreement  should  not  be  idealised  away. 
societies. 
the post- 
It  places 
constraints on what can be introduced into the political sphere.   Like Quong, I 
believe  that  a  political  account  of  justice  is  needed  as  a  response  to  this 
disagreement. However, unlike them, I do not idealise away disagreement about 
378 Tully (1995: 135) 
379 O’Neill (1996: 61) 
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justice or rely on scepticism about the good.380 The reason that my account 
cannot be charged with asymmetry is that I subscribe to what Onora O’Neill calls 
the doubly modal account of reflective endorsement. Although disagreement 
about justice is pervasive, this doesn’t rule out the possibility of convergence. 
O’Neill’s test of endorsement is premised upon what individuals could agree to, 
even if they happen not to. However, Quong premises his on what individuals 
would agree to in some idealised hypothetical scenario. 
Furthermore, convergence on the good is not merely non‐existent, it is 
impossible. Our account of justice must be constructed as a response to 
disagreement; and this response will be a set of constraints arising from an 
agreement about what we could not accept. Like Barry, my argument for anti‐ 
perfectionism is a sceptical one. But, unlike Barry, it is not one of scepticism 
about the truth of perfectionist claims. I take no position on that. Instead, my 
argument is sceptical about there being any prospect of consensus on the good 
such that perfectionist arguments can emerge from the circumstances of politics. 
I  make  this  argument  by 
indeterminacy of language. 
drawing upon Wittgenstein’s argument for the 
380 O’Neill (1997) points out that Rawls slips between modal and motivational language, but that 
ultimately his account is, like Quong’s, motivational and based on idealization about individual’s 
beliefs. 
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